Analysis of the Efficacy of Public Spending on Research and Development in State Programs

This paper presents an approach to assessing the efficacy of public spending on research and development in state programs. At present, there is a need to develop a unified approach to the analysis and evaluation of the efficacy of such spending from the perspective of participants in state programs (federal executive bodies). The proposed approach does not allow evaluating the efficacy of public spending on the development of research areas assigned to the authors.     

Testing Part of a DSGE Model by Indirect Inference

We propose a way of testing a subset of equations of a DSGE model. The test draws on statistical inference for limited information models and the use of indirect inference to test DSGE models. Using the numerical small sample distribution of our test for two subsets of equations of the Smets–Wouters model we show that the test has accurate size and good power in small samples, and better power than using asymptotic distribution theory. In a test of the Smets–Wouters model on US Great Moderation data, we reject the specification of the wage‐price but not the expenditure sector. This points to the wage‐price sector as the source of overall model rejection.     

Preventives Versus Treatments Redux: Tighter Bounds on Distortions in Innovation Incentives with an Application to the Global Demand for HIV Pharmaceuticals

Kremer and Snyder (Q J Econ 130:1167–1239, 2015) show that demand curves for a preventive and treatment may have different shapes though they target the same disease, biasing the pharmaceutical manufacturer toward developing the lucrative rather than the socially desirable product. This paper tightens the theoretical bounds on the potential deadweight loss from such biases. Using a calibration of the global demand for HIV pharmaceuticals, we demonstrate the dramatically sharper analysis achievable with the new bounds, allowing us to pinpoint potential deadweight loss at 62% of the global gain from curing HIV. We use the calibration to perform policy counterfactuals, assessing welfare effects of government policies such as a subsidy, reference pricing, and price-discrimination ban. The fit of our calibration is good: we find that a hypothetical drug monopolist would price an HIV drug so high that only 4% of the infected population worldwide would purchase, matching actual drug prices and quantities in the early 2000s before subsidies in low-income countries ramped up.     

The US financial crisis and corporate dividend reactions: for better or for worse?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We examine how changes in dividend policy in 2008 as the financial crisis was unfolding influenced firm risk-adjusted returns in the following years....     

A Real Options Model of Real Estate Development with Entitlement Risk

Most development projects encounter a highly uncertain entitlement process that is largely uncontrollable by developers. In this study, entitlement is modeled as a separate stage within a compound real option, where developers begin with minimal control (maximum risk) and each successful stage increases control (decreases risk). We solve the model analytically, provide three‐dimensional numerical comparisons, and empirically test the model's predictions using hand collected rezoning petitions. Our main result refines the classic development option model: developers first invest early (secure entitlements) in order to obtain the option to subsequently delay investment (construct the optimal building at the optimal time).     

Entry limiting agreements: First‐mover advantage,authorized generics,and pay‐for‐delay deals

During patent litigation, pay‐for‐delay (P4D) deals involve a payment from a patent holder of a branded drug to a generic drug manufacturer to delay entry and withdraw the patent challenge. In return for staying out of the market, the generic firm receives a payment, and/or an authorized licensed entry at a later date, but before the patent expiration. We examine why such deals are stable when there are multiple potential entrants. We combine the first‐mover advantage for the first generic with the ability of the branded manufacturer to launch an authorized generic (AG) to show when P4D deals are an equilibrium outcome. We further show that limiting a branded firm's ability to launch an AG before entry by a successful challenger will deter such deals. However, removing exclusivity period for the first generic challenger will not.     

It is not just about paying your dues: Impact of generational cohort on active and passive union participation

The lack of a validated measure of active–passive union participation and a dearth of research into the relationship between generational cohort and union participation challenge union leaders to develop policies and practices to facilitate union renewal. We address these issues by (a) developing a multidimensional measure of union participation that captures both active and passive components, (b) using structural equation modelling to validate the measure within a nomological framework, and (c) investigating the impact of generational cohort on all paths in our framework. Data from members of a large American union confirm that generational cohort influences how union members participate in their union. The two‐factor measure developed in this study facilitates research into antecedents and outcomes of passive and active union participation. Our findings should also prove useful to unions seeking to increase participation within their membership, academics researching unions and generational cohort, and human resource practitioners operating in unionised environments.     

Alternative balanced scorecards built from paradigm models in strategic HRM and employment/industrial relations and used to measure the state of employment relations and HR system performance across U.S. workplaces

This paper constructs alternative balanced scorecards based on high‐performance work system (HPWS) and employment relations system (ERS) models. The models are depicted and compared in diagrams and used as framework skeletons for building separate HPWS and ERS scorecards, intended to provide a detailed data picture of the operational health and performance of an organization's employment/HR system and its operations, processes, and inputs/outputs. The scorecards are filled in with nationally representative data from 2,000+ U.S. workplaces using more than 50 employment/HR indicators, as reported by separate panels of managers and employees. The indicators for each workplace are aggregated into an overall HR/employment system score, ranked from low‐to‐high, and graphed as frequency distributions. These distributions provide a unique snapshot picture of the mean and dispersion of the state of employment relations and HR system performance for companies across the United State. They also reveal that “models matter” since the HPWS and ERS scorecards provide distinctly different evaluation assessments.