Market penetration by entry-exit dynamics

A generic characterization of the dynamics of market penetration by technological artifacts is here formulated on the basis of entry rate and exit rate considerations. It is shown that low-order reductions lead to the biologically based logistic dynamic, which—by empirical fit—has been found to be in very good agreement with numerous specific cases. In addition to the derivational justification of the logistic for artifact market penetration, we find that but a small number of parameters are involved in these autonomous characterizations suggesting therefore that market penetration may well be reduced to a similarly small number of dominant operative processes. Some nonautonomous extensions are also discussed.     

Some economics of content protection

We are grateful to a perceptive referee for many constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper entitled The Economics of Content Protection: A Dual Approach. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Individual rights and organizational theory

Rights are very important concepts in everyday life. And they are especially important to participants in organizations. Yet, our theories of organization and management have largely ignored rights — stressing, instead, other concepts, such as goals, roles, etc. This article describes the historical significance of rights and their relevance in understanding social behavior. The advantages of a right-based organizational theory (versus traditional goal-based theories) are discussed.This article draws on the author's forthcoming book,A Social-Contract Theory of Organizations (University of Notre Dame Press, 1988).     

The welfare effects of import “subquotas” on heterogeneous product categories

In spite of its importance to policy makers, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the welfare effects of one aspect of trade policy-how to implement an import quota that applies to a heterogeneous product category. The government can impose a simple quota that applies indiscriminately to all goods within the product category or it can divide the quota among them with subquotas. In this paper, we analyze the welfare effects of subquotas. Under certain simplifying assumptions we find that a system of subquotas nearly always exists that provides greater welfare than a simple quota for a large country that retains quota rights or for a large or small country that gives quota rights away to foreigners. However, subquotas cannot increase the welfare of a small country that retains quota rights. The difference lies in the effect of imports on the home country's terms of trade.The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the US International Trade Commission. The authors are grateful for helpful comments on an earlier draft by anonymous referees.