Assessing the productivity consequences of agri-environmental practices when adoption is endogenous

Journal of Productivity Analysis - We address the general problem of selection bias, an issue endemic to policy analysis when adoption is voluntary, with an empirical application to environmental...     

Endogenous communication among lenders and entrepreneurial incentives

If banks have an informational monopoly about their clients,borrowers may curtail their effort level for fear of being exploitedvia high interest rates in the future. Banks can correct thisincentive problem by committing to share private informationwith other lenders. The fiercer competition triggered by informationsharing lowers future interest rates and future profits of banks.But, provided banks retain an initial informational advantage,their current profits are raised by the borrowers' higher effort.This trade-off determines the banks' willingness to share information.Their decision affects credit market competition, interest rates,volume of lending, and social welfare.     

Comparative precautionary saving under higher-order risk and recursive utility

Measuring and comparing the precautionary saving motive rest almost exclusively on the expected utility framework, and only focus on income risk or coefficients of the Arrow–Pratt type. We generalize the standard approach by characterizing comparative precautionary saving under recursive utility for increases in income risk and increases in risk on the saving return, including higher-order risk effects. We express the comparisons in terms of precautionary premia. In addition, we define a new class of preference coefficients, and derive the associated conditions to predict a stronger precautionary motive. The coefficients provide a detailed picture of the preferences sustaining precautionary saving and could be useful in applications.     

The assessment: trade and location

This paper gives an overview of different analyses of the effectsof globalization on industrial location. It suggests that comparativeadvantage is inadequate to explain several aspects of the changingpatterns of trade and location, and that it needs to supplementedby approaches based on new economic geography and theories ofcumulative causation.     

Synamic banking: a reconsideration

Financially intermediated and stock market consumption-investmentallocations, with and without governmental interventions, arecompared in a welfare sense in overlapping generation economieswith (and without) shocks to agents' intertemporal preferences.We first show that, in economies with preference shocks, governmentalinterventions subject to the same information requirements asthose imposed on financial intermediaries, lead to stock marketallocations that are not inferior to those attained under financialintermediation. Second, we argue that the necessary interventionsare qualitatively no different from those required to implementstationary optimal allocations in OLG models without shocksto agents' intertemporal consumption preferences.     

Cross-holdings: estimation issues, biases, and distortions

Cross-bolding occurs when listed corporations own securitiesissued by other corporations. We analyze the effect of cross-holdingson market capitalization and return measures as well as implicationsfor econometric testing of asset pricing theories. We show thatcross-holdings generally distort standard market return andrisk measures. The magnitudes of such distortions are calculatedfor simulated economies by using a variety of crossholding patterns.In addition, cross-holdings are shown to induce non-stationarityin the covariance matrix of security returns. We examine theeffect of this nonstationarity for estimating efficient frontiersand factor structures. We also discuss the implications forrisk-return estimates in equilibrium asset pricing models.     

Asymmetric Cost Pass-Through in Multi-Unit Procurement Auctions: An Experimental Approach*

We explore input cost pass-through in multi-unit procurement auctions. Whether cost shocks are private versus common across firms has important implications for discriminatory, but not uniform price auctions. We provide evidence of asymmetric pass-through of private cost shocks in discriminatory auctions. Unlike uniform price auctions, revenue-maximizing bidders in discriminatory auctions ‘pad’ bids close to the expected clearing price for units with costs below that price, but they do not bid below cost on higher cost units. Therefore, if costs are higher than expected, the clearing price rises and if costs are lower than expected, the clearing price remains high.     

Weintraub's consumption coefficient: some economic implications and evidence for the UK

Weintraub's consumption coefficient, the ratio of total consumerexpenditure to income from employment, helps to elucidate trendsin the sectoral and functional distributions of income. It simplifiesand adds precision to Kaleckian macroeconomics by showing howdistributions of income affect the level of economic activity.Empirical estimates of the coefficient are presented for theUK from 1972 to 1995. From 1975 onwards, the coefficient hasindicated a marked redistribution of income in favour of capitalist(non-employment) income, accompanied by a significant rise inthe average propensity to consume from capitalist (non-employmentincome). Wealth effects induced by the housing boom of the 1980shave enabled capitalists' income and consumption to continueto increase after 1989 despite a fall in investment.