Licensing and innovation with imperfect contract enforcement

Licensing promotes technology transfer and innovation, but enforcement of licensing contracts is often imperfect. We model contract enforcement as a game with perfect information but probabilistic enforcement and explore the implications of weak enforcement on the design of licensing contracts, the conduct of firms, and market performance. An upstream firm develops a technology that it can license to downstream firms using a fixed fee and a per‐unit royalty. Strictly positive per‐unit royalties maximize the licensor's profit if competition among licensees limits joint profits. With imperfect enforcement, the licensor lowers variable royalties to avoid cheating. Although imperfect contract enforcement reduces the profits of the licensor, weak enforcement lowers prices, increases downstream innovation, and in some circumstances can increase total economic welfare.     

Moving costs and the microeconomics of intra-urban mobility

This paper considers the role of moving costs in long-term optimal moving strategies from a theoretical microeconomic point of view. Using a model of intertemporal utility maximization, we arrive at conditions for (i) the optimal number of moves, (ii) the optimal moving dates, and (iii) the optimal consumption of housing services and other goods in the periods between moves. Also, comparative static results are obtained.     

THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS – A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

The initial objective of the paper is to describe the way in which the term ‘New Institutional Economics’ (NIE) emerged in the literature and became the designation for a new field concerned with the study of various analytical techniques designed for the exploration of institutional phenomena. It is then shown how some of the more important of these techniques, transaction‐cost economics, property‐rights analysis and contract theory, have been applied in two central lines of neoinstitutional thought – the Williamsonian and the Northian. Criticisms of these two disparate theoretical positions on the NIE are considered and assessed. Next, a brief review of some of the empirical literature is undertaken so that the explanatory powers of NIE themes can be gauged. Finally, the paper offers a few general remarks on the present state of the NIE and its possible influence on the further development of economics.     

R&D in markets with network externalities

This paper studies the consequences of network externalities on R&D rivalry between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. In the model, all differences between the R&D projects chosen in market equilibrium and the socially best projects are solely due to network externalities. From a welfare perspective, the incumbent chooses a too risky and the entrant a too certain R&D project. Rothschild and Stiglitz's mean preserving spread criterion is used as a measure of risk. Adoption of a new standard is more likely in equilibrium than in the social optimum.     

Optimal failure rates and penalty-bonus policies in the offshore petroleum sector

We characterize optimal time profiles of risk-reducing expenditures and wreck probabilities for petroleum platforms. The input to our analysis is the development of wreck cost, direct and imputed. Particular attention is paid to the question of how private companies deviating from socially optimal standards may be induced to comply with such standards by means of a) a time-variant penalty, b) a no-wreck bonus and c) a time-invariant penalty.     

HEURISTICS,THE NON‐MAXIMIZING FIRM AND EFFICIENT ALLOCATION

It has been suggested that the theory of the firm can be modified and improved by shifting to a (non‐maximizing) heuristic approach that is able to explain how relatively efficient outcomes can be brought about by the use of ‘fast and frugal’ decision rules. The paper argues, however, that certain heuristic mechanisms, which may have great appeal to entrepreneurs in practice, tend to lead firms to worse solutions than those that could be achieved in a neoinstitutional system with the use of other methods. Moreover, competition cannot be relied upon to eliminate such misallocation, and may even serve to promote the problem.     

Entrepreneurial Judgment,Decision Procedure and the Inevitable Emergence of the Non‐optimizing Firm in a Capitalist Economy

It has been argued that understanding of entrepreneurship and firm behavior can be advanced by generalizing the static theory of the neoclassical firm so that it can deal with conditions in a dynamic economy. The paper rejects generalization and explains why such a shift causes the nature of the allocation process to change from the neoclassical pattern. Under generalization, critical information becomes prohibitively costly to obtain and entrepreneurial judgment rather than the Pareto rules decides allocation. Thus, the non‐optimizing firm becomes dominant.     

Environmental Regulations,Producer Responses,and Secondary Benefits: Carbon Dioxide Reductions Under the Acid Rain Program

This paper derives a production analysis framework for modeling secondary benefits from environmental regulation, i.e. induced changes in yet unregulated pollutants. We emphasize the various ways in which the producers can respond to environmental regulations, and evaluate them in terms of their costs and their generation of secondary benefits. An application on the US electricity sector illustrates our main point: In our case, abatement technologies that reduce regulated emissions while leaving the plants’ unregulated emissions unchanged appear to be among the least costly producer responses to the existing sulfur and nitrogen regulations, but at the expense of limited secondary reductions in carbon dioxide emissions. This finding raises questions about the magnitude of the much debated secondary benefits from future regulations on carbon dioxide emissions, since similar abatement technologies are currently being developed for carbon dioxide. With new environmental issues emerging over time, our findings suggest that regulators should signal the possibilities of new regulations on connected pollutants to producers. Such information may be relevant for producers when choosing current abatement strategies—with minor cost increases to deal with today’s issues, overall compliance costs for near-future environmental problems may be lowered.     

How the internet of things technology enhances emergency response operations

The Internet of Things (IoT) is a novel paradigm that connects the pervasive presence around us of a variety of things or objects to the Internet by using wireless/wired technologies to reach desired goals. Since the concept of the IoT was introduced in 2005, we see the deployment of a new generation of networked smart objects with communication, sensory and action capabilities for numerous applications, mainly in global supply chain management, environment monitoring and other non-stress environments. This paper introduces the IoT technology for use in the emergency management community. Considering the information required for supporting three sequential and distinct rhythms in emergency response operations: mobilization rhythm, preliminary situation assessment rhythm, and intervention rhythm, the paper proposes a modified task-technology fit approach that is used to investigate how the IoT technology can be incorporated into the three rhythms and enhance emergency response operations. The findings from our research support our two hypotheses: H1: IoT technology fits the identified information requirements; and H2: IoT technology provides added value to emergency response operations in terms of obtaining efficient cooperation, accurate situational awareness, and complete visibility of resources.     

Life‐Cycle Patterns of Interest‐Rate Mark‐Ups in Small‐Firm Finance*

We derive empirical implications from a theoretical model of bank–borrower relationships. The interest‐rate mark‐ups of banks are predicted to follow a life‐cycle pattern over the age of the borrowing firms. Because of endogenous bank monitoring by competing banks, borrowing firms initially face a low mark‐up, and thereafter an increasing mark‐up as a result of informational lock‐in, until it falls for older firms when the lock‐in is resolved. By applying a large sample of predominantly small unlisted firms and a new measure of asymmetric information, we find that firms with significant asymmetric‐information problems have a more pronounced life‐cycle pattern of interest‐rate mark‐ups. Additionally, we examine the effects of concentrated banking markets on interest‐rate mark‐ups. The results indicate that the life cycle of mark‐ups is mainly driven by asymmetric‐information problems and not by concentration. However, we find evidence that bank market concentration matters for older firms ? 2 Correction added after online publication on 20^th February 2012; the original text read ‘However, we find evidence that bank market concentration for older firms’, omitting the word ‘matters’.