Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics

We develop a general model of lending in the presence of endogenous borrowing constraints. Borrowing constraints arise because borrowers face limited liability and debt repayment cannot be perfectly enforced. In the model, the dynamics of debt are closely linked with the dynamics of borrowing constraints. In fact, borrowing constraints must satisfy a dynamic consistency requirement: the value of outstanding debt restricts current access to short-term capital, but is itself determined by future access to credit. This dynamic consistency is not guaranteed in models of exogenous borrowing constraints, where the ability to raise short-term capital is limited by some prespecified function of debt. We characterize the optimal default-free contract—which minimizes borrowing constraints at all histories—and derive implications for firm growth, survival, leverage and debt maturity. The model is qualitatively consistent with stylized facts on the growth and survival of firms. Comparative statics with respect to technology and default constraints are derived.     

Dutch housing allowances: social housing at risk

This article deals with the vulnerability of the Dutch housing allowance scheme. This scheme can be compared with the British housing benefit. The vulnerability of the scheme has been augmented by the current less favourable economic conditions (stagnating household incomes, increasing unemployment) and the Dutch government's announcement that it plans to reduce housing allowance expenditure. Two scenarios are outlined, which may serve to resolve the danger of exploding housing allowances expenditure in the coming years. If a market‐led scenario is chosen, whereby housing associations strive to achieve market rents, the housing allowance will be transformed into a form of housing voucher, the value of which is not directly related to the actual rental price of the property. In this American‐style model, the value of the vouchers would be linked to a ‘virtual’ rent, say 40% of the average rental price in the region. The housing associations would then lose their special semi‐public status. Under the social housing model, the housing associations would retain their special status provided they aimed to achieve rents somewhat lower than the market level. The housing allowance would remain directly linked to the actual rental price. However, some marked changes would be required to render this system sustainable. The Netherlands cannot avoid having to make this choice. Cet article porte sur la vulnérabilité du régime hollandais d'aide au logement. Celui‐ci est comparable aux prestations britanniques. La fragilité du régime a été accrue par les conditions économiques actuelles moins favorables (stagnation du revenu des ménages, augmentation du chômage) et par l'annonce du gouvernement néderlandais relative à la réduction prévue des dépenses d'allocation‐logement. Sont présentés deux scénarios susceptibles de limiter le risque d'explosion des dépenses d'allocations dans les années à venir. Si l'option choisie est un scénario de marché où les associations pour le logement luttent pour atteindre les loyers du marché, l'allocation‐logement se transformera en ‘bon’ dont la valeur ne sera pas directement liée au montant réel du loyer. Selon ce modèle de type américain, la valeur des ‘bons’ sera fonction d'un loyer ‘virtuel’, soit environ 40% du prix moyen dans la région; les associations perdraient alors leur statut particulier semi‐public. Selon le modèle de logement social, elles conserveraient leur statut, à condition qu'elles cherchent à atteindre des loyers légèrement inférieurs au niveau du marché; l'allocation‐logement serait alors directement liée au montant réel du loyer. Toutefois, pour que le régime subsiste, il faudrait procéder à d'importants changements. Les Pays‐Bas ne peuvent s'épargner ce choix.     

Golden Parachutes: Incentive Aligners,Management Entrenchers,or Takeover Bid Signals?

In this paper we investigate the effect of golden parachute (GP) adoptions on shareholder wealth. We control for the potential effect a GP adoption has on the probability that a firm will receive a takeover bid by investigating the wealth effects for firms that are in play when the GP is adopted. We find that announcements are wealth neutral when firms are in play and wealth increasing when firms are not in play when a GP is adopted. The results suggest that GPs have no influence on the success of a tender offer, refuting the hypotheses that they either align manager and shareholder interests or that they entrench inefficient managers. The difference in the results for in-play and not-in-play firms is consistent with the hypothesis that GPs signal an increased likelihood that a firm will receive a takeover bid.     

THE ECONOMETRICS OF THE HOLY GRAIL — A REVIEW OF ECONOMETRICS: ALCHEMY OR SCIENCE? ESSAYS IN ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY

Books reviewed in this article: David F. Hendry (1993) Econometrics: Alchemy or Science? Essays in Econometric Methodology     

Impacts of an EC carbon/energy tax and deregulating thermal power supply on CO2, SO2 and NOx emissions

Emission of CO₂, SO₂ and NO_x are all closely linked to the burning of fossil fuels. Here we report on simulations done by linking a Sectoral European Energy Model (SEEM), covering energy demand in nine Western European countries, with the emission-transport-deposition model RAINS developed by IIASA. The study analyses emissions of CO₂, SO₂ and NO_x, deposition of sulphur and nitrogen and the extent of areas where the critical load for sulphur is exceeded in year 2000 under four different energy scenarios. Two different sets of future behavioural patterns for the thermal electric power production sector are considered. In one regime, called the plan-efficient regime, the sector is assumed to follow official plans with regard to investment in new capacity. In the other regime, called the cost-efficient regime, the thermal power sector is assumed to behave in a cost minimizing manner. The effects of the proposed EC carbon/energy tax are studied under both regimes, giving rise to altogether four scenarios.In both regimes the effect of the EC tax is to reduce emissions by between 6 and 10 per cent in year 2000 relative to the scenarios without the tax. A change of regime, from the regulated, plan-efficient regime to the market-based, cost-efficient regime, will, by itself, reduce emissions of CO₂ and NO_x by approximately 3 per cent, while SO₂ emissions are reduced by 13 per cent. The EC tax will reduce sulphur deposition by more than 5 per cent in the nine model countries under the plan-efficient regime. A change of regime further reduces the total deposition by 9 per cent. The area where depositions exceed the critical load is reduced by approximately 6 per cent in year 2000 by the tax in both regimes. Changing from the plan-efficient to the cost-efficient regime has a similar impact.Although the emission reductions due to the EC tax may seem modest, they are shown to have a sizeable effect on the technological abatement costs of reaching targets like those prescribed in the Sofia protocol on the stabilisation of NO_x emissions, and the Helsinki protocol on SO₂ emission reductions. This is part of what can be considered to be secondary benefits of the EC carbon/energy tax.     

EDGAR on the internet: The welfare effects of wider information distribution in an experimental market for risky assets

Policies such as the SEC’s Fair Disclosure Rule, and technologies such as SEC EDGAR, aim to disseminate corporate disclosures to a wider audience of investors in risky assets. In this study, we adopt an experimental approach to measure whether this wider disclosure is beneficial to these investors. Price-clearing equilibrium models based on utility maximization and non-revealing and fully-revealing prices predict that in a pure exchange economy, an arbitrary trader would prefer that no investors are informed rather than all are informed; non-revealing theory further predicts that an arbitrary trader would prefer a situation in which all traders are informed rather than half the traders are informed. These predictions can be summarized as “None > All > Half”. A laboratory study was conducted to test these predictions. Where previous studies have largely focused on information dissemination and its effects on equilibrium price and insider profits, we focus instead on traders’ expected utility, as measured by their preferences for markets in which none, half, or all traders are informed. Our experimental result contradicts the prediction and indicates “Half > None > All”, i.e. subjects favor a situation where a random half is informed. The implication is that in addition to testing predictions of price equilibrium, experiments should also be used to verify analytical welfare predictions of expected utility under different policy choices. JEL Classification D82, D53, G14, L86 This work was largely completed while this author was at The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.     

On the existence of rational expectations equilibrium

We prove a theorem on the existence of rational expectations general economic equilibrium when agents condition on prices as well as on private information, and maximize the expectation of a state-dependent utility function. The key to the result is a new idealization of what it means for a set of empirical distributions to support agents' expectations. This idealization depends on the notion that agents compare their expectations with continuous versions of the random empirical distributions that are generated by the workings of the economy. The existence theorem covers all strictly concave utility functions, arbitrary distributions of the state variable, and situations in which the dimension of the state variable is large relative to the number of commodities.