Is racial salary discrimination disappearing in the NBA? evidence from data during 1985–2015

This study re-examines the racial salary gap of National Basketball Association players by constructing a long unbalanced panel covering the 1985–1986 to 2015–2016 seasons. Contrary to the results of previous studies, we find that non-white players are paid equally to white players with similar characteristics in the 1980s and 1990s, but that white players started to be paid about 20% more than non-white players in the last 10 years. Our results are robust to all specification checks, such as quantile regressions, controlling sample selection, different contract types, and player nationality. We find that neither employer preference nor income gap of white and black residents explains this increasing salary gap.     

Tariff Revenue, Government Expenditure and Growth in a Small Open Economy

I develop a small open endogenous growth model with domestic and foreign intermediate goods. The Marshallian external economies in the domestic intermediate goods sector work as the engine of sustained growth. The model offers two arguments. First, imposing a trade distortion is growth- and welfare-improving if the government uses the tariff revenue for correcting the domestic distortion. Second, comparing the tariff with a lump-sum tax as a financing device, the former is certainly worse than the latter with respect to both growth and welfare if the two intermediate goods are substitutes.
JEL Classification Numbers: F43, H20.     

A larger country sets a lower optimal tariff

We develop a new optimal tariff theory that is consistent with the fact that a larger country sets a lower tariff. In our dynamic Dornbusch–Fischer–Samuelson Ricardian model, the long‐run welfare effects of a rise in a country’s tariff consist of the direct revenue, indirect revenue, and growth effects. Based on this welfare decomposition, we obtain two main results. First, the optimal tariff of a country is positive. Second, the optimal tariff of a country is likely to be decreasing in its absolute advantage parameter, implying that a larger (i.e., more technologically advanced) country sets a lower optimal tariff.     

Pareto-improving Untied Aid with Environmental Externalities

This paper shows that even untied aid is Pareto-improving if and only if the marginal propensity to consume the polluting good in the donor country is sufficiently larger than in the recipient country.     

A NOTE ON THE EFFECT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION VIA OPTIMAL POLLUTION TAX

This paper reexamines the environmental consequences of trade liberalization in a general equilibrium model of a small open economy facing trade and environmental distortions. I show that, under certain conditions, trade liberalization achieved by reducing trade barriers increases the amount of pollution through change in the optimal pollution tax. This result is worthy of consideration in regard to countries that pursue trade liberalization, and the subsequent environmental cleanup.     

TAX REVENUE-FINANCED PUBLIC ABATEMENT AND WELFARE: A CONSUMPTION TAX CASE

This paper develops a model of public abatement financed either by a pollution tax or by a consumption tax. It shows that consumption tax revenue-financed public abatement raises welfare more than pollution tax revenue-financed public abatement does when the pollution tax rate rises. This result is worthwhile for environmental protection policy makers when they are determining the revenue source of public abatement.     

Redistribution, production inefficiency and decentralized efficiency

This paper analyzes the role of production distortion in income redistribution in an international trade model. In particular, it examines the role of the Stolper and Samuelson effect on efficient income redistribution. It first shows that production inefficiency can be part of a Pareto-efficient tax system for a small country when there is an asymmetric information problem between the government and individuals. Second, the paper shows that such production inefficiency is not only Pareto-improving for a small country, but is also essential in achieving worldwide tax-constrained Pareto-efficient allocation. These two results suggest important implications for commercial policies. The original version of this paper was circulated in 1996 as No. 391 of the Discussion Paper Series of Research Seminars in International Economics at the University of Michigan (http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/workingpapers/wp.html), with the title “Tariffs and production subsidies as devices to relax the incentive problem of a progressive income tax system”. Since the distribution of the working paper version, this paper has been cited and used in several papers, such as Guesnerie (2001) and Spector (2001). I hope that this updated version of the paper is useful for researchers.     

Agricultural Productivity Growth and Household Food Security Improvement in Nepal

Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world. Using the panel data of the Nepal Living Standard Measurement Survey (NLSS), the poverty rate in 1995–96 was estimated to be about 40%, while in 2003–04 it was estimated at roughly 30%. Political instability has prevented the development of industry and threatened the food security of poor people, but scholarship on the factors contributing to food security is incomplete; while the determinants of food security have been mentioned in past research, prior studies have analyzed cross‐sectional data and thus could not have omitted heterogeneity bias. This paper analyzes the change in agricultural productivity in real terms and the impact on household food security by using the panel data of NLSS in 1995–96 and 2003–04. This analysis reveals that growth is observed in real agricultural productivity in spite of land segmentation; the growth in agricultural productivity in real terms has a positive impact on household food security; and the lower a farmer's income becomes, the more positive its impact on food security. Therefore, advancements in agricultural productivity play a critical role in promoting food security at the individual and household levels.     

Aid for Trade and Global Growth

Aid for trade increases a recipient's public services, which lower its import and export transport costs. Formulating a two‐country endogenous growth model, we obtain two main results. First, a permanent increase in the donor's aid/gross domestic product (GDP) ratio raises the steady‐state growth rate as well as both countries' long‐run fractions and cost shares of imported varieties if and only if it lowers the product of transport costs. Second, under a plausible condition, there exists a unique interior growth‐maximizing aid/GDP ratio. These results are robust to alternative specifications for congestion and stock‐flow nature of public goods.