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We present a simple model where mergers benefit consumers, harm outsiders and, depending on the shape of demand, can be profitable for insiders (and where mergers do not involve cost synergies). 相似文献
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This article presents a brief survey of two‐sided matching. We introduce the reader to the problem of two‐sided matching in the context of the college admission model and explain two central requirements for a matching mechanism: stability and non‐manipulability. We show how the frequently used ‘Boston Mechanism’ fails these key requirements and describe how an alternative, the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm, leads to stable matchings but fails to be non‐manipulable in general. A third mechanism, the Top Trading Cycle, is efficient and non‐manipulable when only one side of the match acts strategically. We also discuss some applications of matching theory. 相似文献
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Zusammenfassung Determinanten des intraindustriellen Handels: Eine internationale und interindustrielle Querschnittsanalyse. — In der vorliegenden
Untersuchung werden in einem kombinierten Ansatz die Hypothesen empirisch überprüft, da\ (i) die Intensit?t des intraindustriellen
Handels zwischen L?ndern systematisch mit bestimmten Charakteristika der Handelspartner und (ii) die Intensit?t des intraindustriellen
Handels in einzelnen Branchen systematisch mit bestimmten Industriecharakteristika zusammenh?ngt. Als Stichprobe werden bilaterale
Handelsstr?me der Jahre 1972 und 1973 zwischen den OECD-L?ndern auf der Basis dreistelliger Positionen der SITC-Gruppen 5–8
herangezogen. Die Untersuchungsergebnisse lassen darauf schlie\en, da\ es in der Regel zu einer Zunahme von intraindustriellen
Handelsstr?men kommt, wenn Handelspartner im wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsniveau oder in der (heimischen) Marktgr?\e aufholen,
die heimischen M?rkte von Handelspartnern simultan wachsen und natürliche oder künstliche Handelshemmnisse abgebaut werden.
Im Branchenquerschnitt sind intraindustrielle Handelsstr?me insbesondere in jenen Industrien ausgepr?gt, in denen Transaktionskosten
eine vergleichsweise geringe Rolle spielen; gewisse Anhaltspunkte deuten überdies darauf hin, da\ die Intensit?t des intraindustriellen
Handels mit abnehmendem Standardisierungsgrad des Sortiments zunimmt.
Résumé Déterminants du commerce intra-industriel: Une analyse transversale internationale et interindustrielle. — Dans cette analyse nous testons empiriquement à l’aide d’une approche combinée les hypothèses que (i) l’intensité du commerce intra-industriel entre des pays dépend systématiquement des certains caractéristiques des partenaires commerciaux et que (ii) l’intensité du commerce intra-industriel dans les branches dépend systématiquement des certains caractéristiques de líndustrie. Comme échantillon nous utilisons le commerce extérieur bilatéral des années 1972 et {dy1973} entre les pays de l’OCDE au niveau des groupes 3-digit de la CTCI 5–8. Les résultats démontrent qu’il y a une augmentation du commerce intra-industriel en général, si les partenaires gagnent du terrain en niveau de développement économique ou en dimension du marché local, si les marchés locaux des partenaires croissent simultanément et si les obstacles commerciaux naturels ou artificiels sont diminués. En section transversale des branches, le commerce intra-industriel est particulièrement prononcé dans les branches oú les frais de transaction jouent un r?le comparativement faible; de plus, certains signes indiquent que l’intensité de commerce intra-industriel augmente si le degré de standardisation diminue.
Resumen Determinantes del comercio intra-industrial: entre países e industrias. — Este trabajo examina conjuntamente, determinantes especificos de naciones y bienes, que pueden influir sobre la intensidad del comercio intra-industrial, basándose en flujos bilaterales desagregados de comercio entre países pertenecientes a la OCDE. Los resultados son consistentes con las hipótesis de que una equiparación en el nivel de desarrollo o en tama?o del mercado, o crecimiento simultáneo en los mercados nacionales de los países que comercian entre si, o una disminuciń de barreras naturales o artificiales contra el comercio, tienden a ser acompanadas de un incremento en el comercio intra-industrial entre países. A lo largo de las diferentes industrias, este comercio parece ser especialmente intenso cuando los costes de transacción son bajos. Finalmente existe evidencia positiva aunque no definitiva, de que el comercio intra-industrial disminuye con el aumento en la uniformidad de los productos.相似文献
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The price mechanism is fundamental to economics but difficult to reconcile with incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We introduce a double clock auction for a homogeneous good market with multidimensional private information and multiunit traders that is deficit-free, ex post individually rational, constrained efficient, and makes sincere bidding a dominant strategy equilibrium. Under a weak dependence and an identifiability condition, our double clock auction is also asymptotically efficient. Asymptotic efficiency is achieved by estimating demand and supply using information from the bids of traders that have dropped out and following a tâtonnement process that adjusts the clock prices based on the estimates. 相似文献
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Oliver Loertscher;Pau S. Pujolas; 《The Canadian journal of economics》2024,57(2):478-501
We study the behaviour of Canadian Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth over the past 60 years. We find that the observed stagnation during the last 20 years is accounted for entirely by the oil sector. Higher oil prices made capital-intensive sources of oil like the oil sands viable to extract on a commercial scale. However, the greater input required per barrel of oil slowed TFP growth. Comparing Canadian TFP growth with that of the United States and Norway reinforces these results. However, our result should not be interpreted to carry any welfare implications. 相似文献
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We present a model of (re)elections in which an incumbency advantage arises because the incumbent can manipulate issue salience by choosing inefficient policies in the policy dimension in which he is the stronger candidate. The voters are uncertain about the state of the world and the incumbent's choice of policy. Under complete information they would reelect the incumbent if and only if the state is sufficiently high. Undesirable policy outcomes may be due to either a bad state or the incumbent's choice of inefficient policies. The incumbent uses inefficient policies in intermediate states, whereby he creates uncertainty about the true state in such a way that voters are better off in expectation reelecting him. Hence the equilibrium exhibits an incumbency advantage that stems from asymmetric information and the use of inefficient policies. 相似文献
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We analyze the competitive effects of backward vertical integration when firms exert market power upstream and compete in quantities downstream. Contrasting with previous literature, a small degree of vertical integration is always procompetitive because efficiency gains dominate foreclosure effects, and vertical integration even to full foreclosure can be procompetitive. Interestingly, vertical integration is more likely to be procompetitive if the industry is otherwise more concentrated. Extensions analyze welfare effects of integration and the incentives to integrate. Our analysis suggests that antitrust authorities should be wary of vertical integration when the integrating firm faces many competitors and should be permissive otherwise. 相似文献
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For a partnership model with general type distributions and interdependent values, we derive the optimal dissolution mechanisms that, for arbitrary initial ownership, maximize any convex combination of revenue and social surplus. The solution involves ironing around typically interior worst‐off types, which are endogenously determined. The optimal ownership structures are such that, with identical distributions, equal shares are always optimal. With nonidentical distributions, the optimal shares are typically asymmetric, the identity of the agents with large shares may change with the importance of revenue generation, and even fully concentrated initial ownership and assigning zero shares to the strongest agents can be optimal. 相似文献
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I analyze a model of competition between two market makers who are located at the opposite ends of the Hotelling line, both of which are also occupied by a search market. Buyers and sellers are uniformly distributed between the two market places, yet can only trade at one of them. In equilibrium, market makers net a positive profit and trade with buyers and sellers close to them, while buyers and sellers further away participate in search markets. Interestingly, a duopolistic market maker nets a larger profit than a monopoly because search markets make the quantities market makers trade strategic complements. 相似文献