The External Funding of Academic Finance Research

We analyze the external funding of academic finance research. We show that funding is uncommon, particularly for U.S.‐based faculty, and is related to predictable attributes of an author's reputational capital. Further, when research is funded we find it is associated with better articles, as measured by publication in the most prestigious journals and the receipt of increased citations over time. Our study has relevance for every stakeholder in the university's research mission in finance.     

Seatbelt and child restraint use among vehicle occupants in Ho Chi Minh City: an observational study in Vietnam

Abstract

This paper presents the trend of seatbelt use, disaggregated by vehicle occupants, in Ho Chi Minh City between 2016 and 2018. We conducted statistical analyses to identify the determinants of seatbelt use, including the effect of a new fine imposed against seatbelt law violation in the rear seats that became effective in January 2018. Seatbelt use was observed in at least half of all vehicle occupants, and drivers were more likely to use seatbelts than passengers. Only 4.4% of children younger than 5-years and 2.5% of 5 to12-year-olds used a child restraint system. Seatbelt use increased among all occupants after the imposed fine, especially among rear-seat passengers. Imposing new or increasing fixed penalties, with enforcement and public education, may increase seatbelt use to prevent road traffic injuries.     

IQ and corporate insiders’ decisions to time insider and outsider trading

We examine how corporate insiders’ cognitive ability (IQ) affects their decisions to time insider and outsider trading before abnormal stock price changes. Our analysis of archival data on male corporate insiders in Sweden shows they are less prone to time their insider selling and to sell in larger amounts, before abnormal stock price declines as IQ increases. We also find that insiders with a higher IQ are better at timing their outsider buying. Taken together, our results show that corporate insiders’ IQ affects their trading decisions differently, depending on whether they are trading in their insider or outsider stocks.     

Management Changes,Reputation, and “Big Bath”—Earnings Management

We study the effects of managerial turnover on earnings management activities in a model in which managers care about their external reputation. We develop an overlapping generations model showing that both outgoing and incoming managers bias reported earnings such that typically very low returns are reported in the first period after a manager has been replaced. Outgoing managers shift earnings forward to their last period in office as they will not benefit from earnings realized after that. Incoming managers can have an incentive to shift earnings to the second period in office as reported earnings will, immediately after a management change, only be partly attributed to their own ability. Deferred compensation can reduce incentives for earnings management.     

商品流通领域执法问题研究

本文认为,执法是法律实施的重要环节,它维护着商品流通领域的法制和公正,执法不力将直接造成商品流通秩序混乱。商品流通领域的执法问题必须引起重视并迫切需要解决。文章提出,为解决当前商品流通领域存在的执法问题,必须加强商品流通行政管理机关执法队伍的建设,减少商品流通领域的多头执法和交叉执法,适当扩大商品流通行政管理机关的执法权力,赋予商品流通行政管理机关应急执法的权力,以坚决打击流通过程中的不法行为,维护流通主体的合法权益,保证商品流通活动健康、协调发展。     

The Costs of Deception: Evidence from Psychology

Recently, it has been argued that the evidence in social science research suggests that deceiving participants in an experiment does not lead to a significant loss of experimental control. Based on this assessment, experimental economists were counseled to lift their de facto prohibition against deception to capture its potential benefits. To the extent that this recommendation is derived from empirical studies, we argue that it draws on a selective sample of the available evidence. Building on a systematic review of relevant research in psychology, we present two major results: First, the evidence suggests that the experience of having been deceived generates suspicion that in turn is likely to affect the judgment and decision making of a non-negligible number of participants. Second, we find little evidence for the reputational spillover effects that have been hypothesized by a number of authors in psychology and economics (e.g., Kelman, H.C., 1967. Psychological Bulletin. 67, 1–11; Davis, D.D. and Holt, C.A., 1993. Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton). Based on a discussion of the methodological costs and benefits of deception, we conclude that experimental economists' prohibition of deception is a sensible convention that economists should not abandon.     

Collateral or utility penalties?

In a two-period economy with incomplete markets and possibility of default we consider the two classical ways of enforcing the honoring of financial commitments: by using utility penalties and by using collateral requirements that borrowers have to fulfill. First, we prove that any equilibrium in an economy with collateral requirements is also an equilibrium in a non-collateralized economy where each agent is penalized in their utility if his or her delivery rate is lower than the payment rate of the financial market. Second, we prove the converse: any equilibrium in an economy with utility penalties is also an equilibrium in a collateralized economy. For this to be true, the payoff function and initial endowments of the agents must be modified in a quite natural way. Finally, we prove that the equilibrium in the economy with collateral requirements attains the same welfare as in the new economy with utility penalties.     

The Integrity Capacity Construct and Moral Progress in Business

The authors propose the integrity capacity construct with its four dimensions (process, judgment, development and system dimensions) as a framework for analyzing and resolving behavioral, moral and legal complexity in business ethics' issues at the individual and collective levels. They claim that moral progress in business comes about through the increase in stakeholders who regularly handle moral complexity by demonstrating process, judgment, developmental and system integrity capacity domestically and globally.     

Determinants of monetary penalties for environmental violations

This research investigates the likely determinants of monetary penalties for poor environmental performance. We retrieve data from Bloomberg on the monetary penalties imposed on companies in the European Union (EU) found to have performed poorly in corporate social responsibility (CSR), and particularly in the environmental aspects of CSR. Our primary findings reveal that firms with high levels of greenhouse gas and hazardous waste emissions are more likely to receive monetary penalties. On the other hand, firms that invest in green supply chain practices and disclose environment‐related matters avoid monetary penalties more. We also find that firms having executive compensation linked with environmental compliance face more monetary penalties. This finding adds a new dimension to the voluminous research on executive compensation that has investigated primarily the effects of cash and stock option‐based compensation schemes on pay–performance sensitivities. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment