The cross‐cultural study of LMX and individual employee voice: The moderating role of conflict avoidance

This article examines the role of national culture, measured by conflict avoidance, on the relationship between leader–member exchange (LMX) and individual employee voice. Using data collected from automotive industry employees in the United States and Korea, the findings show that conflict avoidance is negatively related to employee voice and also moderates the relationship between LMX and employee voice in the Korean sample. In particular, the relationship between LMX and voice becomes less positive when conflict avoidance is high. On the other hand, conflict avoidance does not have a direct effect on employee voice as well as an interactive effect with LMX on employee voice in the U.S. sample. This study, therefore, highlights the importance of the national culture in the comparative study of employee voice.     

Cognitive ability and human behavior in experimental ultimatum games

Recent researches have shed light on the effect of cognitive ability on economic decision-making. By measuring cognitive ability applying Raven's progressive matrix test, we obtain two significant results that this effect affects decision-making in two types of experimental ultimatum games. First, the higher the cognitive ability, the larger the amount a sender offers when the offer is smaller than or equal to the half split. Second, the higher the responders’ cognitive ability, the smaller the offer they accept, when they accept it or not with the strategy method. This study not only finds new factors that affect decision-making in experimental ultimatum games, but also provides more evidences that cognitive ability influences economic decision-making.     

How Owners Matter? An Examination of Ownership Type in Corporate Disaster Relief Giving

Little research has investigated the effect of ownership identity (or type) and corporate philanthropy experience on giving. In this research, relying on legitimacy theory, we first assess the effect of ownership identity on corporate philanthropy (CP) in the context of the 2008 earthquake in China. Then we explore moderation effects of firms' prior CP experience and size as proxies for perceived legitimacy on owners' efforts at increasing giving and legitimacy. We find that state and CEO ownership are deterrents, while non‐SOE and institutional ownership enhances giving probability and amount. In addition, there is evidence that firm size and prior CP weaken the effects of institutional ownership on CP. This study provides a complete assessment of owner behaviour. Copyright © 2018 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pursuing your leader development: Lessons from 101 executives

To lead effectively in a VUCA (i.e., volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous) environment, leaders must quickly and continuously acquire new skills. However, formal development opportunities aren’t nearly enough to support the ongoing skill development leaders need to manage the level of complexity and change they are facing. Instead, leaders must take ownership of their own development. In this paper, we describe a straightforward, four-step process that leaders can implement to pursue their individualized development through leader development planning. Specifically, we walk leaders through the evidence-based steps of creating their unique leader development plan (LDP), including (1) identifying their leadership strengths and weaknesses, (2) setting effective leader development goals, (3) designing SMART strategies, and (4) reflecting, refining, and realigning their plan. Throughout the article, we detail positive examples as well as common pitfalls that we observed from our work supporting 101 mid- to senior-level leaders in designing their LDPs. Our purpose in doing so is to provide tools and examples to enable leaders at all levels to drive their development at their own pace.     

Negotiation support using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution

The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution is a flexible methodology for systematically studying strategic conflicts in the real world, and is therefore a natural tool for negotiation support. The basic definitions underlying the graph model are reviewed, and the techniques for analysis and interpretation are discussed. The modeling and analysis of a case study, an international trade negotiation concerning the export of Canadian softwood lumber to the United States, are used to demonstrate the practical application of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution as a negotiation support tool. The modeling and analysis is carried out using the GMCR software system. The ability of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution to provide insights and advice to negotiators is emphasized.     

Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining

Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer‐specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—ex ante it was either $15 or $30—affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people’s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents.     

城市房屋拆迁中的公共利益在程序法上的界定——兼评《城市房屋拆迁管理条例》第十六条

公共利益内涵在立法上的缺失,造成大量个人利益被侵犯的案例,在城市房屋拆迁中尤其突出。本文通过探讨如何从程序上赋予受公共利益影响者参与对公共利益内涵的确定以及在个人利益受到侵犯时给予司法救济的途径的问题,试图从法律程序上限制政府对公共利益的滥用,并最大程度地维护公民的个人利益,以此暂时回避对公共利益内涵问题的探讨。     

格莱明银行模式:基于关联博弈的分析

从关联博弈角度对格莱明银行模式进行了分析,认为格莱明银行小组贷款模式实现了贷款博弈与社会资本博弈的紧密结合,正是这种紧密关联博弈克服了成员贷款中的 "搭便车"行为.由于重复博弈的存在,社会资本成为一种可置信的威胁,保证了贷款协议的执行,成功克服了合约中产生的代理问题.格莱明银行模式对我国小额信贷激励机制的建立具有重要的参考价值.     

Average Monotonic Cooperative Games

A subclass of monotonic transferable utility (T.U.) games is studied: average monotonic games. These games are totally balanced. We prove that the core coincides with both the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler and the bargaining set à la Mas-Colell. To obtain this result a technique based on reduced games is used. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71