An experimental study of strategic information transmission

Summary We examine strategic information transmission in an experiment. Senders are privately informed about a state. They send messages to Receivers, who choose actions resulting in payoffs to Senders and Receivers. The payoffs depend on the action and the state. We vary the degree to which the Receivers' and the Senders' preferences diverge. We examine the relationship between the Senders' messages and the true state as well as that between actions and the true state and contrast the ability of different equilibrium message sets to explain the data.When preferences are closely aligned Senders disclose more. We assess two comparative statics: (i) as preferences diverge, state and action are less frequently matched, and (ii) messages tend to become less informative as preferences diverge. The first result is weakly confirmed for adjacent treatments but is considerably stronger when non-adjacent treatments are compared. We find that as preferences diverge messages become less informative. While the ex-ante Pareto-optimal Bayesian Nash Equilibrium does not explain our conditions, the equilibrium message sets supported by the data are similar to the ex-ante Pareto Optimal message sets.We would like to thank seminar participants at the Economic Science Association meetings, the University of Iowa, the University of Minnesota, Northwestern University and the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory meetings for their comments. We would like to thank Beth Allen, Joyce Berg, Robert Forsythe, Yong-Gwan Kim, Antonio Merlo, Leonard Mirman, In-Uck Park, Charles Plott, Jennifer Reinganum and an anonymous referee for their suggestions. Financial support from the Accounting Research Center at the University of Minnesota is also acknowledge.     

Incentive effects of benevolent intervention: The case of government loan guarantees

There has been a substantial recent growth in government loan guarantees to ailing firms in the United States. This paper investigates the potential incentive effects of this practice. Using the simplest available two-period model, it is shown that when firms know that loan guarantees may be forthcoming, they may be induced to adopt riskier investments and take on more leverage. These perverse incentive effects imply that the actual loan-guarantees-related contingent liability of the government could be much larger than suspected. Our policy recommendation is that the government either abandon the practice altogether or set up a federal agency that sells loan guarantees to all firms at prices that depend on the riskiness of the firm's assets and its leverage.     

The Many Faces of Information Disclosure

In this article we ask: what kind of information and how muchof it should firms voluntarily disclose? Three types of disclosuresare considered. One is information that complements the informationavailable only to informed investors (to-be-processed complementaryinformation). The second is information that is orthogonal tothat which any investor can acquire and thus complements theinformation available to all investors (preprocessed complementaryinformation). And the third is information that substitutesfor the information of the informed investors in that it revealsto all what was previously known only by the informed (substituteinformation). Our main results are as follows. First, in equilibrium,all types of firms voluntarily disclose all three types of information.Second, in contrast to the existing literature, complementaryinformation disclosure by firms strengthens investors' privateincentives to acquire information. Substitute information disclosureweakens private information acquisition incentives. Third, whilecomplementary information disclosure has an ambiguous effecton financial innovation incentives, substitute information disclosureweakens those incentives.     

Toward a theory of bank loan commitments

The characteristics of fixed and variable rate bank loan commitments are analyzed in a contingent-claims framework, and valuation expressions are derived for these commitments. The valuation expressions are used to present estimates of the impact of interest rate uncertainty on the liability assumed by a bank issuing loan commitments. Finally, a simple, two-period, asymmetric information model is employed to explain the recent trend among bankers to substitute variable rate commitments for their fixed rate counterparts.     

Relationship Banking, Fragility, and the Asset-Liability Matching Problem

We address a fundamental question in relationship banking: whydo banks that make relationship loans finance themselves primarilywith core deposits and when would it be optimal to finance suchloans with purchased money? We show that not only are relationshiploans informationally opaque and illiquid, but they also requirethe relationship between the bank and the borrower to endurein order for the bank to add value. However, the informationalopacity of relationship loans gives rise to endogenous withdrawalrisk that makes the bank fragile. Core deposits are an attractivefunding source for such loans because the bank provides liquidityservices to core depositors and this diminishes the likelihoodof premature deposit withdrawal, thereby facilitating the continuityof relationship loans. That is, we show that banks will wishto match the highest value-added liabilities with the highestvalue-added loans and that doing so simultaneously minimizesthe bank's fragility owing to withdrawal risk and maximizesthe value the bank adds in relationship lending. We also examinethe impact of interbank competition on the bank's asset-liabilitymatching and extract numerous testable predictions.     

The Asymptotic Optimality of Residual Income Maximization

Residual income subtracts from operating income an interest charge for invested capital. Residual income can be calculated each period from current accounting information, unlike discounted cash flow (DCF), which requires the knowledge of future cash flows. This paper provides a normative justification for residual-income maximization by showing that if investment decisions are made myopically each period to maximize residual income, the resulting path asymptotically maximizes discounted cash flow. Thus, under the assumptions of the model, residual-income maximization is a heuristic that leads to the long-run DCF-optimum.     

Telematics: Decision Time for Detroit

With implications for navigation, safety, entertainment and vehicle maintenance as well as regulation and infrastructure investment in roads, telematics has the potential to transform driving more than any other innovation for decades. In the already well-established Asian telematics industry, revenue tends to come from extra charges at the time of vehicle-sale, with most subsequent services provided free. The US model has evolved differently, with much of the cost of telematics hardware and software subsidized in the initial vehicle sale price and revenue coming from services used. The decision to invest in telematics is therefore riskier in the US. This article first briefly summarizes the potential of telematics. It then analyzes the investment risks, particularly for automakers. It concludes with recommendations on how the US auto industry can minimize risk and make the most of the opportunities.     

EVA AND TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT

Both TQM and EVA can be viewed as organizational innovations designed to reduce “agency costs”—that is, reductions in firm value that stem from conflicts of interest between various corporate constituencies. This article views TQM programs as corporate investments designed to increase value by reducing potential conflicts among non-investor stakeholders such as managers, employees, customers, and suppliers. EVA, by contrast, focuses on reducing conflicts between managers and shareholders by aligning the incentives of the two groups. Besides encouraging managers to make the most efficient possible use of investor capital, EVA reinforces the goal of shareholder value maximization in two other ways: (1) by eliminating the incentive for corporate overinvestment provided by more conventional accounting measures such as EPS and earnings growth; and (2) by reducing the incentive for corporate underinvestment provided by ROE and other rate-of-return measures. At a superficial level, EVA and TQM seem to be in direct conflict with each other. Because of its focus on multiple, non-investor stakeholders, TQM does not address the issue of how to make value-maximizing trade-offs among different stakeholder groups. It fails to provide answers to questions such as: What is the value to shareholders of the increase in employees' human capital created by corporate investments in quality-training programs? And, given that a higherquality product generally costs more to produce, what is the value-maximizing quality-cost combination for the company? The failure of TQM to address such questions may be one of the main reasons why the adoption of TQM does not necessarily lead to improvements in EVA. Because a financial management tool like EVA has the ability to guide managers in making trade-offs among different corporate stakeholders, it can be used to complement and reinforce a TQM program. By subjecting TQM to the discipline of EVA, management is in a better position to ensure that its investment in TQM is translating into increased shareholder value. At the same time, a TQM program tempered by EVA can help managers ensure that they are not under investing in their non-shareholder stakeholders.