Consumption and Portfolio Choice over the Life Cycle

This article solves a realistically calibrated life cycle modelof consumption and portfolio choice with non-tradable laborincome and borrowing constraints. Since labor income substitutesfor riskless asset holdings, the optimal share invested in equitiesis roughly decreasing over life. We compute a measure of theimportance of human capital for investment behavior. We findthat ignoring labor income generates large utility costs, whilethe cost of ignoring only its risk is an order of magnitudesmaller, except when we allow for a disastrous labor incomeshock. Moreover, we study the implications of introducing endogenousborrowing constraints in this incomplete-markets setting.     

Predicting uncertainty: the impact of risk measurement on value of real estate portfolios

This paper presents a theoretical framework for an assessment and valuation of real estate assets and funds, based on modern stochastic discounted cash flow (DCF) models, which accurately captures the nature of related risks. We show that an accurate risk-adjusted valuation is particularly difficult for real estate investments, due to practical limits to diversification and difficulties in approximating total risk with systematic risk. We develop a risk assessment framework that includes idiosyncratic risk but focuses on insolvency risk related to a specific cash flow profile. We also present a methodology of rating this risk, using forecasts and simulations. We conclude that simulation techniques are a valuable tool in property risk assessment. Further, we show that cost of capital and value of assets depend on diversification of specific risks, investors can achieve in their portfolios.     

Corporate governance and risk-taking: Evidence from Japanese firms

This paper examines the influence of corporate governance on the risk taking of Japanese firms. We show that family control and ownership concentration are associated with higher idiosyncratic risk, whereas bank control has the opposite effect. Considering the link between idiosyncratic risk and firm performance, the results provide an economic rationale for the higher (lower) performance of family-controlled firms (bank-controlled firms). The results also explain the higher performance of firms with concentrated ownership by relating their governance structures to the risk-taking strategies that generate greater competitive advantages. Finally, we show that the impact of governance structures on risk taking is stronger after controlling for endogeneity.     

Institutional ownership,cross-shareholdings and corporate cash reserves in Japan

Cross-country studies document a negative relation between corporate governance and cash holdings. In contrast, this relation is found to be positive in the United States. In this paper, we examine the case of Japanese firms. Using institutional ownership and cross-shareholdings as the main governance variables, we show that better governance is associated with higher cash balances as in the United States. The reason is that better-governed firms make better investment decisions. Their investments are not driven by excess liquidity and result in higher profitability and higher firm valuation. Overall, our findings indicate that management profligacy is a bigger concern to shareholders than management propensity to hoard cash because of risk aversion.     

Accounting earnings and firm valuation: the French case

Considering that the level of the association between stock returns and accounting earnings provides a measure of the extent to which earnings summarize the information which is useful for firm valuation, this paper analyses the contemporaneous association between stock returns and earnings changes or earnings level of individual French stocks and portfolios for periods of one, two and five years between 1981 and 1990. The empirical findings are as follows. (a) Stock returns are more linked to earnings changes than to earnings levels indicating that earnings provide more information about changes in firm value than about firm value. (b) Earnings prepared in accordance with the French accounting principles are not less value-relevant than those prepared in accordance with US or UK GAAP. (c) A cross-sectionally and time-aggregated data procedure provides a large increase in the explanatory power of earnings for returns which is consistent with a noise-in-earnings effect probably induced by accounting measurement and valuation principles and with a recognition lag effect due to the fact that value-relevant events are not integrated into earnings exactly when they occur. These two effects are shown to be the major causes of the low association between earnings and returns generally observed in studies based on short period data for individual stocks.     

The Effects of NAFTA/CUSFTA on Agricultural Trade Flows: An Empirical Investigation

This paper examines the effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its predecessor, the Canada‐United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), on agricultural trade flows at disaggregated product categories. The empirical analysis is implemented through gravity models using different econometric methods. It accounts for the baseline NAFTA/CUSFTA‐unrelated magnitudes of trade between member countries throughout the assessment of the NAFTA/CUSFTA trade effects. The benchmark estimates show considerable differences across agricultural product categories. The net post‐NAFTA/CUSFTA magnitudes of trade between member countries are found to be markedly low in some cases, underlining missed regional trade opportunities. The empirical analysis proceeds to estimate the NAFTA/CUSFTA trade effects by time period and by bilateral trading partnership, revealing important variations. Cet article examine les effets de l'Accord de Libre‐Échange Nord‐Américain (ALÉNA) et de son prédécesseur, l'Accord de Libre‐Échange entre le Canada et les États‐Unis (ALÉCÉU), sur les flux commerciaux agricoles au niveau des catégories ventilées. L'analyse empirique est mise en ?uvre grâce à des modèles de gravité en utilisant une variété de méthodes économétriques. Elle compte pour la ligne de base des magnitudes non‐reliées à l'ALÉNA/ALÉCÉU du commerce entre les pays membres à travers l′évaluation des effets de l'ALÉNA/ALÉCÉU sur le commerce. Les estimations de référence montrent des différences considérables entre les catégories de produits agricoles. Les magnitudes post‐ALÉNA/ALÉCÉU nettes du commerce entre les pays membres se trouvent d′être considérablement faibles dans certains cas. Ces résultats soulignent des opportunités commerciales régionales manquées. L'analyse empirique procède à estimer les effets de l'ALÉNA/ALÉCÉU sur le commerce par période et par partenariat commercial bilatéral, et elle montre des variations importantes.     

Tariff equivalents of nontariff measures: the case of European horticultural and fish imports from African countries

In the context of the Partnership Agreements between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries, this study estimates ad valorem tariff equivalents of European food safety standards on imports of key horticultural and fish products from Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. The study uses an extension of the price‐wedge method to account for imperfect substitution and factor endowment in monopolistic competition. The estimated tariff equivalents are 55% and 98% for imports of fresh peas from Zambia to the Netherlands and the U.K., respectively. They range from 39% to 64% for imports of green beans and avocados from Kenya and from 63% to 270% for imports of frozen fish fillets in EU countries from the East African Community. We also observe large variations in tariff equivalents for the horticultural and fish products over time and EU importing countries.     

Executive Compensation: A Model of Disclosure Choice

Recent public policy debates have led to increased calls for full transparency of executive compensation. However, in practice, many firms are reluctant to disclose the full details of how they link executive compensation to performance. One possible reason for lack of full disclosure is that managers use their power to hide the details of their compensation plan in order to disguise opportunistic rent extraction. If this is the reason for secrecy, then public policy designed to force firms to provide full disclosure is unlikely to be resisted by shareholders. However, another possible explanation for less than full transparency is that some degree of secrecy about executive compensation may be in the interest of the company and its shareholders. If this explanation is correct, then public policy moves to increase transparency may be met by counter moves designed to protect managers and shareholders from such policies. In this paper we investigate if full disclosure of executive compensation arrangements is always optimal for shareholders. We develop a model where optimal executive remuneration solves a moral hazard problem. However, the degree to which the moral hazard problem affects the shareholders depends on hidden information, so that disclosure of the executive compensation scheme will typically reveal the hidden information, which can be harmful to shareholders. The model derives, therefore, the optimal disclosure policy and the optimal remuneration scheme. We find that the shareholders are better off pre‐committing not to disclose the executive compensation scheme whenever possible. Executive directors are shown to be better off too in the absence of disclosure of executive compensation schemes. An argument for mandating disclosure is that it provides better information to shareholders but our analysis demonstrates that disclosure does not necessarily achieve this objective. The results suggest that less than full disclosure can be in the interest of shareholders, the reason for this being that disclosures cannot be made selectively to shareholders but will also be made to strategic opponents. This will be the case if the board of directors and the remuneration committee includes enough independent directors. Whether or not non‐disclosure to shareholders is in their interest is however an empirical matter involving a trade‐off between the proprietary costs associated with disclosure to shareholders and the costs of potential collusion between executive and non‐executive directors associated with non‐disclosure.