Effect of credible quality investment with Bertrand and Cournot competition

We show how credible revelation and ability to commit to quality choice effect equilibrium qualities and welfare when product market is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We show that results depend on the type of competition but not generally on the cost of quality function. We show that with Bertrand competition, the equilibrium qualities are lower with credible commitment. Competition is moderated and producer surplus is higher and consumer surplus lower. With Cournot competition, higher quality will be better but lower quality will be worse with credible commitment. Consumer surplus is always greater with credible commitment and if cost does not increase too quickly with quality, producer surplus will also increase. Thus credible commitment is a collusive device with Bertrand competition but it can improve social welfare with Cournot competition. Received: February 8, 2000; revised version: February 14, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The idea of this paper originated in the weekly workshops of Mordecai Kurz at Stanford. I am forever in debted to Mordecai and fellow students – Luis Cabral, Peter DeMarzo, John Hillas, Michihiro Kandori, Steve Langois, Patrick McAllister, Steve Sharpe, Peter Streufert, Steve Turnbull and Gyu-Ho Wang – for their criticism and encouragement. I also benefited from comments from Yi-Heng Chen, Jin-Li Hu, Kala Krishna, Jinji Naoto, Thomas J. Prusa, and Shyh-Fang Ueng at various later stages of this work. Last but not least, I am grateful for the detailed comments of the referee.     

Discrepancies between ex ante and ex post efficiency under identical subjective probabilities

Summary. Starr (1973) showed that, if people have different subjective probabilities, ex ante and ex post efficiency conflict. Conversely, under the simple preferences that he considered, the discrepancy between ex ante and ex post efficiency disappears when subjective probabilities are identical. Here I consider identical subjective probabilities, but more general preferences. First, risk attraction is admitted. Second, I dispense with the double requirement (dubbed IZU) of additive separability and state-independence of the utility of zero-date consumption, an unrealistic requirement when modeling the investment in durable goods. I find that, under IZU, and as long as ex post preferences satisfy the natural assumption of quasiconcavity (and satisfy some technical qualifications), an ex ante efficient allocation is indeed ex post efficient, but the converse is not necessarily true under risk attraction. If, on the other hand, IZU is violated, then one can have ex ante efficient allocations that are not ex post efficient, and vice-versa, even under risk aversion. Received: June 25, 1999; revised version: March 2001     

Nonparametric learning rules from bandit experiments: The eyes have it!

How do people learn? We assess, in a model-free manner, subjectsʼ belief dynamics in a two-armed bandit learning experiment. A novel feature of our approach is to supplement the choice and reward data with subjectsʼ eye movements during the experiment to pin down estimates of subjectsʼ beliefs. Estimates show that subjects are more reluctant to “update down” following unsuccessful choices, than “update up” following successful choices. The profits from following the estimated learning and decision rules are smaller (by about 25% of average earnings by subjects in this experiment) than what would be obtained from a fully-rational Bayesian learning model, but comparable to the profits from alternative non-Bayesian learning models, including reinforcement learning and a simple “win-stay” choice heuristic.     

The informativeness of domestic and foreign investors’ stock trades: Evidence from the perfectly segmented Chinese market

This paper uses the perfect market segmentation setting in China's stock market to compare the information content of the stock trades of domestic and foreign investors. We study 76 firms that issue both A-shares (for domestic investors) and B-shares (for foreign investors) and compare the price discovery role of the two segmented markets in China. Before Feb 19, 2001, the A-share market led the B-share market in price discovery, as the signed volume and quote revision of the A-share market had strong predictive ability for B-share quote returns, but not vice versa. After Feb 19, 2001, because some domestic investors were allowed to invest in the B-share market, we find evidence for a reverse causality from the B-share to the A-share market. Nevertheless, the [Hasbrouck (1995). One security, many markets: determining the contributions to price discovery, Journal of Finance 50, 1175–1199.] information share analysis reveals that A-shares continue to dominate the price discovery process.     

Courts and Firm Investments in Real Property

The legal environment and rule of law are important for business, but existing studies often treat rule of law holistically. This article examines the role of courts, specifically the speed of court decisions, the enforcement of edicts, and the impartiality of decision-making as perceived by firms of various sizes, and the impact this has on firm investments in real property. The article analyzes a panel of 6,300 firms from 27 countries in the period from 2002 to 2009 to find that (i) firm size affects perceptions positively, while (ii) paying bribes affects perceptions negatively. At the same time, (iii) a firm’s connections to the government have no apparent impact. More importantly, while all three components have a positive correlation with the amount firms invest in land and machinery, the speed of courts has the greatest significance and the highest marginal effect. Firms perceiving courts to be quick invest nearly four times as much as the average real property investment. This finding suggests that policymakers should focus on reducing backlogs in the court system, perhaps by encouraging more arbitration or staffing more clerks.     

BERTRAND COMPETITION CAN YIELD HIGHER PRICES THAN MONOPOLY

If we take into account the spatial dimension of markets, prices of incumbent firms may be higher and consumer surplus may be lower with competition than with monopoly. This result obtains unambiguously, even in the supposedly highly competitive case of Bertrand competition. Moreover, we are able to show that consumers of the commodity may be worse off with duopoly, if the distance between the firms' sites is sufficiently large.     

An Empirical Investigation of the True and Fair Override in the United Kingdom

Abstract:  The True and Fair View concept requires companies to depart from GAAP or the law if necessary to present a true and fair view of the corporation's financial affairs. We analyze UK public companies invoking a true and fair override to assess whether overrides are associated with weakened performance, earnings quality and informativeness. We find quantified overrides increase income and equity significantly, and firms that invoke more costly overrides report weaker performance. We also find that firms invoking the most costly overrides have less informative financial statements than control firms, and lower earnings quality. In contrast, firms invoking less costly overrides do not exhibit weaker performance, less informative financial statements or weaker earnings quality. These findings are relevant for the debate on principle- vs. rules-based accounting.     

Risk Sharing and Efficiency Implications of Progressive Pension Arrangements*

This paper aims to quantify the welfare effects of progressive pension arrangements in Germany. Starting from a purely contribution‐related benefit system, we introduce basic allowances for contributions and a flat benefit fraction. Since our overlapping‐generations model takes into account variable labor supply, borrowing constraints as well as stochastic income risk, we can compare the labor supply, the liquidity and the insurance effects of the policy reform. Our simulations indicate that it would be optimal to introduce a flat benefit share of 50 percent and a basic allowance that amounts to 30 percent of average income. Such a reform would yield an aggregate efficiency gain of 3.3 percent of resources.     

Effectiveness and Use of Marketing Activities Covered by the 1990 AICPA-FTC Consent Agreement

Members of the Association of Accounting Marketing Executives evaluated the effectiveness and use of marketing activi- ties covered by the 1990 AICPA-FK consent decree to determine what, if any, impact the decree had on CPA marketing. A slight increase in usage of a few of the activities occurred after the consent decree was signed. Many of the covered activities are viewed as ineffective, yet accountants plan to use more of almost all activities. Demographic differences in attitudes and planned usage are identi- fied.