Bubbles for Fama

We evaluate Eugene F. Fama's claim that stock prices do not exhibit price bubbles. Based on US industry returns (1926?2014) and international sector returns (1985?2014), we present four findings (1) Fama is correct in that a sharp price increase of an industry portfolio does not, on average, predict unusually low returns going forward; (2) such sharp price increases predict a substantially heightened probability of a crash but not of a further price boom; (3) attributes of the price run-up, including volatility, turnover, issuance, and the price path of the run-up, help forecast an eventual crash; and (4) these attributes also help forecast future returns. Results hold similarly in US and international samples.     

Do Institutions Cause Growth?

We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that (a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, (b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and (c) subsequently improve their political institutions.     

Family Firms

We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on what fraction of the company to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder's decision is shaped by the legal environment. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo‐Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross‐country evidence.     

Private credit in 129 countries

We investigate cross-country determinants of private credit, using new data on legal creditor rights and private and public credit registries in 129 countries. Both creditor protection through the legal system and information-sharing institutions are associated with higher ratios of private credit to gross domestic product, but the former is relatively more important in the richer countries. An analysis of legal reforms shows that credit rises after improvements in creditor rights and in information sharing. Creditor rights are remarkably stable over time, contrary to the hypothesis that legal rules are converging. Finally, legal origins are an important determinant of both creditor rights and information-sharing institutions. The analysis suggests that public credit registries, which are primarily a feature of French civil law countries, benefit private credit markets in developing countries.     

Corporate Ownership Around the World

We use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management.     

The quality of government

We investigate empirically the determinants of the quality ofgovernments in a large cross-section of countries. We assessgovernment performance using measures of government intervention,public sector efficiency, public good provision, size of government,and political freedom. We find that countries that are poor,close to the equator, ethnolinguistically heterogeneous, useFrench or socialist laws, or have high proportions of Catholicsof Muslims exhibit inferior government performance. We alsofind that the larger governments tend to be the better performingones. The importance of (reasonably) exogenous historical factorsin explaining the variation in government performance acrosscountries sheds light on the economic, political, and culturaltheories of institutions.     

Growth in regions

We use a newly assembled sample of 1,528 regions from 83 countries to compare the speed of per capita income convergence within and across countries. Regional growth is shaped by similar factors as national growth, such as geography and human capital. Regional convergence rate is about 2 % per year, comparable to that between countries. Regional convergence is faster in richer countries, and countries with better capital markets. A calibration of a neoclassical growth model suggests that significant barriers to factor mobility within countries are needed to account for the evidence.     

Chasing noise

We present a simple model in which rational but uninformed traders occasionally chase noise as if it were information, thereby amplifying sentiment shocks and moving prices away from fundamental values. In the model, noise traders can have an impact on market equilibrium disproportionate to their size in the market. The model offers a partial explanation for the surprisingly low market price of financial risk in the spring of 2007.     

Channels of redistribution: Inequality and poverty in the Russian transition

Contrary to popular perception, Russia entered the transition with significant inequality. Using the large Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey dataset, we demonstrate that inequality has subsequently risen yet further and by end-1996 was roughly comparable to inequality in Mexico, Colombia or Malaysia. Driving this increase has been not only wealth transfers through privatization but also changes in government expenditure and a sharp growth in earnings dispersion. There has been a large, associated shift in the structure of income. The paper also looks at the incidence and depth of poverty over the period 1992-96. At the start of transition, roughly half the population of households fell below the poverty line. While this has subsequently declined, at end-1996 nearly 40 per cent of households were below the poverty line and a substantial stratum of households were locked in chronic poverty.     

Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation

We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder.