Optimal taxation with joint production of agriculture and rural amenities

We show that, when there is joint production of an agricultural good and rural amenities, the first-best allocation of resources can be implemented with a tax on the agricultural good and some subsidies on the production factors (land and labor). The use of a subsidy on the agricultural good can only be explained by the desire of the policymaker to redistribute income from the consumers to the farmers.     

The political economy of public research investment and commodity policies in agriculture: an empirical study

The paper tests a political economy theory of simultaneous government decision‐making on income redistribution through commodity policies and on public research investment in agriculture. We use data from 37 countries on agricultural protection and public agricultural research expenditures (PARI). The empirical results are consistent with the political economy hypotheses. The analysis suggest that structural changes in the economy have important effects on the political incentives for governments not only to subsidize or tax farmers, but also to invest in public agricultural research. Furthermore, the analysis supports the hypotheses that the impact of such structural changes on government decision‐making on PARI is non‐linear and conditional on other factors. Regarding the impact of political institutions, the results suggest that more democracy neither leads to more distortionary transfers (agricultural protection), nor to lower investment in public goods (PARI). ©2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.     

The Role of Patent Rights in Mergers: Consolidation in Plant Biotechnology

Few empirical studies have addressed the impact of the patent system on industry structure. Using firm-level patent data for firms in plant biotechnology, we develop a measure of patent enforceability. Duration models show that patent statistics are useful predictors of the timing of consolidation and that patent enforceability is an important factor influencing the likelihood of consolidation. Acquisitions in plant biotechnology may be motivated by the enforcement of patent rights when firms have overlapping technologies; some merger activity may be explained by attempts to avoid mutually blocking technology, as exemplified by the case of Roundup Ready corn.     

AN ADAPTIVE CONTROL APPROACH TO AGRICULTURAL POLICY*

It is postulated that some issues of economic policy in general, and of Australian agricultural policy in particular, may be analysed in the framework of an adaptive control model. Policy making is characterized as a rational, sequential decision-making process under conditions of imperfect knowledge in which forthcoming information may be used to learn about the uncertain terms as decision periods pass. Emphasis is given to the linear-quadratic control problem. The paper provides a review of the formulation of a policy problem in the framework of an adaptive control model and of derived policy strategies. An illustrative example is reported.     

Complementarities and spillovers in mergers: an empirical investigation using patent data

We investigate the merger behavior of firms in the plant biotechnology sector using firm-level patent data for public and private firms in the 1980s and 1990s. Conditional logit estimation is used to estimate the probability that the firms will match in mergers and spinoffs. We calculate several patent portfolio-based measures of complementarity and spillovers between firms, and find that both are important to defining a good match of acquirer and target. However, complementarities provide the more robust explanation. The mergers and spinoffs observed in plant biotechnology may have been designed to overcome the anti-commons problem of mutually blocking technology, an extreme form of complementarity. Our results highlight the need to integrate patent and competition policy.     

Regulating Multiple Polluters: Deterrence and Liability Allocation

We consider regulation of multiple polluters when individual emissions are unobservable. The tension between pollution deterrence and funding of remediation is examined under two constraints: that penalty revenues fully fund remediation costs and that the regulator cannot make positive transfers to firms. To isolate the effect of increasing the number of polluters, we compare an industry consisting of a single large firm with one in which many small firms in aggregate mimic the large firm. Contrary to previous findings, both the number of firms and the ability to monitor individual firms affect the welfare of a large class of regulators.     

Estimating statistical properties of political economic decisions

Revelation of criteria implicit in setting policy is addressed in a political economic framework that includes identification and estimation of unknown parameters in the presence of multiple sources of uncertainty. Policy formation is viewed as an optimization process under which the government maximizes a criterion function subject to market constraints. A method for estimating political criterion function weights and their associated standard errors over multiple time periods is presented. The approach is illustrated with an empirical example from Japanese rice and wheat trade policy.