组织间关系:价值界面与关系租金的获取

价值界面与关系租金概念的提出大大地拓展了获取企业内生性成长中各种资源的空间。本文通过价值界面、关系租金的模块化生产范式和关系型交易范式的分析,指出了价值界面与关系租金对于帕累托边界外推、埃奇沃思方盒改进的经济学意义,并进一步得出了价值界面构成与关系租金获取的四维模型,为网络创新提供了积极的研究视角。     

Supplements and Complements to the Current Employee Representation System in the United States

Employee representation is an important aspect of the employment relationship. In some countries (e.g., Germany), the government mandates employee representation. In other countries (e.g., the Commonwealth), employers voluntarily recognize employee representatives. In the United States, employees must earn their right to be represented in a certification process that results in collective bargaining. With the significant reduction of union membership in the United States, this representation model is in decline. Other forms of participation have not picked up the slack. Hence, there remains a significant representation gap. In this paper, I describe and analyze several solutions to the representation gap. Both unorganized and organized forms of employee representation are considered.     

The effectiveness of R&D subsidies

In this paper, the effectiveness of R&D subsidies is analyzed in an oligopolistic model that we apply to the cases of international R&D competition and cooperation. We find that the existence of asymmetric information among firms on whether a rival (or partner) is being subsidized or not may play a key role in explaining whether subsidies are effective or not in increasing R&D investments. In particular, it is shown that if the existence of the subsidy is made public (e.g. because strict information release regulation about R&D subsidies is enforced) and depending on the strategic relationship between the firms’ R&D efforts, an R&D subsidy could even hurt the subsidized firm.     

Coordination and learning in games with strategic substitutes and complements

This paper experimentally compares the impact of the presence of strategic substitutes (GSS) and complements (GSC) on players’ ability to successfully play equilibrium strategies. By exploiting a simple property of the ordering on strategy spaces, our design allows us to isolate these effects by avoiding other confounding factors that are present in more complex settings, such as market games. We find that the presence of strategic complementarities significantly improves the rate of Nash play, but that this effect is driven mainly by early rounds of play. This suggests that GSS may be more difficult to learn initially, but that given sufficient time, the theoretically supported globally stable equilibrium offers a good prediction in both settings. We also show that increasing the degree of substitutability or complementarity does not significantly improve the rate of Nash play in either setting, which builds on the findings of previous studies.     

Value creation in innovation ecosystems: how the structure of technological interdependence affects firm performance in new technology generations

The success of an innovating firm often depends on the efforts of other innovators in its environment. How do the challenges faced by external innovators affect the focal firm's outcomes? To address this question we first characterize the external environment according to the structure of interdependence. We follow the flow of inputs and outputs in the ecosystem to distinguish between upstream components that are bundled by the focal firm, and downstream complements that are bundled by the firm's customers. We hypothesize that the effects of external innovation challenges depend not only on their magnitude, but also on their location in the ecosystem relative to the focal firm. We identify a key asymmetry that results from the location of challenges relative to a focal firm—greater upstream innovation challenges in components enhance the benefits that accrue to technology leaders, while greater downstream innovation challenges in complements erode these benefits. We further propose that the effectiveness of vertical integration as a strategy to manage ecosystem interdependence increases over the course of the technology life cycle. We explore these arguments in the context of the global semiconductor lithography equipment industry from its emergence in 1962 to 2005 across nine distinct technology generations. We find strong empirical support for our framework. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Games played in a contracting environment

We analyze normal form games where a player has to pay a price to a supplier in order to play a specific action. Our focus is on supplier competition, arising from the fact that distinct suppliers supply different players, and possibly different actions of the same player. With private contracts, where a player only observes the prices quoted by his own suppliers, the set of equilibrium distributions over player actions coincides with the set of equilibrium distributions when all actions are supplied competitively, at cost. With public contracts, the two distributions differ dramatically even in simple games.     

A global game with strategic substitutes and complements: Comment

In Karp et al. (2007), an argument is made to show existence of Bayesian–Nash equilibrium in global games that may include both strategic substitutes and complements. This note documents a gap in the proof of that statement.     

Strategic Interaction in the Dutch Market for Consumer Magazines

Information goods such as newspapers and magazines have a number of distinct economic characteristics such as a high fixed cost – low marginal (variable) cost structure and the possibility to subsidize content through selling advertising space. We develop a simple one-shot duopoly model that analyses strategic interaction in a market with such features. We focus on the firms best responses and test the theoretical predictions of the model empirically by panel regression techniques using a balanced panel data set of 60 Dutch consumer magazines over the period 1991–1998. Our 3SLS estimation results confirm the prediction of our model that the Dutch market for consumer magazines is characterized by strategic complementarity between magazine and ad prices.     

Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games

We consider n-person games with quasi-concave payoffs that depend on a player's own action and the sum of all players' actions. We show that a discrete-time, stochastic process in which players move towards better replies—the better-reply dynamics—converges globally to a Nash equilibrium if actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements for all players around each Nash equilibrium that is asymptotically stable under a deterministic, adjusted best-reply dynamics. We present an example of a 2-person game with a unique equilibrium where the derivatives of the best-reply functions have different signs and the better-reply dynamics does not converge.