Competition Policy: What are the Costs and Benefits of Measuring its Costs and Benefits?

Summary  Competition authorities are increasingly measuring the effects of their enforcement actions, seeking a robust justification for the proliferation of competition policy. We highlight the importance of identifying the right counterfactual against which to measure effects, and set out the relevant categories of costs and benefits. We then explore how a balance can be struck between the benefits and inherent limitations of these measurement exercises. Relatively crude analyses of cartel action benefits can be sufficient to achieve public legitimacy for competition policy. Assessing the effects of merger and conduct inquiries is often ambiguous, but could be used to improve decision-making processes. Director and Managing Consultant, respectively, at Oxera, Oxford and London. The valuable comments of Fod Barnes, Kerry Hughes and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors alone.     

Efficient Liability Rules: Complete Characterization

Received May, 18, 2000; revised version received March, 19, 2001     

Additive and Multiplicative Uncertainty Revisited: What Explains the Contrasting Biases?

above the certainty level while for additive uncertainty the price should be lower than the certainty level. This note gives an intuitive explanation for the result after first presenting a parsimonious review of the two models. We also discuss which, if either, of the two models is more realistic. Received December 14, 2001; revised version received July 16, 2002 Published online: April 30, 2003 We thank referees for helpful comments. Ciaran Driver would like to acknowledge the research facilities from ANU, Canberra for their help in writing this paper.     

Demand fluctuations and capacity utilization under duopoly

Summary.  This paper studies the impact of uncertain demand on firms’ capacity decisions when they operate in an oligopolistic environment. We define a two-stage game where firms choose capacity in the first stage without knowing which state of Nature is going to realize, and output levels in the second, knowing which state is realized. We prove the existence of a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium at which firms are in excess capacity compared with the capacity they would choose in the Cournot certainty equivalent game. Received: May 17, 1996; revised version July 31, 1996     

Money and specialization

Summary.  This paper examines the relationship between specialization and the use of money in two versions of the search-theoretic monetary model. The first version establishes a surprising result that specialization is more likely to occur in a barter economy than in a monetary economy. The result is reversed in the second version where a different specification of preferences is adopted to limit the scope of barter. This contrast between the results provides a concrete illustration of the general argument that money encourages specialization only when it enlarges the extent of the market. Received: January 31, 1995; revised version August 12, 1996     

Economics and underdetermination: a case study of urban land and housing economics

Underdetermination, associated with the Duhem–Quine thesis,is a familiar if under-researched theme in economics. In thelight of this, we examine the development of urban land andhousing economics. Through its Cartesian dualistic delineationof theory and data, the contemporary mainstream approach appearsunable to circumvent the problem of underdetermination. In effect,it employs the strong version of Duhem–Quine in its retentionof the assumption of a single, unitary competitive market (andassociated access–space trade-off). Conversely, we highlightthe affinity of Ely's (and the later Columbia School's) approachto pragmatists Dewey and Peirce, which provides a more fruitfulbasis for explanation.     

Endogenous Growth and Negative Externalities

Received March 5, 2001; revised version received August 5, 2002 Published online: April 30, 2003     

中间选民理论在农民工市民化政策制定中的运用——基武汉市436位农民工的实证研究

The Median Voter Theory is an important theory in the neo-political economics. It can be applied to solve the collective choice paradox and analyze the policy making for the citizenization of peasant workers. Adopting the method of factor analysis, this paper makes an empirical study on peasant workers’ preference for citizenization. We find that there is a paradox of future residence preference and self-identification in peasant workers. On this basis, peasant workers are divided into 5 subgroups, and it is found that the median undecided peasant workers are the median voters. Based on the analysis of the median undecided peasant worker’s complaints and appeals, it is proposed that the country should strengthen the vocational training system, establish a social security system, expand the agricultural reform and promote educational reform to facilitate the citizenization of peasant workers. __________ Translated from Guanli Shijie 맜理世界 (Management World), 2007, (4): 40–67     

A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of ‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role. I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.