首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
文章检索
  按 检索   检索词:      
出版年份:   被引次数:   他引次数: 提示:输入*表示无穷大
  收费全文   7篇
  免费   0篇
财政金融   1篇
工业经济   1篇
经济学   4篇
贸易经济   1篇
  2020年   1篇
  2013年   1篇
  2011年   1篇
  2009年   1篇
  2007年   3篇
排序方式: 共有7条查询结果,搜索用时 11 毫秒
1
1.
In this paper we propose a model that explains how cooperation can emerge spontaneously between firms in a highly competitive market environment. The basic idea is that the more competitive is the market, the less costly it is for firms to help each other like good neighbors. Cooperation takes the form of sharing technical know-how, which speeds up the adoption of new technologies (normally developed elsewhere) that spur industrial development. The model comports with the development history of Japan's first example of successful industrial development – its cotton spinning industry – whose conditions match those of firms in small open economies today.  相似文献   
2.
Striking parallels observed in the evolution of firm size and within-firm earnings distributions over time are documented. At the time of entry, the distribution of the whole sample and that of eventual survivors look similar, but the distribution of survivors subsequently shifts to the right. The left tails thins out while the right tail thickens, and the variance increases. While separate theories in industrial organization and labor literature are offered to account for this evidence, we demonstrate that it can be explained in a unified framework presented by noisy selection. In particular, we show explicitly that noisy selection implies the shift of the conditional distribution to the right because less efficient workers (firms) face higher hazard rates before their true efficiency is revealed with certainty.  相似文献   
3.
A macroeconomic model of Russian transition   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
We present a model in which capital assets can only be owned by members of a relatively small politically connected elite (‘the oligarchs’), each member of which faces a given risk of being expropriated, and we investigate the implications of such an imperfection of property rights for the transition to a market economy. At the start of the transition, the oligarchs are long on local capital assets but short on safe deposits abroad. This causes a depression phase characterized by acute liquidity constraints and large capital outflows at the same time. As the oligarchs acquire enough safe deposits, the economy enters a recovery phase, still accompanied by capital outflows. The model can parsimoniously explain both the steep decline suffered by the Russian economy in the first stage of its transition to a market economy and the subsequent turnaround. The decline could be avoided by allowing foreigners to own some domestic capital assets, but home‐country oligarchs may not be able credibly to collectively commit to such a reform.  相似文献   
4.
A theory of competitive industry dynamics with innovation and imitation   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
Empirical evidence on industry life-cycle reveals a pattern in which innovation rates remain fairly stable or are perhaps even higher at early stages, while patenting increases sharply as the industry matures. This increase in patenting in later stages is accompanied by net exit and lower rates of output growth and price decline. In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of a competitive industry with innovation and imitation that is consistent with these stylized facts. We derive an equilibrium growth path, along which leading firms invest in increasing the stock of technological knowledge and choose not to prevent imitation by other firms as long as the industry remains relatively small. As the industry expands including new entry, the leaders' optimal amount of investment gradually declines. We show that under some rather general conditions, there would exist a scale of the industry where innovating firms would choose to start preventing free imitation, bringing further expansion of the industry through new entry to a halt and causing net exit.  相似文献   
5.
6.
This paper proposes a new approach to estimate the idiosyncratic volatility premium. In contrast to the popular two-pass regression method, this approach relies on a novel GMM-type estimation procedure that uses only a single cross-section of return observations to obtain consistent estimates. Also, it enables a comparison of idiosyncratic volatility premia estimated using stock returns with different holding periods. The approach is empirically illustrated by applying it to daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual US stock return data over the course of 2000–2011. The results suggest that the idiosyncratic volatility premium tends to be positive on daily return data, but negative on monthly, quarterly, and annual data. They also indicate the presence of a January effect.  相似文献   
7.
Capital and growth with oligarchic property rights   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
To analyze effects of imperfect property rights on economic growth, we consider economies where some fraction of capital can be owned only by local oligarchs, whose status is subject to political risk. Political risk decreases local capital and wages. Risk-averse oligarchs acquire safe foreign assets for insurance, thus increasing wages in other countries that protect outside investors. We show that for empirically reasonable parameter values, reforms to decrease political risk or to protect more outsiders' investments can decrease local oligarchs' welfare by increasing wages, making such reforms prone to political resistance from the ruling elite. We suggest measures of property rights imperfections derived from empirically observable data, and we test the quantitative predictions of our model using those measures and other parameter values routinely assumed in growth theory.  相似文献   
1
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号