The Impact of Supervision on Bank Performance

We explore the impact of supervision on the riskiness, profitability, and growth of U.S. banks. Using data on supervisors' time use, we demonstrate that the top-ranked banks by size within a supervisory district receive more attention from supervisors, even after controlling for size, complexity, risk, and other characteristics. Using a matched sample approach, we find that these top-ranked banks that receive more supervisory attention hold less risky loan portfolios, are less volatile, and are less sensitive to industry downturns, but do not have lower growth or profitability. Our results underscore the distinct role of supervision in mitigating banking sector risk.     

EVOLUTION OF GENDER DIFFERENCES IN POST‐SECONDARY HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENTS: COLLEGE MAJORS

Although women in the United States now complete more college degrees than men, the distribution of college majors among college graduates remains unequal, with women about two‐thirds as likely as men to major in business or science. We develop and estimate a dynamic, overlapping generations model of human capital investments and labor supply. We allow for specific college major choices, instead of aggregating these choices to the education level. Results show that changes in skill prices, higher schooling costs, and gender‐specific changes in home value were each important to the long‐term trends.     

A Risk‐Dominant Allocation: Maximizing Coalition Stability

This paper presents a rule to allocate a coalition’s worth for superadditive games with positive externalities. The allocation rule awards each member their outside payoff, plus an equal share of the surplus. The resulting allocation maximizes coalition stability. Stable coalitions are Strong Nash equilibria since no subset of members has an incentive to leave. Similarly, no subset of non‐members has an incentive to join a stable coalition if the game is concave in this region. The allocation is risk‐dominant. All stable coalitions are robust to the maximum probability of 50% that players’ deviate from their individual best‐responses. The paper compares the allocation to the Shapley value and the Nash bargaining solution, and illustrates why these traditional rules result in small coalitions when applied to issues such as international environmental agreements.     

Globalization and Declining Unionization in the United States

For decades, the private‐sector unionization rate in the United States has been falling. At the same time, the integration of the United States into the world economy has been rising. Many anecdotes suggest the latter has played a role in that decline, with unions feeling pressured to reduce employment and/or compensation demands in the face of rising cross‐border activity of employers. To investigate this possibility econometrically, in this paper I assembled a panel of U.S. manufacturing industries that matches union‐coverage rates with measures of global engagement such as exports, imports, tariffs, transportation costs, and foreign direct investment. The main finding is a statistically and economically significant correlation between falling union coverage and greater numbers of inward FDI transactions. Possible interpretations of this finding are then discussed. Because U.S. affiliates of foreign multinationals have higher unionization rates than U.S.‐based firms do, this correlation does not reflect just a compositional shift toward these affiliates. Instead, it may reflect pressure of international capital mobility on U.S.‐based companies, consistent with research on how rising capital mobility raises labor‐demand elasticities and alters bargaining power.     

THE USEFULNESS OF IMPERFECT ELECTIONS: THE CASE OF VILLAGE ELECTIONS IN RURAL CHINA

Using a sample of rural Chinese villages, which have recently been the subject of democratic reforms, we look for relationships between marginal changes in the democratic process and marginal changes in economic outcomes. We find that even very poorly conducted elections can have large incentive effects. That is, even corruptible elections provide leaders with strong incentives to act in the interests of their constituents. Our findings also allow us to rank the importance of four possible election reforms, which have attracted the attention of international observers and academic researchers.     

Growth Opportunities and the Choice of Leverage, Debt Maturity, and Covenants

We investigate the effect of growth opportunities in a firm's investment opportunity set on its joint choice of leverage, debt maturity, and covenants. Using a database that contains detailed debt covenant information, we provide large‐sample evidence of the incidence of covenants in public debt and construct firm‐level indices of bondholder covenant protection. We find that covenant protection is increasing in growth opportunities, debt maturity, and leverage. We also document that the negative relation between leverage and growth opportunities is significantly attenuated by covenant protection, suggesting that covenants can mitigate the agency costs of debt for high growth firms.     

NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES,COMPETITION AND CONSUMER CHOICE*

Consumers sometimes make choices that impose greater external costs on those who do not make the same choice. This paper examines how the selectivity of negative externalities in such situations affects the competitive equilibrium and the desirability of an externality‐reducing public policy. Selective negative externalities create network externalities, but outcomes may differ greatly from typical network effects. Price effects may cause the imposing product's sales to decline with the size of the negative externality. Consequently, a positive competitive effect may overwhelm the externality's negative direct effects on welfare, such that a policy that enlarges the externality may improve welfare.