Choice of Accounting Method for Valuation of Investment Securities: Evidence from Hong Kong Firms

This study examines whether Hong Kong managers choose “benchmark” or “alternative” valuation method for investment securities, after the Hong Kong SSAP 24 became effective starting with fiscal‐year ending December 31, 1999. Tests are conducted on a sample of 292 firms, out of which 155 Hong Kong firms reported unrealized gains and losses and 128 firms that did not report holding gains/losses, but reported investment securities. The findings indicate that firms with strong relative performance, i.e. current year's EPS higher than that of the last year, chose the alternative valuation method when the investment securities had holding gains and recognized the unrealized holding gains in the equity section of the balance sheet. This finding is consistent with the Cookie Jar hypothesis because these holding gains would be used in the income statement in future periods, when needed. With regard to firms with strong relative performance and holding losses, the findings indicate that the benchmark valuation was used. The losses were reported in the income statement to the extent that they did not reduce the EPS below that of the last year. This finding is consistent with the Income Smoothing Hypothesis, because the use of benchmark valuation reduced EPS of the current year to bring it in line with that of the last year. Evidence on firms with weak economic performance and holding gains or losses provided weak support to the Income Smoothing Hypothesis and Big Bath Hypothesis. Additionally, the results indicate that the firms with high debt‐equity ratio preferred the benchmark method and recorded securities at cost. This treatment provided managers with an opportunity to liquidate or reclassify the securities in future periods and use the accrued gains, when needed. The findings are inconclusive with regard to the impact of bonus plan on the choice of valuation method.     

Can Agents Be Better Off with Pay Caps?

A popular way to discipline the managers of companies or banks that got into trouble during the recent financial crisis has been to impose caps on managers' pay. Using a small extension of the standard principal–agent model, we argue that pay caps might serve the opposite purpose, because the agent might be better off with a pay cap. Specifically, we show that, given a fixed effort level to be implemented, the agent's expected utility can be decreasing in an upper bound for the agent's reward. The effect of pay caps on the general structure of optimal incentive contracts is also characterized. While an improvement of contracting information always helps the principal, it might increase or decrease the marginal cost of imposing pay caps.     

Top management turnover,firm performance and government control: Evidence from China's listed state-owned enterprises

Using a sample of 916 Chinese listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2001 to 2005, we find that the likelihood of top management turnover is negatively associated with firm performance, suggesting the existence of an effective corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy that is highly controlled by government. We also find that the negative turnover–performance relationship is stronger when the SOE is directly held by the central or local government, holding a monopolistic position in a local economy or in a strategic/regulated industry. The results indicate that the market-based corporate governance mechanism that disciplines top executives as a result of poor performance is not only used in Chinese SOEs, but is used more frequently when the governance control of SOEs is more intense. Our findings support the notion that government control strengthens rather than weakens the turnover–performance governance mechanism. Our additional analysis shows that this complementary effect is stronger in regions that lack pro-market institutions, such as investor protections and a functioning capital market.     

Corporate strategy and capital structure

The basic thesis of this exploratory investigation was that a corporate strategy perspective may complement the traditional financial paradigm in explaining capital structure in large U.S. corporations. Earlier fusion of strategic and financial literature led to a series of propositions antecedent to this work. Inclusion of Rumelt's diversification categories plus elsewhere validated financial contextual variables led to hypotheses for the present study. Results suggest a managerial choice perspective may help to explain the capital structure choice at the firm level of analysis.     

Economic Consequences of the Cancellation of Inner Reserves for Hong Kong Banks

Inner reserves, which allow banks to report a higher or lower earnings at managerial discretion, bring into focus the ability of the market to make an informed judgment of banks' performance. This study examines the market response to the disclosure and elimination of inner reserves by Hong Kong banks resulting from a change in the regulatory reporting system. Test results show that despite a significant increase in the variability of bank earnings in the post-compared to the pre-disclosure period, there is no evidence of a significant increase in banks' systematic risk in the post-disclosure period. Earnings-returns association is significantly stronger in the post- than in the pre-disclosure period, indicating an improvement in the value relevance of reported earnings. Disclosure of inner reserve transfer is found to provide incremental information over reported earnings over a short disclosure window. These results suggest that the increased value relevance of earnings outweighs the costs of inner reserve cancellation, thus supporting greater reporting transparency for Hong Kong banks.     

Basic needs or comprehensive development: Should the UNDP have a development strategy?

The basic needs strategy turns out, on examination, not to be a development strategy at all. Most versions neglect the most basic of all development needs–the need for structural transformation as well as a quantum jump in modern industry and modern technology. Considerations of equity, indispensable as they are, do not require that consumption goals be placed ahead of all others. A society is entitled to set its priorities for consumption as part of an overall programme for comprehensive change and development, recognizing that a choice may have to be made between the earliest possible attainment of minimum standards of living and a more rapid and secure advance in such standards in future. International agencies should not take strong positions on such matters, and should concentrate their efforts in the areas where their experience and competence lie.     

A baseline model of industry evolution

The paper analyses some general dynamic properties of industries characterized by heterogeneous firms and continuing stochastic entry.After a brief critical assessment of some significant drawbacks of recent contributions to modeling of stochastic industrial dynamics, we propose a novel analytical apparatus able to derive some generic properties of the underlying competition process combining persistent technological heterogeneity, differential growth of individual firms and turnover. The basic model, we suggest, is indeed applicable with proper modifications to a large class of evolutionary processes, well beyond industrial dynamics.JEL Classification: L11, O30, C60Support to this research by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Austria; the Fujitsu Research Institute for Advanced Information (FRI), Japan; the Italian National Research Council (CNR), the Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research (MIUR, prot. 2002132413 003) and the Free University of Bozen Bolzano, Italy, is gratefully acknowledged. Comments by Andrea Bassanini, Francesca Chiaromonte, Steven Klepper, Uwe Cantner, Drew Fudenberg and the anonymous referees helped in shaping the paper to its present form. Mariele Berté provided the computer simulations of the model. The usual caveats apply.Correspondence to: G. Dosi     

Asymptotic behavior of market shares for a stochastic growth model

Consider a market with finitely many firms, each enjoying an uncertain growth. We assume the (random) growth rates of these firms are independent and identically distributed. We show that the asymptotic probability distribution of the market shares gives each firm an equal probability of dominating the market (while all other firms are almost extinguished). In particular, these conclusions are independent of the initial market shares of the firms. We conclude that sample paths fluctuate between almost domination and almost extinction. We also demonstrate that these fluctuations may be very slow. Extensions to situations where the total demand is restricted are discussed.