Economic Reform and Macroeconomic Policy in New Zealand

In 1984 the Labour government in New Zealand began a wide-ranging process of reform with the objective of achieving a sustainable improvement in economic performance. The breadth and rapidity with which deregulation, tax reform, and privatisation were implemented has attracted widespread interest. The expected improvement in macroeconomic performance, however, has not yet been realised.
This article describes some background to the policy shift, and focuses on macroeconomic aspects of the reforms. It argues that while many improvements in microeconomic resource allocation have been made, the interaction between monetary, fiscal and wages policies has contributed substantially to the present high cost of structural change in New Zealand.     

The Antecedents of Middle Managers' Strategic Contribution: The Case of a Professional Bureaucracy

abstract    Our study contributes towards a burgeoning literature that argues organizational performance is heavily influenced by what happens in the middle of the organization, rather than at the top. Examining the UK National Health Service, our study develops the work of Floyd and Wooldridge (1992 , 1994 , 1997 , 2000 ). It utilizes role theory to conceptualize changing experiences of middle managers in organizations as a role transition. Associated with this are problems of role conflict and role ambiguity ( Biddle, 1979 , 1986 ; Biddle and Thomas, 1966 ; Kahn et al., 1964 , 1966 ). Our study illustrates that there are limiting factors to a more strategic role for middle managers associated with the professional bureaucracy context. However, role conflict and ambiguity can be mediated by a socialization process, which values incoming identity and personal characteristics ( Van Maanen and Schein, 1979 ).     

Incentive Regulation of Prices When Costs are Sunk

We present a model featuring irreversible investment, economies of scale, uncertain future demand and capital prices, and a regulator who sets the firm’s output price according to the cost structure of a hypothetical replacement firm. We show that a replacement firm has a fundamental cost advantage over the regulated firm: it can better exploit the economies of scale because it has not had to confront the historical uncertainties faced by the regulated firm. We show that setting prices so low that a replacement firm is just willing to participate is insufficient to allow the regulated firm to expect to break even whenever it has to invest. Thus, unless the regulator is willing to incur costly monitoring to ensure the firm invests, revenue must be allowed in excess of that required for a replacement firm to participate. This contrasts with much of the existing literature, which argues that the market value of a regulated firm should equal the cost of replacing its existing assets. We also obtain a closed-form solution for the regulated firm’s output price when this price is set at discrete intervals. In contrast to rate of return regulation, we find that resetting the regulated price more frequently can increase the risk faced by the firm’s owners, and that this is reflected in a higher output price and a higher weighted-average cost of capital.     

Fiscal Consolidation and Decentralisation: A Tale of Two Tiers*

This paper contributes to the established literature on fiscal consolidations by investigating the distinct behaviour of central and sub‐central tiers of government during general government consolidation attempts. In the light of different degrees of decentralisation across OECD countries, and the different responsibilities devolved to sub‐central tiers, we believe that this approach offers an illuminating insight into the analysis of fiscal consolidations and their success. We show that the involvement of the sub‐central tiers of government is crucial to achieving cuts in expenditure, particularly in relation to the overall size of the government wage bill. In addition, central governments appear to exert a strong influence on the expenditure of sub‐central tiers through their grant allocations, and control of these allocations appears to have a considerable impact upon the overall success of consolidation attempts. Finally, we demonstrate that there is a skewness in cuts towards sub‐central capital expenditure both when central governments cut grant allocations and when sub‐central governments engage in lone consolidation attempts.     

REAL OPTIONS AND THE CROSS‐SECTION OF EXPECTED STOCK RETURNS

This paper surveys the theoretical literature investigating the effect of firms’ investment flexibility on the cross‐section of expected stock returns. Real options analysis derives firms’ value‐maximizing investment policies as functions of exogenous fundamental drivers of profitability and calculates firms’ market values as functions of the same variables. These functions yield the relationship between expected stock returns and firm fundamentals. Several plausible explanations for the value premium – the high average stock returns earned by firms with high book‐to‐market ratios – emerge from this literature.     

A quantitative and qualitative analysis of sexual harassment claims 1995–2005

This article explores the organisational and legal context in which parties involved in claims relating to sexual harassment operate, and presents an analysis of the population of sexual harassment cases heard by Employment Tribunals between 1995 and 2005.