Formalisation of land rights: Some empirical evidence from Mali, Niger and South Africa

In this paper, we re-interpret three cases of research previously carried out in Mali, Niger and South Africa in light of the recent debate about formalisation of land rights that has emerged since the publication of Hernando de Soto's ‘Mystery of Capital’. The Malian case shows that lack of broad access to formalisation processes in high-pressure areas may play into the hands of those with power, information, and resources. The case also demonstrates that timing of formalisation efforts in urban areas characterised by rapid expansion is crucial in terms of distributive outcomes. The Nigerien case demonstrates how impending formalisation led to a scramble for land and increased conflicts in a context of institutional competition and limited administrative capacity. The South African case shows that the very process of surveying and registering rights may also change the rights themselves. Formalisation procedures may also amplify the tension between individual and communal rights, and boost privatisation.     

Endogenous market incompleteness without market frictions: Dynamic suboptimality of competitive equilibrium in multiperiod overlapping generations economies

In this paper, we show that within the set of stochastic three-period-lived OLG economies with productive assets (such as land), markets are necessarily sequentially incomplete, and agents in the model do not share risk optimally. We start by characterizing perfect risk-sharing and find that it requires state-dependent consumption claims which depend only on the exogenous shock realizations. We show then that the recursive competitive equilibrium of any overlapping generations economy with weakly more than three generations is not strongly stationary. This then allows us to show directly that there are short-run Pareto improvements possible in terms of risk-sharing and hence, that the recursive competitive equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. We then show that a financial reform which eliminates the equity asset and replaces it with zero net supply insurance contracts (Arrow securities) will implement to Pareto optimal stochastic steady-state known to exist in the model. Finally, we also show via numerical simulations that a system of government taxes and transfers can lead to a Pareto improvement over the competitive equilibrium in the model.     

Company interests and foreign aid policy: Playing donors off against one another

The evidence on conditionality indicates that this instrument sometimes works, and sometimes does not work. We suggest that third parties to the donor-recipient relationship influence the aid disbursement. The halt in aid that should follow non-compliance could trigger the recipient to cancel contracts with companies from donor countries, which creates incentives for the companies to put pressure towards aid disbursement. We use a multi-agent triadic model of the relationships between a recipient and two donors and two companies to illustrate that recipients may act strategically to make third parties (like companies and others) influence the disbursement decision. Failing to take account of third parties’ role yields the opposite result; conditionality becomes successful.     

Ownership and Cost‐Sharing Contracts

We discuss the relative merits of public and private ownership in an incomplete contract framework developed by Hart, Shleifer and Vishney (HSV). We add two new elements to their model. First, the government may offer cost‐sharing contracts when procuring the good. Second, the owner of a private firm may divert resources that increase their own profit/utility but increase total costs. The cost sharing contract allows the government to reduce the private firm's incentives to dump quality in order to save on costs. However, this also leads to resource diversion, which increases total costs. We derive the preferred mode of ownership when the government optimally chooses the power of the cost sharing scheme. We find that the presence of quality‐reducing cost reductions only favours government ownership if the scope for resource diversion is substantial. A discussion of when resource diversion is likely to be important is also provided.     

Resource interaction in inter-organizational networks: Introduction to the special issue

This article introduces the special issue of Journal of Business Research on the topic of resource interaction in inter-organizational networks. Both networks and resources receive considerable attention in the field of business studies. As companies specialize further and rely on cooperative agreements with external parties, the importance of networks is gaining increasing recognition. Resources are typically a key factor for identifying a company's competencies, or its sources of growth, profitability, and sustained competitive advantage. This special issue takes a novel approach by directing attention toward the processes of interaction in which companies combine and recombine resources at the network level. This approach provides new insights into the development, production, exchange, and use of resources. The introductory article also reviews the 13 articles in this special issue and concludes by discussing their contributions to the fields of marketing, innovation, entrepreneurship, and logistics.     

Asian options with zero cost-of-carry: EEX options on freight and iron ore futures

Decisions in Economics and Finance - The Turnbull–Wakeman (J Financ Quant Anal 26:377, 2003) formula is a well-known formula for continuous arithmetic average rate options. However, the...     

Globally correlated nominal fluctuations

Fluctuations in nominal variables—aggregate price levels and nominal interest rates—are documented to be substantially more synchronized across countries at business cycle frequencies than fluctuations in real output. A transparent mechanism accounting for this striking feature of the nominal environment is described and quantitatively evaluated. It is based on the interaction between (small) cross-country spillovers of shocks, Taylor rules, and domestic no-arbitrage conditions. The mechanism is robust to various parameterizations and extensions aligning the model with other important aspects of domestic and international fluctuations. Furthermore, its key features are consistent with cross-country forecasts from Consensus survey.