Governance of shale gas development: Insights from the Bloomington school of institutional analysis

The Review of Austrian Economics - The boom in shale gas production has been accompanied by concerns that polycentricity, whereby multiple levels of government share regulatory authority, has...     

On the conceptual foundations of financial reporting

Standard setters advocate a balance sheet approach to financial reporting, which views assets and liabilities as primary, and income as just the derivative change in net assets. This paper argues that income is conceptually and practically better described as ‘adjusted net cash flows,’ where the adjustments are the accounting accruals. One proof of that is seen in the existence of whole accounting systems like tax accounting and national income accounting, which emphasize the determination of income but have no balance sheets. The paper also argues that an income-based approach to financial reporting is by nature better suited to reflect the success of advancing cash to earn more cash, which defines what for-profit entities do. There are two main features of the income-based approach. One is attention on the cash flows as the natural foundation for financial reporting because they are precisely determined, and provide a clear link to firm valuation. The other is attention on the accounting accruals, which serve to adjust the raw cash flows to better show the current success of investing cash to ultimately earn more cash. Specifically, the paper argues for revenue recognition which is close to current practice, and for expense recognition which is aligned with the matching principle.     

Higher risk,lower returns: What hedge fund investors really earn

The returns of hedge fund investors depend not only on the returns of the funds they hold but also on the timing and magnitude of their capital flows in and out of these funds. We use dollar-weighted returns (a form of Internal Rate of Return (IRR)) to assess the properties of actual investor returns on hedge funds and compare them to buy-and-hold fund returns. Our main finding is that annualized dollar-weighted returns are on the magnitude of 3% to 7% lower than corresponding buy-and-hold fund returns. Using factor models of risk and the estimated dollar-weighted performance gap, we find that the real alpha of hedge fund investors is close to zero. In absolute terms, dollar-weighted returns are reliably lower than the return on the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 index, and are only marginally higher than the risk-free rate as of the end of 2008. The combined impression from these results is that the return experience of hedge fund investors is much worse than previously thought.     

Is the Risk of Bankruptcy a Systematic Risk?

Several studies suggest that a firm distress risk factor could be behind the size and the book-to-market effects. A natural proxy for firm distress is bankruptcy risk. If bankruptcy risk is systematic, one would expect a positive association between bankruptcy risk and subsequent realized returns. However, results demonstrate that bankruptcy risk is not rewarded by higher returns. Thus, a distress factor is unlikely to account for the size and book-to-market effects. Surprisingly, firms with high bankruptcy risk earn lower than average returns since 1980. A risk-based explanation cannot fully explain the anomalous evidence.     

The political economy of legal titling

The libertarian case for legal titling is that formalization of the economic (de facto) rights of those who own land and buildings improves prospects for capitalism and, ultimately, development. Although all rich countries have private property rights, we argue that the success of legal titling depends on a certain kind of state—what we call a property-protecting state—that is often missing in developing countries. We use insights from Austrian economics, public choice, and institutional economics to clarify the political basis for legal titling to improve land tenure security. Evidence from Afghanistan shows that legal titling has not worked because the country does not have a property-protecting state. We suggest focusing on improving political institutions before investing in legal titling. In the meantime, it makes more sense to register land ownership at the community level, without the state.

     

Apportioning of risks via stochastic dominance

Consider a simple two-state risk with equal probabilities for the two states. In particular, assume that the random wealth variable dominates via ith-order stochastic dominance for i=M,N. We show that the 50-50 lottery dominates the lottery via (N+M)th-order stochastic dominance. The basic idea is that a decision maker exhibiting (N+M)th-order stochastic dominance preference will allocate the state-contingent lotteries in such a way as not to group the two “bad” lotteries in the same state, where “bad” is defined via ith-order stochastic dominance. In this way, we can extend and generalize existing results about risk attitudes. This lottery preference includes behavior exhibiting higher-order risk effects, such as precautionary effects and tempering effects.     

Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders

Information aggregation, a key concern for uniform-price, common-value auctions with many bidders, has been characterized in models where bidders know exactly how many rivals they face. A model allowing for uncertainty over the number of bidders is essential for capturing a critical condition for information to aggregate: as the numbers of winning and losing bidders grow large, information aggregates if and only if uncertainty about the fraction of winning bidders vanishes. It may be possible for the seller to impart this information by precommitting to a specified fraction of winning bidders, via a proportional selling policy. Intuitively, this could make the proportion of winners known, and thus provide all the information that bidders need to make winner's curse corrections.     

Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions

We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which k₁ objects are sold in the first round and k₂ in the second round, with and without revelation of the first-round winning bids. We demonstrate that auctioning objects in sequence generates a lowballing effect that reduces the first-round price. Total revenue is greater in a single-round, uniform auction for k=k₁+k₂ objects than in a sequential uniform auction with no bid announcement. When the first-round winning bids are announced, we also identify a positive informational effect on the second-round price. Total expected revenue in a sequential uniform auction with winning-bids announcement may be greater or smaller than in a single-round uniform auction, depending on the model's parameters.     

The Long-Run Stock Returns Following Bond Ratings Changes

Using essentially all Moody's bond ratings changes between 1970 and 1997, we find no reliable abnormal returns following upgrades. However, we find negative abnormal returns on the magnitude of 10 to 14 percent in the first year following downgrades. Additional results reveal that this underperformance is especially pronounced for small, low-credit-quality firms. Also, downgrades underperform in nearly all years in the sample, and a large part of the abnormal returns occur at subsequent earnings announcements. Thus, the evidence suggests that the poor returns result from an underreaction to the announcement of downgrades, rather than from lower systematic risk.