Does local government competition aggravate haze pollution? A new perspective of factor market distortion

Haze pollution has become a new threat to China's sustainable development, but it may be that local government behaviour can play an important role in the prevention and control of pollutants. A dynamic spatial autoregressive (SAR) model is used to study the relationship between local government competition and haze pollution. To further explore the indirect impact of factor market distortion on haze pollution and control potential endogeneity problems, a newly developed intermediary effect model that incorporates the characteristics of the generalized method of moments (GMM) is utilized to explore how factor market distortion indirectly affects haze pollution. The research results show that regional haze pollution in China is characterized by significant spatial correlation, and local government competition has a positive impact on haze pollution; that is, local government competition exacerbates haze pollution. In general, local government competition not only directly leads to an increase in haze pollution but also further intensifies it by distorting the local factor market, and the intermediary role of factor market distortion is approximately 7.04%. The results of the regional inspection found that competition among local governments in the eastern region did not lead to haze pollution, and distortion of the factor market did not exist as an intermediary effect. However, both direct and intermediary effects are significant in the central and western regions. Therefore, an official performance appraisal system that includes ecological constraints should be established to guide the benign transformation of local government competition, and an environmental management mechanism must be developed for joint prevention and control to reduce haze pollution. In addition, the free flow of factors and marketization are equally important.     

Can stable environmental protection officials’ tenure reduce illegal emissions?

Based on the day-night PM_2.5 difference of the nearest atmospheric monitoring points to measure whether there is illegal emission, this paper explores the impact of environmental protection officials' tenure (EPLT) on illegal emissions. The results show that there is a positive correlation between EPLT and illegal emissions. Stable EPLT can reduce illegal emissions by increasing environmental information disclosure and environmental subsidies. It can increase illegal emissions by weakening public pollution reporting and media supervision, environmental law enforcement and promoting corruption. In addition, EPLT can increase illegal emissions as EPLT is less than 3.55 years, while EPLT can increase illegal emissions as EPLT exceeds 6.21 years. Further, when mayor's tenure and EPLT are both stable, the promotion effect of EPLT on illegal emission is stronger. Stable company director's tenure can also aggravate the promotion effect of EPLT on illegal emissions.     

稻鳅共生种养模式试验研究

[目的]稻鳅共生是典型的稻田综合利用模式,符合生态农业发展方向。通过对稻鳅共生生态系统的生理生态学机制开展试验研究,为进一步推广稻鳅共生种养模式提供科学依据。[方法]采用田间试验方法,以水稻单作为对照,研究了不同泥鳅养殖密度下的稻鳅共生对水稻农艺性状、土壤理化性质、水稻产量构成的影响,并对稻鳅共生种养模式进行了经济效益分析。[结果]与对照处理相比,水稻长势在株高、有效分蘖率、根长等方面有一定提高。养殖田水稻株高增高了3%,有效分蘖率提高了8%~11%,根长提高了8.8%~31.3%。在土壤理化性质方面,与对照相比,土壤容重降低了7.1%~21.2%,孔隙度增加了4.1%~14.7%。实验前后养殖田内土壤有机质增加了3.5%~26.5%,对照田降低了2.5%~5.8%。土壤肥力(氮、磷、钾)减少,但减少幅度小于对照处理。稻鳅共生种养模式下水稻产量提高了5%~25%,同时稻田增收泥鳅1 725~3 375kg/hm2,净收入为1.836 0万~2.307 0万元/hm2,经济效益提高了3.65~4.84倍。稻鳅共生种养模式中泥鳅的养殖密度为30万尾/hm2时稻田的生态效益和经济效益最佳。[结论]稻鳅共生有效改善了土壤理化性质,促进了水稻的生长,提高了稻田产量和产值。     

Environmental Taxation and Vertical Cournot Oligopolies: How Eco-industries Matter

This article specifies what an optimal pollution tax should be when dealing with a vertical Cournot oligopoly. Polluting firms sell final goods to consumers and outsource their abatement activities to an environment industry. It is assumed that both markets are imperfectly competitive. Thus, the tax is a single instrument used to regulate three sorts of distortions, one negative externality and two restrictions in production. Consequently, the optimal tax rate is the result of a trade-off that depends on the firms’ market power along the vertical structure. A detailed analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibria in both markets is also performed. In this context, the efficiency of abatement activities plays a key-role. It gives a new understanding to the necessary conditions for the emergence of an eco-industrial sector.      

Pollution Control in Open Economies: Implications of Within-period Interactions for Dynamic Game Equilibrium

This paper examines a two-country, dynamic game model of pollution control in the presence of economic interactions between countries within a period, as well as the environmental interaction between periods (i.e., a change in the stock of global pollution). These economic interactions emerge because of changes in the terms of trade of polluting goods or the market share of domestic polluting industries. It is shown that if within-period externalities exist, a noncooperative equilibrium may result in a smaller stock of global pollution in the steady state than does international cooperation. Moreover, the properties of equilibrium paths depend on the direction and size of such externalities. In addition, trigger strategy equilibria that achieve the outcome of the collusive solution are examined.     

土工实验中的液、塑限测定浅议

文章分析了当前土工实验中的液、塑限测定过程中应当注意的问题及其存在的问题,并论述了如何对其实验数据进行处理和分析的方法。     

Ambient Taxes Under m-Dimensional Choice Sets, Heterogeneous Expectations, and Risk-Aversion

We consider the design of ambient taxes forrisk-neutral and risk-averse polluters whenpolluters and the regulatory agency haveasymmetric information about environmentalrelationships and probabilities associatedwith random events. Unlike prior work, we showthat under these conditions, optimal ambienttaxes must be firm-specific, and accompaniedby additional incentives to influencepolluters' choices of abatement techniques.     

全国土壤污染状况调查中采样点定位方法初探

探讨了通过互联网利用Google Earth以及中文地图网页对全国土壤污染状况调查中的采样点进行定位的方法,阐述了必要的操作步骤及应用技巧,指出了这种方法的不足,提出应用此方法可大大提高土壤样品采集的工作效率。     

Prevention versus Treatment under Precautionary Regulation: A Case Study of Groundwater Contamination under Uncertainty

Policy discussions on agricultural pollution problems characterize prevention as more cost effective and precautionary than ex post treatment. We derive conditions under which treatment alone is more cost effective in situations involving multiple sources of emissions, multiple sites affected, and a commonly used precautionary approach to uncertainty. We also show that a greater degree of precaution can result in less reliance on prevention. An empirical case study indicates that treatment alone is the most cost-effective means of dealing with nitrate in most Maryland community water system wells. The use of leaching prevention measures is restricted to the most intensive poultry producing areas. The incremental cost of precaution is substantial.     

On modeling incentive systems which utilize pollution charges for pollution abatement

This paper examines a scheme of economic incentives for environmental protection, in which spatially differentiated pollution taxes are in use in compensating the pollution abatement costs. A simple mathematical model is described which determines an incentive system that encourages polluters to reduce the discharges to an acceptable level of ambient quality standards in a cost-effective manner. It is shown that the vector of pollution charges has to be proportional to the marginal abatement cost vector, but is smaller than the latter in magnitude. It is demonstrated that a necessary incentive effect may be achieved even if the total pollution charge is much lower (about three times) than the total abatement costs. It is also estimated how this charge incentive system reconciles conflicting criteria of cost-effectiveness and of equity. These conclusions are verified by numerical experiments with real data.