论我国重复保险制度的立法完善

虽然2009年2月28日第十一届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第七次会议对《保险法》中涉及的重复保险制度进行了局部修正,但这一修正并没有从根本上解决重复保险存在的诸多问题。借鉴国外相关立法经验,有必要对此问题作进一步探讨。     

Malice and patience in Rubinstein bargaining

If two players playing a Rubinstein alternating offers game are highly malicious (getting a high utility from “malice” in every period when the other player does not obtain a share in a fixed pie), and highly patient, no equilibrium with an agreement exists and players choose perpetual disagreement. This does not change if the players are subjected to a known deadline after which the pie will be appropriated by outside agencies or disappear: perpetual disagreement is still the only outcome. If in addition players are required to pay endogenously determined fines if they fail to reach agreement, players with discount factors in a certain range do reach agreement, but only at the deadline. However, infinitely patient players would never reach agreement for any feasible level of one-time fines. The result contrasts with spiteful or envious preferences. Our results highlight a novel reason for failure to resolve property disputes.