Local democracy implications for coastal zone management—A case study in southern Norway

Stakeholder participation is frequently recommended to ensure that public values are taken into account in the decision-making processes. However, few attempts have been made to analyse the extent to which increasing stakeholder participation actually leads to better representation of the public values. The main aim of this study is to obtain more insights about reasons why the most frequently applied form of stakeholder participation, i.e. the public hearings, may fail in representing the general public views and values when applied at a local level. A case study was conducted on policy formulations and decision-making in the coastal zone on the island Flekkerøy in southern Norway. Local- and regional-public authorities contributed in in-depth interviews and with written documentation to inform about a comprehensive stakeholder participation process that took place in the early 1990s. The main findings include that landowner interests, and not public views and values, were legitimised during the participatory process because of: (1) the landowner's strong local social power among inhabitants, (2) the design of the participatory processes favouring the landowner interests, (3) the personal relations between local landowners and public managers, and (4) the low representation of public views and values due to a problem of scale, i.e. the NIMBY syndrome. Based on our experience, we recommend improving representation of public views by changing the frequently applied participatory processes to also include citizens in addition to interest groups and experts.     

Why do transaction costs of agricultural policies vary?

Policy related transaction costs (TCs) is an important issue when evaluating different policy options. However, TCs are often not taken into account in policy evaluations, but may be as important for efficiency as the direct production costs. Different policies may result in different TCs, and the main aim of this article is to explore possible reasons for these differences. We compare the level of TCs for 12 different agricultural policy measures in Norway, and we analyze the causes of the differences along three different dimensions: asset specificity, frequency, and point of policy application. At the national level we find that all three dimensions are of importance when explaining the differences, while variation in TCs incurred by farmers are mainly due to differences in point of policy application and asset specificity. Data show that direct price support has the lowest TCs, while more direct payments for environmental amenities has the highest.     

Resource regimes and cooperation

The choice of resource regimes is a choice over the cost of transacting and the ability and willingness to cooperate. This paper argues that people may be willing to forgo individual gains for the sake of the common good. This depends, however, on the institutional context. Hence, it is argued that an important role of resource regimes is their capacity to define whether the issue is one of individual gain or cooperation. The paper builds its arguments on material from experiments in psychology and economics. They show that cooperative action dominates under certain institutional structures while individual gain is fostered in others. Moreover, studies of behavior in real-life institutional settings—e.g., of markets, common property regimes and public provisioning—support these findings. The lessons learned are finally used to introduce a discussion over the direction of institutional design being able to solve the growing problems of global environmental degradation.     

Governing uncertain and unknown effects of genetically modified crops

This paper analyzes the capabilities of three different governance regimes for adequately handling uncertain and unknown effects of genetically modified (GM) crops. Adequate handling requires the development of sound procedures for identification of uncertainty and ignorance (U&I), reduction of U&I, decisions on how to treat irreducible U&I and monitoring of unexpected effects. The nature of U&I implies, however, that these procedures will be highly incomplete. Governance mechanisms that facilitate cooperative adaptation and communicative rationality are therefore needed. The three governance regimes (GRs) compared are: GM-crops are produced by private firms and these firms are made liable for harm (GR1); GM-crops are produced by private firms and the government decides whether the crops should be marketed (GR2); and GM-crops are produced and the government decides whether the crops should be marketed (GR3). The effect of bringing the civil society into the decision-making process is also analyzed. GR3 will be stronger in cooperative adaptation and communicative rationality than GR2. Public research organizations have fewer conflicts of interest with the government than private firms, and academic norms are important. Difficulties in proving harm and identifying the responsible firm will make GR1 weak in cooperative adaptation and communicative rationality.