Financial scandals: a historical overview

I examine the incidence of fraud from c.1720 to 2009 and relate it to the occurrence of significant financial scandals. Focusing on the UK, and US prior to Enron, and using a detailed dataset of significant events and news content, underpinned by examination of specific watershed scandals, the paper highlights the regulatory response to scandals and the implications for accounting and financial reporting. The evidence reveals the incidence of fraud and financial scandal to be historically contingent and skewed towards certain sectors, particularly banking and finance, facilitated by complex group structures and international capital mobility, and mediated by managerial incentives and ownership concentration. Financial reporting and auditing can mitigate fraud opportunities in all sectors and businesses without complex group structures, and the accounting profession achieved some success in this respect up to the mid-1970s. Since then, the profession has been increasingly challenged by, and to some degree implicated in, the development of interconnected and international business networks, which, combined with wider financial deregulation, has led to a resurgence of fraud and financial scandal not previously experienced since the mid-nineteenth century.     

Corporate Governance and Financial Constraints on Strategic Turnarounds*

abstract The paper extends the Robbins and Pearce (1992 ) two‐stage turnaround response model to include governance factors. In addition to retrenchment and recovery, the paper proposes the addition of a realignment stage, referring specifically to the realignment of expectations of principal and agent groups. The realignment stage imposes a threshold that must be crossed before the retrenchment and hence recovery stage can be entered. Crossing this threshold is problematic to the extent that the interests of governance‐stakeholder groups diverge in a crisis situation. The severity of the crisis impacts on the bases of strategy contingent asset valuation leading to the fragmentation of stakeholder interests. In some cases the consequence may be that management are prevented from carrying out turnarounds by governance constraints. The paper uses a case study to illustrate these dynamics, and like the Robbins and Pearce study, it focuses on the textile industry. A longitudinal approach is used to show the impact of the removal of governance constraints. The empirical evidence suggests that such financial constraints become less serious to the extent that there is a functioning market for corporate control. Building on governance research and turnaround literature, the paper also outlines the general case necessary and sufficient conditions for successful turnarounds.     

Financial control, managerial control and accountability: evidence from the British Cotton Industry, 1700–2000

The paper seeks to identify the underlying and long run historical determinants of accounting practices. These practices include the nature and relative importance of management and financial accounting techniques, together with the mediating roles of corporate finance and especially financial markets. To explain historical variation in the application of these techniques the paper introduces an analytical model. The model is based on the principles of historical materialism and hence comprises objective and subjective elements. Definitional categories are borrowed from Marx’s analysis of the workings of capitalism, and extended to include contexts where there is extensive socialization of capital, as manifested by the pooling of investments in liquid financial markets. To examine the detailed implications for accounting change, the model is then applied to a longitudinal case study of the British cotton textile industry. The paper shows that techniques of financial and managerial control and mechanisms of accountability can be explained by the dynamic interaction of capital centralization and capital socialization.     

The labour theory of value,risk and the rate of profit

The paper extends Marx's law of value to include the effects of risk. It shows how risk has its origins in the labour process and is transferred between labour and capital on an unequal basis and between capitals on a zero sum basis. An empirical test is then presented, which shows that the employment of labour increases risk from the point of view of the investing capitalist. The conclusion is that the employment of labour is a curate's egg from capital's point of view. On the one hand it is essential for the production of sustainable surplus value and therefore for competitive advantage and capital accumulation. On the other hand employment of labour renders such accumulation inherently risky and therefore commensurately more costly to the rational capitalist investor.     

Predicting mispricing of initial public offerings

This article investigates the ability of neural network models to predict mispricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). The aim is to improve the modest explanatory power of existing models that are based on the theory of asymmetrically informed economic agents surrounding post‐issue market value of IPOs. This study develops and compares linear regression and neural network models. The results show that modelling variable interactions and non‐linearity allows a potentially fruitful approach for stagging in IPOs. Neural networks have been criticized for being a black box; however, this paper shows that, by using sensitivity analysis, neural networks can provide a reasonable explanation of their predictive behaviour and direction of association between variables. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Accounting‐based Risk Management and the Capital Asset Pricing Model: An Empirical Comparison

Accounting‐based risk management (ABRM) is a theoretically consistent and practical tool for calculating the cost of capital from underlying financial ratios. In this paper, a sample of ABRM‐generated discount factors is used to generate risk‐adjusted returns, which are compared to CAPM equivalent discount factors. In view of the debates about CAPM's validity, alternative models, the nature and scale of the equity risk premium, and the importance of discount rates in capital budgeting and asset valuation, ABRM's characteristics and resulting discount rates offer a potentially useful alternative. Results suggest that although average discount rates are comparable, their cross‐sectional distributions are dissimilar, so that investors in an average risky firm are overcompensated for systematic risk when using CAPM discount rates, because CAPM discount factors overestimate risk arising from fixed costs in most firms.     

Corporate Governance,Strategy and Survival in a Declining Industry: A Study of UK Cotton Textile Companies*

ABSTRACT Building on the strategic flexibility perspective, this paper examines the influences of organizational diversity, ownership structure and board characteristics on strategic responses to industrial decline in firms from the UK textile industry. Using samples of exiting and surviving companies it shows that, in line with the predictions of the strategic flexibility framework, the surviving companies tended to have a higher level of organizational diversity. They also tended to have larger institutional ownership and more diverse boards. These factors are associated with higher investment, financial performance, and growth. The results are consistent with the resource and service roles of the corporate governance factors.     

The social risk–rent thesis: A reply to Harney

The paper responds to Stefano Harney's critique, ‘Accounting, Risk and Revolution’ and in doing so offers a further extension of Toms, 2006, Toms, 2010 perspective on labour rents and capitalist risk. Harney's challenge, to ask what is left out of critical accounting's account of risk, is an important one. Therefore the social rent–risk (SRR) hypothesis extends the analysis of critical accounting from systematic risk to include firm specific risk and primitive accumulation risk. It is argued that the SRR approach provides a generalised method of accounting for social relations of production and the necessary conditions of social transformation.     

Accounting for competitive advantage: The resource-based view of the firm and the labour theory of value

This article uses accounting concepts to assist the field of strategic management in its search for a theory of value, competitive advantage and superior profitability. Specifically, it argues that the resource-based view of the firm requires a labour theory of value creation. Using the circuit of capital as an organizing framework this article integrates RBV and Marx's value theory, by introducing the notion of value as socially necessary labour time, into the analysis of resource-based advantage. This enables us to identify the impact of particular sources of competitive advantage as they become diffused through an industry. Some resource-based advantages, when eventually imitated lead to an overall reduction in industry profitability, and other advantages lead to increases in industry average profitability.