Always Leave Home Without It: A Further Investigation of the Credit-Card Effect on Willingness to Pay

In studies involving genuine transactions of potentially high value we show that willingness-to-pay can be increased when customers are instructed to use a credit card rather than cash. The effect may be large (up to 100%) and it appears unlikely that it arises due solely to liquidity constraints. In addition to demonstrating the effect, we provide a methodology for detecting it, and our findings suggest a source of variance to test alternative explanations.     

Neuroeconomics: Why Economics Needs Brains

Neuroeconomics uses knowledge about brain mechanisms to inform economic theory. It opens up the “black box” of the brain, much as organizational economics opened up the theory of the firm. Neuroscientists use many tools—including brain imaging, behavior of patients with brain damage, animal behavior and recording single neuron activity. The key insight for economics is that the brain is composed of multiple systems which interact. Controlled systems (“executive function”) interrupt automatic ones. Brain evidence complicates standard assumptions about basic preference, to include homeostasis and other kinds of state‐dependence, and shows emotional activation in ambiguous choice and strategic interaction.     

A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY

This article proposes a structural approach to measuring the effects of electoral accountability. We estimate a political agency model with imperfect information in order to identify and quantify discipline and selection effects, using data on U.S. governors. We find that the possibility of reelection provides a significant incentive for incumbents to exert effort, that is, a disciplining effect. We also find a positive but weaker selection effect. According to our model, the widely used two‐term regime improves voter welfare by 4.2% compared to a one‐term regime, and better voter information about the effort of the governors would further increase voter welfare by up to 0.5%.     

Tight money and inflation: Further Results

The Sargent-Wallace results on inflationary effects of monetary restraint are considered in a Sidrauski money growth model when the utility function is unrestricted except for separability. Temporary monetary tightening will eventually lead to higher inflation when the deficit is fixed only if the elasticity of money demand with respect to the money growth rate is less than unity. It is also shown that for inflation to rise immediately further requires the elasticity with respect to the nominal interest rate to be no less than unity.     

Do Crises Induce Reform? Simple Empirical Tests of Conventional Wisdom

We find evidence for the crisis-induces-reform hypothesis at extreme values of the inflation rate and the black market premium. Episodes of extremely high inflation or black market premiums are followed by periods of better performance than episodes of moderately high inflation or black market premiums. We fail to find similar evidence of the crisis hypothesis when crisis is measured as a high current account deficit, a high budget deficit, or a negative per capita growth rate. The pattern of foreign aid disbursements may help explain the results. Foreign aid is reduced at extreme values of inflation or the black market premium, while it is actually increased for more extreme values of the current account deficit and the budget deficit.     

A simple test of the effect of interest rate defense

High interest rates to defend the exchange rate signal that a government is committed to fixed exchange rates, but may also signal weak fundamentals. We test the effectiveness of the interest rate defense by disaggregating into the effects on future interest rates differentials, expectations of future exchange rates, and risk premia. While much previous empirical work has been inconclusive due to offsetting effects, tests that “disaggregate” the effects provide significant information. Raising overnight interest rates strengthens the exchange rate over the short-term, but also leads to an expected depreciation at a horizon of a year and longer and an increase in the risk premium, consistent with the argument that it also signals weak fundamentals. J. Japanese Int. Economies 20 (4) (2006) 612–636.     

Psychology, Behavioral Economics, and Public Policy

Economics has typically been the social science of choice to inform public policy and policymakers. In the current paper we contemplate the role behavioral science can play in enlightening policymakers. In particular, we provide some examples of research that has and can be used to inform policy, reflect on the kind of behavioral science that is important for policy, and approaches for convincing policy-makers to listen to behavioral scientists. We suggest that policymakers are unlikely to invest the time translating behavioral research into its policy implications, and researchers interested in influencing public policy must therefore invest substantial effort, and direct that effort differently than in standard research practices.     

The optimal rate of inflation revisited

Inflation viewed as a tax on cash balances is investigated using the optimal commodity tax framework. The optimal inflation rate is shown to depend on the effect of changes in the rate of inflation on quantity demanded of ‘costly-to-produce’ goods. Even when other goods are taxed, it is not always optimal to have a positive tax on money, as Phelps and others have claimed. A zero tax or even a rate of deflation greater than the pre-tax rate of interest may be optimal.     

Unemployment in LDCs: Worker heterogeneity, screening, and quantity constraints

Unemployment in many less developed countries is characterized by a significant urban-rural wage differential coexisting with high urban unemployment. This may be consistent with optimization when there is imperfect information about a worker's ability, and abilities are heterogeneous. Firms know only the average quality of workers in the labour pool. High urban wages induce immigration of workers from rural areas, improving the average quality of the urban labour pool which has been depleted of high ability workers by previous screening. Hence, both sides of the market way find high non-market-clearing wages optimal. Quantity constraints from imperfect capital markets may strengthen this effect.