Is greater flexibility in the labour market the answer to the unemployment crisis?

In view of high and persistent unemployment in the European industrialised countries there is growing consensus that more flexibility is needed with regard to both the legal and institutional conditions governing the labour market (external flexibility) and the management of human resources within individual firms (internal flexibility). This article examines the interaction between internal and external flexibility with special reference to wages, working time and job security.     

Fiscal Decentralisation and Economic Growth in High‐Income OECD Countries

Among the majority of high–income OECD countries, the degree of fiscal decentralisation has converged over the last 30 years towards an intermediate level. The theoretical arguments for and against fiscal decentralisation point to explanations for this tendency, because both extreme decentralisation and extreme centralisation are associated with disadvantages for economic growth. Hence, the observed trend of convergence would be growth–promoting. The paper analyses the long–run empirical relationship between per capita economic growth, capital formation and total factor productivity growth, and fiscal decentralisation for the high–income OECD countries. The evidence supports the view that the relationship is positive when fiscal decentralisation is increasing from low levels, but then reaches a peak and turns negative. A policy implication is that policy–makers in several countries with relatively low degrees of fiscal decentralisation could possibly mobilise growth reserves by increasing it.     

The effects of debt versus equity inflows on savings and growth in developing economies

Zusammenfassung Die Wirkung von ausl?ndischer Kapitalbeteiligung und Kreditfinanzierung auf Ersparnisbildung und Wachstum in Entwicklungsl?ndern. — Zur Bew?ltigung der internationalen Schuldenprobleme von Entwicklungsl?ndern wird h?ufig vorgeschlagen, die Struktur des Kapitalimports zugunsten von Forderungsarten zu verschieben, bei denen sich die Gl?ubiger am wirtschaftlichen Risiko beteiligen, wie dies etwa bei Direktinvestitionen der Fall ist. Die Wahl zwischen Kapitalbeteiligung und Kreditfinanzierung mag jedoch Risiko-Ertrag-Konflikte zwischen Einkommensstabilit?t und erwartetem wirtschaftlichem Wachstum involvieren. Diese Hypothese wird aus einem entscheidungstheoretischen Modell auf der Basis eines Benutzer-Eigentümer Verh?ltnisses abgeleitet und mittels einer L?nderquerschnittsuntersuchung regressionsanalytisch getestet. Es zeigt sich, da\ bei nichtkooperativen Beziehungen zwischen Schuldnern und Gl?ubigern kreditfinanzierte Kapitalimporte einen vergleichsweise starken positiven Einflu\ auf die Ersparnisbildung und das Wirtschaftswachtum im Schuldnerland ausüben. Kapitalbeteiligungen k?nnen deshalb nicht ohne weiteres als vorteilhaft angesehen werden und auch nicht allen L?ndern empfohlen werden, ohne zu bedenken, wie sich soziale Gruppen gegenüber dem Risiko verhalten.

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Résumé Les effets de l’influx de la dette et du capital propre sur l’épargne et la croissance en économies développantes. — L’élément commun des beaucoup de propositions données pour faciliter les problèmes de la dette extérieure des pays développants est l’intention de changer la structure des importations de capital vers l’augmentation du rapport des créances qui basent sur quelque forme de partager les risques, p.e. la participation en capital propre. Cependant, le choix entre le capital propre ou des influx des capitaux financés par des dettes peut induire un conflit de ?rendement-risque? entre la stabilité de revenu et la croissance attendue. Cette hypothèse est dérivée d’un modèle choix-théorique basé sur l’approche agent-principal et testée empiriquement en appliquant l’analyse de régression trans-pays. Les auteurs démontrent que, dans un cadre non-coopératif des relations débiteurcréditeur, des transferts financés par des dettes ont une influence plus positive sur l’épargne et la croissance économique. La participation en capital propre ne peut pas être évaluée supérieure sans ambigu?té et c’est pourquoi elle ne peut pas être recommendée pour tous les pays, indépendant des attitudes sociales envers le risque.

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Resumen El efecto del endeudamiento sobre el ahorro y el crecimiento eneconomías en desarrollo comparado con el de las inversiones directas. — En varias propuestas para aliviar el problema de la deuda externa de los países en desarrollo se sugiere alterar la composición de las importaciones de capital en el sentido de aumentar la proportión de derechos con participación en el riesgo económico, es decir, la participación de la inversión directa. La elección entre inversión directa y deuda considera la relación inversa riesgo-beneficio que existe entre la estabilidad del ingreso y el crecimiento esperado. Esta tesis se dériva de un modelo teórico de elección basado en el enfoque agente-principal, que es sometido a un test empírico de regresión sobre una muestra de países. Se muestra que en el marco de relaciones deudor-acreedor de tipo no cooperativas las transferencias de financiamiento por deuda ejercen una influencia positiva relativamente superior sobre el ahorro y el crecimiento económico. La participación directa en el capital no resulta superior en todos casos y por ello no puede ser recomendada para todos los países, independientemente de las actitudes frente al riesgo que prevalezcan.

     

Human capital and the internationalisation of venture capital firms

We examine the neglected area of internationalisation by VCs. Using a representative sample of 195 VCs, we show that the decision of a European VC firm to invest internationally is driven by its human resources. Having more VC executives in general and more VC executives with previous international experience in specific, results in a higher probability of investing internationally. In contrast, more VC executives with experience in the VC industry or with an engineering background lead to a higher probability of remaining domestic.     

Rational expectations equilibria of economies with local interactions

We consider general economies in which rational agents interact locally. The local aspect of the interactions is designed to represent in a simple abstract way social interactions, that is, socioeconomic environments in which markets do not mediate all of agents’ choices, which might be in part determined, for instance, by family, peer group, or ethnic group effects. We study static as well as dynamic infinite horizon economies; we allow for economies with incomplete information, and we consider jointly global and local interactions, to integrate e.g., global externalities and markets with peer and group effects. We provide conditions under which such economies have rational expectations equilibria. We illustrate the effects of local interactions when agents are rational by studying in detail the equilibrium properties of a simple economy with quadratic preferences which captures, in turn, local preferences for conformity, habit persistence, and preferences for status or adherence to aggregate norms of behavior.     

Innovation timing games: a general framework with applications

We offer a new algorithm for analyzing innovation timing games. Its main advantage over the traditional approach is that it applies to problems that had previously been intractable. We use the algorithm to examine two classical innovation problems. We find that the competition takes the form of a waiting game with a second-mover advantage either for any level of R&D costs (process innovation) or for high R&D costs (product innovation). Moreover, both models predict that the second-mover advantage is monotonically increasing in the costs of R&D.