Optimales Vertragsdesign bei moralischem Risiko in der Rückversicherung

This paper addresses the optimal design of risk sharing arrangements in reinsurance contracts with asymmetric information concerning the primary insurer’s behavior. The latter usually has significant unobservable discretions, for instance with respect to risk selection, implying a moral hazard problem. We show that the existence of moral hazard strongly affects the characteristics of the reinsurance indemnification rule, i. e. the connection between the level of losses and the indemnity, which is specified in the contract. For this analysis, a standard model framework from the theory of optimal reinsurance with perfect information is modified by the assumption that the primary insurer has unobservable control of the probability distribution of the extent of losses. In particular, the solution indicates that for this situation, a Pareto-optimal indemnity rule is less steep, and therefore the primary insurer’s share in a marginal increase of the loss is greater, compared to the case of complete information. A deductible, however, turns out not to be a suitable approach in this context.     

An Experimental Bribery Game

Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) reciprocityrelationships between bribers and public officials, (2) negativewelfare effects, and (3) high penalties when discovered. Weseparate the influences of these factors in an experiment. Ina two-player game, reciprocation is economically inefficientthrough negative externalities. A control treatment withoutexternalities is also conducted. In a third, so-called suddendeath treatment, corrupt pairs face a low probability of exclusionfrom the experiment without payment. The results show that reciprocitycan establish bribery relationships, where negative externalitieshave no apparent effect. The penalty threat significantly reducescorruption, although discovery probabilities are typically underestimated.     

How Leviathan Taxes

The Leviathan hypothesis remains a cornerstone of constitutional tax theory. Following Brennan and Buchanan's (1980) seminal contribution, the power to tax is often likened to a monopoly, and its use by a revenue-maximising government is said to obey the rules of optimal taxation theory. We revisit, and refine, this position, explaining its underpinnings and discussing the Leviathan solution in several well-known optimal taxation models. It turns out that the power to tax is not a perfect analogue of ordinary monopoly power and that the similarity between Leviathan and optimal taxation solutions hinges on the irrelevance of distributional weights.     

Extending working hours: why not work 42 h rather than 38?—a CGE analysis for Germany

Faced with a record level of unemployment, the present debate in Germany is to extend the weekly hours of work. In this paper the employment effects of an economy-wide increase in weekly hours are quantified on the basis of a computable general equilibrium model for different specifications of the wage setting rule and the use of additional policy-induced public income. The simulation results back the argument of the opponents of longer working time that not more jobs will be created. However, when the higher tax revenues from GDP growth are used to reduce social security contributions, then the claim of the proponents that more jobs will be created can be supported.     

Gestaltung der Abschlussprüferhaftung – Implikationen theoretischer Modelle

Business scandals such as Enron, WorldCom or Parmalat have sparked intense discussions on the quality of corporate governance as well as the trustworthiness of statutory auditors. It is therefore no surprise that regulators have issued a large number of new regulations concerning auditing. The civil liability of external auditors has not changed in Germany, but such changes have already been announced by the German government. An increase in the existing liability cap in cases of negligent misconduct and extended third-party liability are planned. As a consequence, the results of analytical research on this topic are highly relevant. This paper summarises and comments on prior analytical research, in particular its assumptions and results, and focuses on important elements for the design of a liability regime. To this end, the paper addresses the questions of joint–and-several vs. proportionate liability rules, negligent vs. strict liability regimes, the extent of third party liability, and limited vs. unlimited liability.     

Are hyperinflation paths learnable?

Earlier studies of the seigniorage inflation model have found that the high-inflation steady state is not stable under learning. We reconsider this issue and analyze the full set of solutions for the linearized model. Our main focus is on stationary hyperinflationary paths near the high-inflation steady state. These paths are shown to be stable under least-squares learning if agents can utilize contemporaneous data. In an economy with a mixture of agents, some of whom only have access to lagged data, stable hyperinflationary paths emerge only if the proportion of agents with access to contemporaneous data is sufficiently high.     

Infrastructure provision and international market share rivalry

The paper examines a model of strategic infrastructure investment. Two oligopolistic firms compete on home and foreign product markets for market shares. The national governments support the firms in the market rivalry by providing cost reducing public infrastructure services that are financed out of taxing an input used in the production process. It is shown, that infrastructure policy can be used as an instrument for strategic trade policy. However, governments are facing the problem of balancing the burden of taxation and the benefits of infrastructures. The theoretical model also raises some critical issues with respect to the policy relevance of recent empirical infrastructure research.     

Stable matchings and preferences of couples

Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of stable matchings. We illustrate how small deviations from (weak) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion that excludes myopic blocking. Our remaining results deal with various properties of the set of stable matchings for “responsive couples markets”, viz., optimality, filled positions, and manipulation.