Customer concentration and loan contract terms

We study pricing and non-pricing features of loan contracts to gauge how the credit market evaluates a firm’s customer-base profile and supply-chain relations. Higher customer concentration increases interest rate spreads and the number of restrictive covenants featured in newly initiated as well as renegotiated bank loans. Customer concentration also abbreviates the maturity of those loans as well as the relationship between firms and their banks. These effects are intensified by customers’ financial distress, the level of relationship-specific investments, and the use of trade credit in customer–supplier relations. Our evidence shows that a deeper exposure to a small set of large customers bears negative consequences for a firm’s relations with its creditors, revealing limits to integration along the supply chain.     

Price shocks in regional markets: Japan's Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923

Japan's Great Kantō Earthquake of 1 September 1923 devastated the area around Tokyo and the country's main port of Yokohama. This article uses the earthquake as a case study to inform our understanding of the economics of disasters and the history of market integration. It seeks to test two main assumptions: first, that shifting demand and supply curves consequent on a disaster will have some impact on prices; and second, that any local changes in the disaster region are likely to be diffused across a wider geographical area. We make use of a unique monthly wholesale price dataset for a number of cities across Japan, and our analysis suggests three main findings: that price changes in the affected areas immediately following the disaster were in most cases reflected in price changes in Japan's provincial cities; that cities further away from the devastation witnessed smaller price changes than those nearer to the affected area; and that the observed pattern of price changes reflects the regional heterogeneity identified by scholars who have worked on market integration in Japan.     

An efficient market? Going public in London, 1891–1911

There have been claims that British capital was not well deployed in Victorian Britain. There was, allegedly, a lack of support for new and dynamic companies in comparison to the situation in Germany and the US. We find no evidence to support these claims. The London Stock Exchange welcomed young, old, domestic, and foreign firms. It provided funds to firms in old, existing industries as well as patenting firms in ‘new‐tech’ industries at similar costs of capital. If investors did show a preference for older and foreign firms, it was because those firms offered investors better long‐run performance. In addition, we show some evidence that investors who worked in the same industry and lived close to the firm going public were allotted more shares in high‐quality initial public offerings.     

Profitability and Efficiency of High Nature Value Marginal Farming in England

The UK Brexit vote triggered a new wave of policy developments for a future outside the EU. In this context, we analyse the business performance of English hill and upland farms, characterised by marginal economic conditions but also high nature value (HNV). The analysis aims to help identify farm-level management and policy options for greater economic, environmental and social sustainability. Business performance is measured as technical efficiency and the occurrence and persistence of abnormal profits, estimated through stochastic frontier analysis and static and dynamic panel-data methods. The results help indicate rationales for recent trends including farm enlargement, farm family diversification, and agri-environment scheme entry. The single farm payment is found to be negatively associated with farm technical efficiency while agri-environmental subsidies were positively associated to short-term farm profitability. Farm adaptation and resilience during a period of likely turbulence in external circumstances is discussed in light of these findings, as well as potential parallels with marginal HNV areas across Europe.     

Interethnic relations,informal trading networks,and social integration: imitation,habits, and social evolution

The ethnically homogeneous middleman groups (EHMGs), which are informal trading networks, are ubiquitous in less-developed economies where the legal infrastructure for contract enforcement is not well developed. This paper develops a formal model of social interaction among members of the EHMG as well as in more general situations in a multi-ethnic or multi-cultural society consisting of identifiable ethnic or linguistic groups. Behavioral patterns are transmitted between generations and altered via imitation in social contacts. The model demonstrates how different discriminatory behavioral patterns can evolve and persist over time. One result is that the trust between such groups can increase due to a higher frequency of inter-group contacts. In concluding the paper, we speculate about how the model can be expanded to include changes in legal structures, especially contract law. This could lead to an increase in the trust between the different groups.     

Inflation,uncertainty, and monetary policy

Low inflation likely reflects factors whose influence should fade over time. But many uncertainties attend this assessment, and downward pressures on inflation could prove to be unexpectedly persistent. My colleagues and I may have misjudged the strength of the labor market, the degree to which longer-run inflation expectations are consistent with our inflation objective, or even the fundamental forces driving inflation. In interpreting incoming data, we will need to stay alert to these possibilities and, in light of incoming information, adjust our views about inflation, the overall economy, and the stance of monetary policy best suited to promoting maximum employment and price stability. How should policy be formulated in the face of such significant uncertainties? In my view, it strengthens the case for a gradual pace of adjustment. But we should also be wary of moving too gradually. It would be imprudent to keep monetary policy on hold until inflation is back to 2%.