ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF EXTERNAL FINANCE: A SURVEY

For many developing countries, alternative forms of externalfinance—all forms of finance that are not guaranteed byor mediated through the public sector—have become increasinglyimportant as traditional financing to the public sector hasebbed. Yet a survey of the literature reveals few recent analyticalinsights about alternative financing, which includes foreigndirect investment, project lending, portfolio investment, closed-endequity funds, private nonguaranteed debt, licensing, joint ventures,quasi-equity contracts, and other forms of private, nonrecourselending to private borrowers. The literature offers little solidguidance for distinguishing between alternative and traditionalfinancing with respect to country risk, for establishing themost appropriate and efficient incentive structures and restrictionsin the host country, or for identifying the optimal financingmodes for international firms investing in developing countries.This gap in the analytical literature has important implicationsfor policy formulation. It is not always clear whether a countryis developing incentives and establishing safeguards (for ensuringadherence to project performance requirements) that are mosteffective in attracting alternative forms of finance.      

Portfolio Capital Flows: Hot or Cold?

A distinction is often made between short-term and long-termcapital flows: the former are deemed unstable hot money andthe latter are deemed stable cold money. Using time-series analysisof balance of payments data for five industrial and five developingcountries, we find that in most cases the labels "short-term"and "long-term" do not provide any information about the time-seriesproperties of the flow. In particular, long-term flows are oftenas volatile as short-term flows, and the time it takes for anunexpected shock to a flow to die out is similar across flows.long-term flows are also at least as unpredictable as short-termflows, and knowledge of the type of flow does not improve theability to forecast the aggregate capital account.     

Competition in the Financial Sector: Overview of Competition Policies

Competition in the financial sector, as in other sectors, mattersfor allocative, productive, and dynamic efficiency. Theory suggests,however, that unfettered competition is not necessarily bestgiven the special features of financial services. The authordiscusses these analytical complications before reviewing howto assess competition in the financial sector and its determinants.It is shown that competitiveness varies greatly across countries,in perhaps surprising ways, and that it is not driven by financialsystem concentration. Rather, systems with greater foreign entryand fewer entry and activity restrictions tend to be more competitive,confirming that contestability—the lack of barriers toentry and exit—determines effective competition. The authorthen analyzes how competition policy in the financial sectorhas generally been conducted and how changes in competitionin the financial services industries should affect competitionpolicy going forward. In part based on comparison with otherindustries, the author provides some suggestions on how competitionpolicy in the financial sector could be better approached aswell as what institutional arrangements best fit a modern viewof competition policy in the sector. The specific competitionchallenges for developing countries is also highlighted. Theauthor concludes that practices today fall far short of theneed for better competition policy in the financial sector. JEL codes: G10, G18, G28, L1, L5     

Crisis Management and Resolution:Lessons from the Financial Crisis

The recent crisis was unusual in its speed and breadth and the type of countries affected.Systemic crises, situations of significant stress in the financial sector, followed by significant policy interventions, often affect several countries at the same time.In the past, though, crises have been largely limited to specific regions or types of economies, the Nordic countries in the early 1990s, Latin America in the mid-1990s, Asia in the late 1990s, and the emerging market economies of the early 2000s.The recent crisis has been unusual in its global nature, affecting countries with a speed and virulence not seen since the Great Depression, with major advance countries and countries recently integrating with the European Union (EU) most affected.     

The global financial crisis: How similar? How different? How costly?

This paper provides a brief analysis of three major questions raised in the context of the recent global financial crisis. First, how similar is the crisis to previous episodes? We argue that the crisis featured some close similarities to earlier ones, including the presence of credit and asset price booms fueled by rapid debt accumulation. Second, how different is it from earlier episodes? We show that, as much as it displayed some similarities with previous cases, it also featured some significant differences, such as the explosion of opaque and complex financial instruments in a context of highly integrated global financial markets. Third, how costly are recessions that followed these types of crises? Although the latest episode took a very heavy toll on the real economy, we argue that this was not a surprising outcome. In particular, historical comparisons indicate that recessions associated with periods of deep financial disruptions result in much larger declines in real economic activity. We discuss the implications of these findings for economic and financial sector policies and future research.     

Corporate Governance and Development

The literature shows that good corporate governance generallypays—for firms, for markets, and for countries. It isassociated with a lower cost of capital, higher returns on equity,greater efficiency, and more favorable treatment of all stakeholders,although the direction of causality is not always clear. Thelaw and finance literature has documented the important roleof institutions aimed at contractual and legal enforcement,including corporate governance, across countries. Using firm-leveldata, researchers have documented relationships between countries’corporate governance frameworks on the one hand and performance,valuation, the cost of capital, and access to external financingon the other. Given the benefits of good corporate governance,firms and countries should voluntarily reform more. Resistanceby entrenched owners and managers at the firm level and politicaleconomy factors at the level of markets and countries partlyexplain why they do not.      

Contagion: Understanding How It Spreads

Much of the current debate on reforming the international financialarchitecture is aimed at reducing the risks of contagion—bestdefined as a significant increase in cross-market linkages aftera shock to an individual country (or group of countries). Thisdefinition highlights the importance of other links throughwhich shocks are normally transmitted, including trade and finance.During times of crisis, the ways in which shocks are transmitteddo seem to differ, and these differences appear to be important.Empirical work has helped to identify the types of links andother macroeconomic conditions that can make a country vulnerableto contagion during crisis periods, although less is known aboutthe importance of microeconomic considerations and institutionalfactors in propagating shocks. Empirical research has helpedto identify those countries that are at risk of contagion aswell as some, albeit quite general, policy interventions thatcan reduce risks.