Do stock market returns predict changes to output? Evidence from a nonlinear panel data model

Recent empirical work suggests a predictive relationship between stock returns and output growth. We employ quarterly data from a panel of 27 countries to test whether stock returns as useful in predicting growth. Unlike previous research, our approach allows for the possible non-linear effect of recessions on the growth-return relationship. There is strong evidence to suggest that a linear model would be misspecified and provide potentially misleading inference. Using a switching regression approach, we find evidence that returns are most useful in predicting growth when the economy is in recession.First version received: November 2002/Final version received: April 2003This paper benefited greatly from discussions with Kalvinder Shields, Mark Harris, Pete Summers, and Vance Martin. Two anonymous referees provided useful comments on an earlier version of the paper for which we are grateful. The usual disclaimer applies to any errors and omissions. Funding from The University of Melbourne greatly assisted in the completion of this paper.     

Output decline and the demise of the CMEA and the USSR: The case of Hungary

The direct effect of market losses in CMEA on Hungarian output was 4%, out of the 18% decline registered in gross output in 1988–1992. Total (direct and indirect) effects amounted to 8%. In the same period Hungary's export expansion in western markets led to direct and total effects equivalent to 2.9% and 5.6% of the 1988 output, respectively. The share of reorientation within this switch from east to west was not negligible, it amounted to 19% of respective trade volumes. The 1991 price explosion of imported inputs inhibited the activity of Hungarian firms only moderately, due to earlier realistic domestic prices. In 1991 Hungary suffered a 26% terms of trade loss, and could have experienced an income terms of trade loss of USD 1400 to 1600 million, had the trade volume of 1990 been repeated. Since adjustments in 1991, much smaller income losses accrued. Due to earlier special tax arrangements, much of the burden of terms of trade losses had to be born by the budget.     

2002年世界经济形势与中国的对策

2001年世界经济陷入了30年来最严重的衰退。这次衰退是继多年经济繁荣后的“硬着陆”,衰退导致世界经济增长曲线呈现“U”字型。从全球主要经济机构的预测结果看,2002年世界经济前景依然黯淡。世界经济的复苏,取决于美国经济的复苏,而美国经济复苏主要依靠扩张性政策的拉动,是政策导向型的复苏。面对严峻的外部经济环境,2002年中国经济要实现7%以上的增长,在立足于内需的同时,应对对外经济政策做适当的调整。     

Evolutions and Contradictions in Mainstream Macroeconomics: The Case of Olivier Blanchard

This article traces the complex intellectual path of Olivier Blanchard, a personification of the controversial evolution of macroeconomic research over the last three decades. After contributing to consolidation of the core of mainstream macroeconomics, Blanchard recently suggested ‘rethinking’ some of its key aspects to take stock of the lessons of the 2008 Great Recession, which he witnessed as the International Monetary Fund’s Chief Economist. This welcome discussion, which according to Blanchard should open mainstream macroeconomics to heterodox thinking, has so far produced a certainly interesting albeit theoretically contradictory synthesis and limited policy consequences. The most paradigmatic aspect of this rethinking of macroeconomics is represented by the abandonment in teaching of aggregate supply and demand in favor of a revival of the IS–LM model complemented by the Phillips curve. While this change of perspective does allow for the instability of ‘natural’ equilibrium to be emphasized, a deeper reading may prove incompatible with the neoclassical foundations of the mainstream approach.     

Corporate governance in family firms,learning and reaction to recession: Evidence from Italy

This paper focuses on the interaction between internal and external factors explaining performance of small and medium-sized family firms. We used framework foresight to suggest how learning and internal factors such as CEO’s origin, tenure and turnover, could affect the firm’s reactions to one particular external factor, economic recession. The paper draws on empirical observations of a large sample of small and medium family firms operating in Italy between 2002 and 2011 to identify the baseline future, an expected future for these firms. This analysis may be of interest to both management scholars and practitioners. We hope to contribute to the debate on how internal and external factors interact to affect firm success, measured as sales growth. The implications for the future viability of an economic system based on family businesses are straightforward, as the turbulence and instability of the economic environment has grown significantly in the last decade, especially in more developed countries. Whether the ability of a company to adapt and survive to negative shocks depends on its governance provides a rationale for exploring alternative perspectives on the competitiveness of the economic system and the ability of different owners to cope with future negative events.     

DSGE forecasts of the lost recovery

The years following the Great Recession were challenging for forecasters. Unlike other deep downturns, this recession was not followed by a swift recovery, but instead generated a sizable and persistent output gap that was not accompanied by deflation as a traditional Phillips curve relationship would have predicted. Moreover, the zero lower bound and unconventional monetary policy generated an unprecedented policy environment. We document the actual real-time forecasting performance of the New York Fed dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model during this period and explain the results using the pseudo real-time forecasting performance results from a battery of DSGE models. We find the New York Fed DSGE model’s forecasting accuracy to be comparable to that of private forecasters, and notably better for output growth than the median forecasts from the FOMC’s Summary of Economic Projections. The model’s financial frictions were key in obtaining these results, as they implied a slow recovery following the financial crisis.     

Wilhelm Röpke and Richard C. Koo On Secondary Deflations and Balance Sheet Recessions

The concept of a ‘secondary deflation’ was developed in the 1930s by the German economist Wilhelm Röpke, who saw it as something different from a normal depression. While a primary deflation is a necessary reaction to the inflation from a boom period, a secondary deflation is independent and economically purposeless. Röpke argued that secondary depressions occurred in the US, Germany, France and Switzerland during the 1930s, but was vague on what made them follow primary depressions. Recently, the Taiwanese–American economist Richard C. Koo has claimed to have discovered the ‘Holy Grail of macroeconomics’, that is, what made the Great Depression so deep and long. During the Great Depression, the bursting of the asset price bubble resulted in private sectors having more debt than assets; as they shifted from maximising profits to minimising debt, the consequent debt deflation shrank the economy. According to Koo, Western economies today are suffering from a similar ‘balance sheet recession’. Strengthened by the notion of a balance sheet recession, Röpke's long‐lost insights might advance our understanding of the business cycle in general and the present crisis in the US and the Eurozone in particular.     

Looking into the abyss? Brazil at the mid-2010s

In 2015, the Brazilian economy was afflicted by a lethal combination of a falling level of activity and accelerating inflation. Expectations for 2016 are equally or even more adverse, since the effects of rising unemployment emerge only after a lag. The domestic debate has opposed analysts who believe the crisis is due exclusively to past policy mistakes to analysts who believe that all was well until the government decided to implement austerity policies in 2015. A closer examination of the evidence shows that in fact both reasons contributed to causing the crisis, but it also suggests that its depth has a more proximate cause in the political collapse of the federal government in 2015, which led Brazilian society to an impasse for which a solution is not yet in view.     

Entry dynamics of self-employment in South Korea

The purpose of this paper is to clarify whether the entry into self-employment was an inevitable move due to economic recession (push hypothesis) or a voluntary move due to entrepreneurship (pull hypothesis) in Korea. It also examines how this decision is affected by changes in socio-economic conditions. The empirical analysis in this study exploited the matched sample for the adjacent months in the Economically Active Population Survey (EAPS) conducted by Korea National Statistical Office in 2000–2004. The empirical results showed that the push aspect of self-employment was strong in Korea over the whole sampled periods. The entry into self-employment in South Korea is largely attributable to economic sluggishness and an increase in unemployment rather than a voluntary transition resulting from entrepreneurship. Policy environment (such as providing information and financial support for new start-ups after the Asian financial crisis), which is a country-specific factor magnified the pushed effects. For the pushed (unprepared) self-employed people, not only is there a need to expand the coverage of vocational training programmes, but also it is vital that social safety nets are strengthened and supplemented.     

WHICH INDUSTRIES TO BAIL OUT FIRST IN ECONOMIC RECESSION? RANKING US INDUSTRIAL SECTORS BY THE POWER-OF-PULL

There have been intense debates regarding which industrial sectors should be prioritized for receiving bailout in economic recessions. This paper takes a network perspective to rank sectors according to the Power-of-Pull (PoP), i.e. a sector's power to pull the overall economy. An eigenvector method is employed to assess the PoP of sectors in the USA, using input–output data from 1998 to 2010. The results support bailout to the motor vehicle sector, but argue against bailout to public infrastructure, health care and information technologies design and service sectors, and also reveal the continual decline of PoP ranking of computer and electronics manufacturing sector over time. These results confirm some but also show little support to some other economic revival policies of the Obama Administration in the USA.