Motivational phases associated with the foreign placement of managerial candidates: an application of the Rubicon model of action phases

This study describes an initial attempt to apply Heckhausen's Rubicon model of action phases to the decision-making process involved in a professional stay abroad. The datas stem from the longitudinal study Selection and Socialization of Managerial Candidates, which provides for the standardized questioning of examinees at the university faculties of economics, the natural sciences and engineering in Munich, Berlin and the Ruhr area. A sample of 453 managerial candidates, employed in German companies, was analysed in this study. The following conclusions for organizations can be drawn from the results of our study: the candidates' values and previous experiences abroad can furnish decisive criteria. Information offered in the job interview can further encourage already motivated persons. The lesser emphasis put on the value 'leadership' and the great importance ascribed to the value 'technological progress' could indicate training needs. Intercultural as well as special management trainings within the organization seem appropriate here.     

Does increased credibility of elections lead to higher political competition? Evidence from India

A large amount of administrative effort is directed towards making elections credible and reducing electoral fraud in large democracies. However, it is not clear if such policy efforts have a feedback effect on political competition. In this paper, we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in perceptions of electoral credibility following the introduction of a technology-induced voting reform in India and find significant impacts on political competition. Electronic voting machines in India were mandated to include an additional layer of transparency by the introduction of a Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT). We find that with the introduction of VVPAT, the winning margins and vote share of winners decline whereas the number of candidates in the average race increases. The results are robust to econometric concerns arising out of staggered implementation of the program providing support to our identification design. Our results also point to heterogeneous effects of the VVPAT roll-out in constituencies that received it only once relative to those that got the VVPAT in two successive elections. Interestingly, we note that much of the welfare improvement through increased political competition is reversed with more experience, suggesting the presence of important learning effects.