When Does Information Asymmetry Affect the Cost of Capital?

This paper examines when information asymmetry among investors affects the cost of capital in excess of standard risk factors. When equity markets are perfectly competitive, information asymmetry has no separate effect on the cost of capital. When markets are imperfect, information asymmetry can have a separate effect on firms’ cost of capital. Consistent with our prediction, we find that information asymmetry has a positive relation with firms’ cost of capital in excess of standard risk factors when markets are imperfect and no relation when markets approximate perfect competition. Overall, our results show that the degree of market competition is an important conditioning variable to consider when examining the relation between information asymmetry and cost of capital.     

Assessing the Effects of Service Quality,Past Experience,and Destination Image on Behavioral Intentions in the Spring Training Camp of a Japanese Professional Baseball Team

This study aimed to examine the theoretical relationships between service quality, past experience, destination image, and behavioral intentions in the spring training camp of a professional baseball team in Japan. The results indicate that the service quality of spring training camps was divided into five factors: (1) place, (2) enjoyment, (3) information, (4) fan interaction, and (5) operating time. The findings suggest that service quality and past experience had positive effects on both destination image and behavioral intentions. Behavioral intentions were also highly influenced by destination image. Future research and managerial implications are also discussed.     

Survey of Recent Developments

As Indonesia heads to the polls in 2014, its economy is slowing. The end of the commodities boom and the global return to more normal monetary policy has exposed some weaknesses. Exchange-rate depreciation has absorbed some of the adjustment; but structural rigidities are still likely to limit the expansion of non-commodity sectors, and the increased fuel-subsidy bill for imported oil is putting pressure on the current account and the budget. The immediate focus is on demand-side consolidation to manage inflation and the currentaccount deficit.

For an economy like Indonesia’s to be overheating, and for monetary and fiscal authorities to be engineering a soft landing, when growth is below 6%, points to major structural problems. If Indonesia is to prevent the current rate of growth from becoming the new normal, there will need to be a substantial supply-side response to lift productivity, as well as a restructuring of the economy and the introduction of policies that make the economy more flexible in adjusting to shocks. The current economic slowdown has yet to trigger sweeping reforms; policy coordination remains problematic as Indonesia enters a big political year.

Compared with its neighbours, Indonesia is largely on the outside of the regional production networks, and its manufacturing sector does not play into factory Asia. Now, faced with lower commodity prices globally—and growth in non-resource sectors is critical— the lack of a large manufacturing base appears to be a weakness. Indonesia is attracting more foreign direct investment than ever and is climbing the global rankings of preferred economies in which to invest, but this is occurring without improvements to its investment environment or competitiveness. Indonesia can participate more fully in global supply chains and increase its potential for growth by upgrading its infrastructure, improving its investment environment, and using regional initiatives strategically to make strong commitments that reinforce its priorities for domestic reform.

In its hosting of APEC in 2013, Indonesia championed infrastructure investment where the lack of structural reform and macroeconomic constraints are inhibiting much-needed expansion, both in Indonesia and in the region. The positive outcome, albeit only a small step forward for the Doha Round, at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali, in December, also builds momentum for better regional and global cooperation. The priority now is for Indonesia to commit to, and show leadership in, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community.     

Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities

This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity‐based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports. While several prior studies have examined this important question, the empirical evidence is mixed and the existence of a link between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities remains an open question. Because inferences from prior studies may be confounded by assumptions inherent in research design choices, we use propensity‐score matching and assess hidden (omitted variable) bias within a broader sample. In contrast to most prior research, we do not find evidence of a positive association between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities after matching CEOs on the observable characteristics of their contracting environments. Instead, we find some evidence that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms where CEOs have relatively higher levels of equity incentives.     

The Stability of the Japanese Banking System: A Historical Perspective

In this paper we study the stability of the Japanese banking system in the prewar period. First, we review the development of the Japanese banking system from the Meiji Restoration until the Second World War. It will be shown that government policy toward the banking industry changed drastically after the 1927 banking panic. Second, we examine the causes of bank closings in 1927. We test whether or not such bank closings were due to their unsound management, which was reflected in the structure of assets and liabilities and bank performance, using a qualitative model. Our empirical results conclude that bank closings occurred more for banks with unsound management and inefficient operations. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 1993, 7(4), pp. 387–407. School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, 6-1 Nishiwaseda 1-chome, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 160, Japan; and University of Tokyo, Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, Japan.