The impacts of robotization on macro and sectoral economies within a world econometric model

A world model of industry and trade is developed to evaluate the probable global impact of robotization on the macro and sectoral economies. It is found that robotization in Japan and Korea has a positive impact on their economic growth, whereas robotization in the United States apparently has a negative impact on economic growth. It is also found that the international impacts of robotization in Japan are negative for the United States, but positive for the Korean economy.     

Japanese Investment in Indonesia: Problems and Prospects

The majority of Japanese investment in Indonesia is import-substitution orientated and located primarily in manufacturing. Declining Japanese investment in recent years is attributable partly to economic factors such as the drop in the price of oil and the higher cost of imports resulting from the devaluation of March 1983 But it is also due to Indonesian government policy. The author suggests a number of ways in which the Indonesian government could establish conditions more favourable to foreign investment.     

拉锯战：2009年亚洲经济展望

虽然亚洲仍然很容易受到全球衰退及金融危机的影响，但其经济基本面还是要好于其他地区。假以时日，亚洲必定会因大宗商品价格下跌而受惠。最重要的是，亚洲决策者有采取颇具扩张性的货币及财政政策的意图和空间。不过政策响应需要一些时间才能发挥效用，而经济的负反馈循环已在形成。在第二轮经济效应（如失业增加、不良贷款上升及存货堆积）的制肘下，     

Re-examination of wage, employment, and hours adjustments: what is crucial for differences in the adjustments?

Manufacturing wage, employment, and hours adjustments are significantly different among developed countries, typically between Japan and the US. The problem of explaining the differences is closely related to that of what effect the extent of wage flexibility has on labor market adjustments. However, prevailing theories are invalid or incomplete for explaining the differences. The differences in the adjustments cannot be unrelated with institutional features of the labor market. Indeed, the extent of wage flexibility depends on the differences in the institutional features. Using a new model with such an idea, this paper theoretically re-examines the cause of the differences in the adjustments. The crucial causes are the characteristics of wage flexibility as well as the differences of the institutional features. The characteristics are that wage adjustment is discontinuous, infrequent, and has a lower limit in comparison with changes in demand.     

Private information for foreign investment in emerging economies

In previous studies it has been found that new foreign investment is significantly related to the stock of existing investment in the country/region. This paper's contribution is the finding that a Japanese firm's new investment in an emerging economy is positively correlated with its own previous investment in that economy and also with the current/planned investments by competitors. These two channels are primarily substitutes; that is, investment by competitors becomes less salient when the firm has experience in the market. The correlated behaviour is not explained by industrial agglomerations but appears to reflect the value of private information to investment in emerging economies.
Information privée et investissement étranger dans les économies en émergence. Des travaux antérieurs ont montré que les nouveaux investissements à l'étranger sont co-reliés de manière significative à la taille du stock d'investissement étranger dans le pays ou la région. La contribution de ce mémoire porte sur le fait qu'un nouvel investissement d'une entreprise japonaise dans une économie en émergence est co-relié positivement avec son propre niveau antérieur d'investissement dans cette économie mais aussi avec le niveau des investissements présents et anticipés de ses concurrents. Ces deux canaux d'information sont des substituts: le niveau d'investissement par les concurrents devient moins important à proportion que l'entreprise a acquis de l'expérience dans ce marché. Ce comportement co-relié n'est pas expliqué par les effets d'agglomération industrielle mais semble refléter la valeur de l'information privée quand on investit dans des économies en émergence.     

东亚2009：顺风和逆风的拉锯战

纷纷加入“衰退俱乐部” 我们曾在2008年11月初大幅下调了对2009年GDP增长的预期，但此后高频数据迅速恶化，我们不得不再次下调我们的预期。我们将2009年亚洲总体GDP增长预期从3．1％下调至2．3％，而2008年增长率的估计值是4．1％。2009年亚洲（日本除外）GDP的增长预期则从5．7％降至4．9％。     

The nature and consequences of lawyers'market regulation in Japan

In Japan, the lawyers'market is regulated so strictly that the contrast between the small lawyers'market and the huge economy is surprising. The number of lawyers is about 15,000, while the GDP and population are $4 trillion and 130 million, respectively. The regulation is governed principally by the Supreme Court of Japan and the Ministry of Justice. Regulations are implemented mainly through (1) strict bar examinations and (2) long trial times. The pass rates of the exam are 2–4% each year, and the average trial time (civil cases and District Courts) is 19.2 months. The consequences of the regulation are that (1) consumers pay 13.9-100.0% higher prices than in countries with no regulation, and (2) the expected rate of return on human capital investment in lawyers is very low, around the 0% level. It is not only a great loss for Japanese economy but also very unfortunate for university students that the investment opportunity in this most respected profession is almost blocked.     

A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ENLARGING THE JAPANESE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

This article presents a cost-benefit analysis of enlarging the Japanese judicial system, especially the civil section of District Courts (CSDC). Constructing a simple econometric model of CSDC, the effects of increase of judges on the supply of judicial services and the trial time are analyzed. Then a cost and benefit calculation is done. The basic assumption is that the total benefit of the judicial system is the aggregate of monetary value of a suit (MVS). The main conclusions are: (1) The demand elasticity for a civil trial with respect to trial time is – 1.3 to about – 1.4 , and its income elasticity is 0.95. (2) The supply of civil trials is proportional to the number of judges. (3) Ten-percent increase of judges will shorten the average trial time by 5.2%. (4) The net benefit of CSDC is estimated to be ¥466 billion per year if the annual discount rate is 10%. (5) Judging from the demand and supply relation, if CSDC is doubled, the net increase of total benefit per year will be ¥543 billion. (6) If the benefit of the external effect on lawyers' market is added, the total net benefit will reach almost ¥1 trillion, which is 0.22% of gross domestic product.