LBOs,Reversions and Implicit Contracts

The conventional view of going-private transactions is that they are designed to enhance the efficiency of the firm (for example, Jensen (1986) ). A starkly different view is that these and other control transactions are motivated to effect transfers from other stakeholders in the firm to equity holders ( Shleifer and Summers (1988) ). This study exploits data describing pension terminations as a way to test these theories. We conclude that the efficiency theory can plausibly explain a substantial number of LBO-related terminations, but not enough to undermine the transfer theory. More specific predictions from the efflciency theory are needed to structure more exacting tests.     

Investment Spending in Australia: Further Study and Interpretation*

Recent work in macro theory suggests that aggregate 'demand' policies have direct supply-side effects in the short run, if Lucas's standard specification of the nonlinear adjustment costs for capital is generalized In this paper, we estimate an investment equation (involving Tobin's valuation ratio and Australian data) which nests three hypotheses: Lucas's standard specification of adjustment costs, a simple generalization which permits labour to be involved in the installation of capital and a model which allows for liquidity constraints. The results support the suggested alternative formulation of the q-theory     

Capital Commitment and Illiquidity in Corporate Bonds

We study trading costs and dealer behavior in U.S. corporate bond markets from 2006 to 2016. Despite a temporary spike during the financial crisis, average trade execution costs have not increased notably over time. However, dealer capital commitment, turnover, block trade frequency, and average trade size decreased during the financial crisis and thereafter. These declines are attributable to bank‐affiliated dealers, as nonbank dealers have increased their market commitment. Our evidence indicates that liquidity provision in the corporate bond markets is evolving away from the commitment of bank‐affiliated dealer capital to absorb customer imbalances, and that postcrisis banking regulations likely contribute.     

THE PECULIAR ECONOMICS OF HOUSING BUBBLES

Home values increase rapidly during housing bubbles generating large capital gains. High loan‐to‐value (LTV) mortgages secured by expected future home values are one way to take advantage of these capital gains. In this article, we use a simple partial equilibrium consumer theory model to explore the implications of high LTV borrowing. We find that sufficiently large expected house price growth leads to an upward‐sloping budget line when households can obtain high LTV mortgages. In this environment, the demand for housing fits neither the conventional theories of consumer goods nor that of investment goods. In fact, increases in the expected future price of housing may reduce current housing demand, whereas decreases in the effective (current) price may lead to households buying smaller homes. Moreover, high LTV loans reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy, but raise the volatility of aggregate demand. Tighter borrowing standards may help lower demand volatility at the expense of shrinking the economy. (JEL E21, R21, E52)     

中美服务贸易领域拓展及其途径选择

多年来,美国对华巨大贸易逆差使其对中国愈来愈不满,而并不刻意追求贸易顺差的中国也在试图转变经济增长方式,试图摆脱过于依赖出口和外资的不利局面本文分析了中美两国在新的经济切合点--服务贸易上的共同利益,阐述了两国可以率先扩大服务贸易领域及其操作方法.     

CASINOS,HOTELS, AND CRIME

This paper examines the links among casinos, hotels, and crime using Indiana's counties for 1994‐2004. In estimating casinos' impacts, I introduce a measure of casino activity in addition to variables related to the timing of casino opening. I test whether or not the number of hotel rooms affects crime rates. Increased casino activity reduces crime rates except for burglary, where crime rates rise after a lag. Leaving out a measure of casino activity appears to create a serious specification error. Finally, including problem crime data plagued by incomplete reporting affects the estimated impact of casinos on crime. (JEL R11, L83)