Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany

The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid multi-unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending-bid multi-unit auctions. In particular, it is shown that in the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies, the efficient allocation is reached at minimum bids.     

40 years on: An account of innovation in the regulation of UK telecommunications,in 3½ chapters

The past nearly 40 years have seen major developments in telecommunications networks and services, and in how they are regulated. This paper describes innovations in UK telecommunications regulation which have taken place over the period, broken down into stages, beginning with the regulation of the former monopolist by an independent regulator under a price cap, continuing the regulation first of mobile and then, under European Directives, of copper-based broadband, and ending with the diffusion of fibre networks. It is argued that a variety of changes have reduced the scope of innovation over the period, including domestic institutional reform, the limits placed on later decisions by earlier ones (path dependency), and the constraining impact of European Union law and regulation. The paper concludes with some consideration of the effects on future innovation of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.     

On regulations for 5G: Micro licensing for locally operated networks

Future 5G networks aim at providing new high-quality wireless services to meet stringent and case-specific needs of various vertical sectors beyond traditional mobile broadband offerings. 5G is expected to disrupt the mobile communication business ecosystem and open the market to drastically new sharing based network operational models. 5G technical features of network slicing and small cell deployments in higher carrier frequencies will lower the investment barrier for new entrants to deploy local radio access networks and offer vertical specific services in specific areas and allow them lease the remaining required infrastructure on demand from mobile network operators (MNO) or infrastructure vendors. To realize the full vision of 5G to benefit the society and promote competition, innovation and emergence of new services when the 5G end-to-end network spans across different stakeholders administrative domains, the existing regulations governing the mobile communication business ecosystem are being refined. This paper provides a tutorial overview on how 5G innovations impact mobile communications and reviews the regulatory elements relevant to 5G development for locally deployed networks. This paper expands the recent micro licensing model for local spectrum authorization in future 5G systems and provides guidelines for the development of the key micro licensing elements. This local micro licensing model can open the mobile market by allowing different stakeholders to deploy local small cell networks with locally issued spectrum licenses ensuring pre-defined quality guarantees for the vertical sectors’ case specific needs.     

Is allowing trading enough? Making secondary markets in spectrum work

The debate on spectrum reforms has mostly focused on the choice between a property rights and a commons regime. This article argues that moving to a property right system requires careful attention to details in order to avoid that “micro” rather than “macro” factors may prevent efficient trades from taking place. It provides a framework to conduct this assessment, identifies a number of possible concerns and puts forward some solutions.     

GEOSTAR卫星无线电定位系统扩频接收机的实现

GEOSTAR卫星无线电定位系统是为美国本土和世界各地妁地面移动用户以及航海、航空用户提供准确的位置信息和辅助双向信息。用户至Geostar中心线路由移动站的发射机、中继卫星和中心接收站组成并已经建成。来自用户终端的扩频和卷积编码的突发射频信号通过卫星被中继到GEOSTAR中心,由该中心进行信息包的捕获、解调和处理。在突发工作方式的扩频系统中,传输和数据误差率取决予线路特性、捕获概率、虚警概率和使用的解调器数量。本文比较了用户至GEOSTAR中心线路理论和实测传输特性和数据误差特性。     

直接序列非相参扩频系统抗干扰性能的研究

<正> 我国是一个人口众多,人均资源相对贫乏,经济、文化比较落后的发展中国家。要在这样的国家实现科学技术的现代化,建设一个现代化的工业强国,依赖外国不行,闭关自守也不行。坚持自力更生为主,积极吸收国外科学技     

辐照玻璃光特性在辐照鉴定中的应用

对钠钙硅玻璃和石英玻璃辐照后的光特性进行了研究。辐照钠钙硅玻璃在400nm处的吸收值和辐照剂量有着良好的线性关系,相关系数达到0.991,该特性使得钠钙硅玻璃片可用于辐照剂量的核查。此外,对辐照玻璃的热释光、光致发光进行了测量,结果显示可以通过测量热释光、光致发光值判定玻璃是否经过辐照,该技术适用于辐照食品和化妆品的间接鉴定。     

The value of 1800 MHz and 2100 MHz spectrums in India and implications for auction design

The sequence of events leading up to the upcoming auction of 1800 MHz spectrum in India has led to the auctions acquiring an extraordinary significance for the future of the Indian mobile industry. A key feature of the auction design proposed by the regulator TRAI is the benchmarking of the reserve price of 1800 MHz to the price of 2100 – 3G spectrum revealed in the 2010 auction. In the context of the low number of LTE devices available and the fragmentation in the 1800 MHz band, this paper proposes reducing the duration of spectrum holding to ten years (from the current level of twenty years), and calibrating the reserve price of 1800 MHz with its value with GSM deployment. An economic model is used to compute the value of startup and incremental 1800 MHz spectrum. The estimated values are shown to differ from the value of 2100 MHz spectrum at a pan-India level and also in their distribution across circles. A new set of reserve prices are computed based on the estimation. The estimated values are also shown to be close to the AGR-adjusted price revealed in the 2001 auction. A reserve price based on the 2001 auction is also provided. Concomitant features of the auction are suggested to give coherence to the auction design.     

Allocative vs. technical spectrum efficiency

Achieving allocative and technically efficient spectrum management is a key aspect of deregulatory reforms in several OECD countries. However, reform legislation offers few clues as to how these objectives should rank when they conflict with one another. An ‘innocent’ prior acquisition of service-neutral spectrum at an efficiently run auction may prove allocative efficient but fail to be technically efficient if the spectrum is left fallow in the short term. Accountability for the productive usage of a public resource and pressures from short-term political cycles may induce regulators to mandate some minimal level of activity. Two plausible regulatory responses are considered: use it or lose it clauses and spectrum trading incentives. The former favours technical efficiency whilst the latter promotes allocative efficiency. The argument is formalised in a simple economic model buttressing the roles of uncertainty and transaction costs to assert the primacy of allocative efficiency over technical efficiency.