Credit claiming

We consider a leader and a subordinate he appoints who work in a team. The public observes the organization’s performance, but not the separate contribution of the leader or of the subordinate. The leader may therefore claim credit for the good work of his subordinate. We find conditions which induce the leader to claim credit (both truthfully and untruthfully), and the conditions which lead the leader to appoint a subordinate of low ability.JEL Classification: M5Björn Segendorff gratefully acknowledge financial support from The Swedish Council for Research in Humanities and Social Sciences (HSFR, F0357/97). We are also grateful for comments by an anonymous referee.     

A note on the independence of irrelevant alternatives in probabilistic choice models

The purpose of this note is to show that there is no necessary relationship between the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property and stochastic independence of the errors in probabilistic choice models.     

Aid Effectiveness,Debt Relief and Public Finance Response: Evidence from a Panel of HIPC Countries

Substantial amounts of debt relief have been granted to a set of low-income countries, as an alternative aid modality. Although the theoretical case for debt relief is firmly established, only empirical analysis can show whether debt relief is indeed a (more) effective mode of aid delivery. We investigate the linkages between debt relief and other fiscal variables such as current expenditure, government investment, taxation and domestic borrowing, in comparison to the effects of grants and concessional loans. We find that the fiscal impact of HIPC debt relief follows fairly complex dynamics. For example, debt relief initially reduces government investment, but the effect becomes positive after two years, well outperforming other modes of aid delivery. JEL no. F34, F35, O11, O19     

Sharing Common Resources in Patriarchal and Status-Based Societies: Evidence from Tanzania

ABSTRACT

In rural African societies, socioeconomic differentiation linked to gender and social status exerts an important influence on the distribution of common-pool resources. Through a behavioral experiment conducted in 2008 in rural Tanzania, this contribution examines the influence of gender and social status on distribution behavior of users of self-governed common watersheds. It finds that men and women with low social status distribute water equally when water is abundant but keep larger shares when water is scarce, although low-status women try to be as fair as possible at the expense of their returns from irrigated agriculture. Men of high social status keep more than half of the available water for themselves, both in abundance and scarcity, and deprive others from sizeable returns from irrigated agriculture. Women of high social status share altruistically when water is abundant and equally when water is scarce, giving up on returns from irrigated agriculture.