Trading Against the Random Expiration of Private Information: A Natural Experiment

For years, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) accidentally distributed securities disclosures to some investors before the public. We exploit this setting, which is unique because the delay until public disclosure was exogenous and the private information window was well defined, to study informed trading with a random stopping time. Trading intensity and the pace at which prices incorporate information decrease with the expected delay until public release, but the relation between trading intensity and time elapsed varies with traders' learning process. Noise trading and relative information advantage play similar roles as in standard microstructure theories assuming a fixed time window.     

ARE DISAGREEMENTS AMONG MALE AND FEMALE ECONOMISTS MARGINAL AT BEST?: A SURVEY OF AEA MEMBERS AND THEIR VIEWS ON ECONOMICS AND ECONOMIC POLICY

The authors survey economists in the United States holding membership in the American Economic Association (AEA) to determine if there are significant differences in views between male and female economists on important policy issues. Controlling for place of current employment (academic institution with graduate program, academic institution—undergraduate only, government, for‐profit institution) and decade of PhD, the authors find many areas in which economists agree. However, important differences exist in the views of male and female economists on issues including the minimum wage, views on labor standards, health insurance, and especially on explanations for the gender wage gap and issues of equal opportunity in the labor market and the economics profession itself. These results lend support to the notion that gender diversity in policy‐making circles may be an important aspect in broadening the menu of public policy choices. (JEL A11, J78, A14)     

When Does Information Asymmetry Affect the Cost of Capital?

This paper examines when information asymmetry among investors affects the cost of capital in excess of standard risk factors. When equity markets are perfectly competitive, information asymmetry has no separate effect on the cost of capital. When markets are imperfect, information asymmetry can have a separate effect on firms’ cost of capital. Consistent with our prediction, we find that information asymmetry has a positive relation with firms’ cost of capital in excess of standard risk factors when markets are imperfect and no relation when markets approximate perfect competition. Overall, our results show that the degree of market competition is an important conditioning variable to consider when examining the relation between information asymmetry and cost of capital.     

Audit Firm Tenure,Non‐Audit Services,and Internal Assessments of Audit Quality

We use data from internal assessments of audit quality in a Big 4 firm to investigate the impact of audit firm tenure and auditor‐provided non‐audit services (NAS) on audit quality. We find that first‐year audits receive lower assessments of audit quality and that quality improves shortly thereafter and then declines as tenure becomes very long. Partitioning our sample between SEC registrants and private clients, we find that the decline in audit quality in the long tenure range is attributable to audits of private clients. For audits of SEC registrants, the probability of a high quality audit reaches its maximum with very long tenure. We also find that audit fees are discounted for first‐year audits but auditor effort is higher than in subsequent years. We find no association, on average, between total NAS fees and audit quality in the full sample but observe that total NAS fees are positively associated with quality for SEC registrants and negatively associated with quality for privately held clients. Our findings are important for regulatory policies related to audit firm tenure and auditor‐provided NAS.     

Marketing Performance and Business Risk in Acutecare Health Trusts - A New Comparative Approach

The introduction of an internal market to the NHS in April 1991 has created a vastly different structure for the delivery of healthcare throughout the UK. This paper investigates the relationship between the changing income structure of acute care Trusts and their use of marketing as a tool to manage an increasingly complex operating environment. Primary data from a postal questionnaire to Trust Chief Executives (or their representatives) has been used to classify the 51 responding Trusts according to their performance within an acute care market that accounts for some £3.57 billion of the annual NHS spend.This is the first time that this type of marketing risk analysis as been attempted within the UK Health Service.

An innovativepositional matrix has been developed, categorising all the acute healthcare Trusts into four categories according to theirMarketing Index (MI) and Perceived Future Income Instability (INS) scores. The study suggests that about 24 per cent of all the Trusts are excessively exposed to future business risk as evident by their rather high income instability scores and low useof marketing tools and therefore more attention to marketing has to be given by these Trusts. Closer analysis of the results ofthe data indicates that those Trusts with a high marketing index (i.e. those more likely to be able to handle income instability),place market analysis, marketing strategy, demand forecasting and personal contact with purchasers, as top priorities. ThoseTrusts with low marketing indexes give priority to pricing analysis and personal contact with purchasers only.     

PER UNIT COST ALLOCATION OF INVESTED CAPITAL WITH ANTICIPATED NON-LEVEL PRODUCTION: THE CASE OF EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES

The concept of equivalent annual annuity (EAA) has long been used as a method of costing recovery of invested capital and the required return on invested capital over the productive life of a capital project. Academic texts almost universally use EAA methodology with level payment streams (annuities) to allocate capital costs. We develop a methodology for allocating capital costs evenly over each unit of production for projects with anticipated non-level production. This methodology uses a modified EAA approach that allows non-level annuity payment streams. Capital cost allocation is an important component in computing the value of extracted minerals for severance tax purposes; however, many firms and state and federal agencies use ad hocdepreciation schedules to allocate these costs. Ad hocdepreciation methods such as modified accelerated cost recovery system (MACRS) may be appropriate for income tax purposes but are inconsistent with commonly found requirements that severance taxes “shall be assessed on the wellhead or mine mouth fair market value.” The modified EAA approach provides a straightforward alternative that is based on sound financial methodology.     

Disclosure and Recognition Requirements: Corporate Investment Decisions with Externalities*

This paper examines the effects of disclosure and recognition requirements on investment decisions when shareholders have limited liability. Firms' investment projects have either high initial pollution prevention costs or high subsequent clean‐up costs, and their liability for clean‐up costs may be either individual or joint and several. Even with individual liability for clean‐up costs, shareholders' limited liability creates an incentive to select the latter project type and to impose costs on the rest of the economy. This tendency is exacerbated when clean‐up liability is joint and several. We show that a disclosure requirement cannot have an unambiguous effect on the selection of the “cleaner” project. However, an accrual requirement, together with an accounting‐based dividend restriction, is shown to promote choice of the project that imposes lower expected costs on the rest of the economy. Moreover, we find that it is possible for a recognition requirement to have a greater impact in a joint‐and‐several liability regime than in an individual liability regime.     

A Model of Shadow Banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which banks originate and trade loans, assemble them into diversified portfolios, and finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, bank assets and leverage move together, banks become interconnected through markets, and banks increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce idiosyncratic risk through diversification. The shadow banking system is stable and welfare improving under rational expectations, but vulnerable to crises and liquidity dry‐ups when investors neglect tail risks.