MOTIVATING RECYCLING: A MARGINAL COST ANALYSIS

Areas considering alternative house-to-house recycling programs as a means of diverting material from landfills can determine the most efficient choice by comparing programs' marginal costs with diversion's marginal benefits. This paper describes a controlled field experiment that observed individual household recycling habits over a six-month period. The experiment monitored the quantity of material that households recycled under increasingly more convenient (and increasingly more costly) programs. The analysis here uses a Tobit model to determine how the quantity of material diverted varies as a function of convenience factors and demographic characteristics. The analysis compares the value of the expected marginal increase in diversion to the marginal cost of increasing recycling convenience to determine the efficient level of convenience for an area's recycling program.     

The Demand for Life Insurance: An Application of the Economics of Uncertainty

Financial economists typically assume that capital income uncertainty, derived from investments in uncertain returned marketable securities, represents the major source of household consumption uncertainty. But, for many households, if not most, labor income uncertainty dominates capital income uncertainty. This study analyzes households optimal reactions to labor income (human capital) uncertainty that is derived from the possibility of their wage earners' non–survival. By introducing a risk resolution mechanism—an insurance market—and allowing for the possibility that future tastes may be state–dependent, simple demand–for–insurance equations are mathematically derived to explicitly describe households optimal responses to human capital uncertainty.     

Does the Market Value Financial Expertise on Audit Committees of Boards of Directors?

We examine three‐day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of 702 newly appointed outside directors assigned to audit committees during a period before implementation of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX). Motivated by the SOX requirement that public companies disclose whether they have a financial expert on their audit committee, we test whether the market reacts favorably to the appointment of directors with financial expertise to the audit committee. In addition, because it is controversial whether SOX should define financial experts narrowly to include primarily accounting financial experts (as initially proposed) or more broadly to include nonaccounting financial experts (as ultimately passed), we separately examine appointments of each type of expert. We find a positive market reaction to the appointment of accounting financial experts assigned to audit committees but no reaction to nonaccounting financial experts assigned to audit committees, consistent with accounting‐based financial skills, but not broader financial skills, improving the audit committee's ability to ensure high‐quality financial reporting. In addition, we find that this positive reaction is concentrated among firms with relatively strong corporate governance, consistent with accounting financial expertise complementing strong governance, possibly because strong governance helps channel the expertise toward enhancing shareholder value. Together, these findings are consistent with financial expertise on audit committees improving corporate governance but only when both the expert and the appointing firm possess characteristics that facilitate the effective use of the expertise.     

The Impact of Bank Consolidation on Commercial Borrower Welfare

We estimate the impact of bank merger announcements on borrowers' stock prices for publicly traded Norwegian firms. Borrowers of target banks lose about 0.8% in equity value, while borrowers of acquiring banks earn positive abnormal returns, suggesting that borrower welfare is influenced by a strategic focus favoring acquiring borrowers. Bank mergers lead to higher relationship exit rates among borrowers of target banks. Larger merger‐induced increases in relationship termination rates are associated with less negative abnormal returns, suggesting that firms with low switching costs switch banks, while similar firms with high switching costs are locked into their current relationship.     

Household Finance

The study of household finance is challenging because household behavior is difficult to measure, and households face constraints not captured by textbook models. Evidence on participation, diversification, and mortgage refinancing suggests that many households invest effectively, but a minority make significant mistakes. This minority appears to be poorer and less well educated than the majority of more successful investors. There is some evidence that households understand their own limitations and avoid financial strategies for which they feel unqualified. Some financial products involve a cross‐subsidy from naive to sophisticated households, and this can inhibit welfare‐improving financial innovation.