Does corporate diversification create value in emerging markets? New evidence from Chile

Using a sample of 85 Chilean firms listed in the Santiago Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2013, we analyze the impact of corporate diversification on firm value. We consider voting rights of the main shareholder and institutional investors’ influence on firm value. We report firm‐value destruction for diversified firms. Regarding ownership concentration, we report a negative relation between the largest shareholder ownership and firm value. Separation between voting rights and cash flows rights of this shareholder is negatively related to firm value. While Pension Fund Administrators (AFP) mitigate firm value destruction in diversified firms, other institutional investors do not play an active role in controlling value destruction. Finally, if the largest owner is a family, we report firm‐value creation in diversified firms. Copyright © 2016 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Activist‐impelled divestitures and shareholder value

Research Summary : This study analyzes how the divestitures that are impelled by activist investors in their campaigns against public corporations affect shareholder value. Using hand‐collected data on the activist campaigns that were launched against and the divestitures that were undertaken by Fortune 500 companies between 2007 and 2015, we find that activist‐impelled divestitures are more positively associated with immediate and longer‐term measures of shareholder value than comparable manager‐led divestitures. These performance differences persist for nearly two years after the completion of these deals. Our results empirically test the idea that firms with agency problems unlock shareholder value when they divest, and support the notion that activist investors fulfill an important external governance function. Our work also opens new research opportunities and offers practical implications as well. Managerial Summary : This study investigates how divestitures that are undertaken at the behest of activist investors affect shareholder value. We find that divestitures that were undertaken under pressure from activist investors are associated with more positive shareholder returns than comparable divestitures that were undertaken voluntarily by managers. These performance differences persist for nearly two years after the completion of these deals, alleviating concerns about the purported short‐termism of activist investors. Our findings suggest that activist investors may fulfill an important governance function by inducing managers to undertake strategies that they might not otherwise pursue, thereby unlocking shareholder value.     

Contrarian Investment in the Dutch Stock Market

The efficient markets hypothesis states that at any times security prices fully reflect all available information. Contrarian investment strategies do not recognize the efficiency of capital markets. They call for buying undervalued stocks, i.e. stocks with a low price relative to their fundamentals. The idea behind such a strategy is to take advantage of the extrapolation behaviour of naive investors. Using a fresh and extensive data set from the Dutch stock market, we found that these strategies yield an outperformance without a higher risk. Our results make it hard to maintain the efficient market hypothesis.     

The appraisal of ordinary shares by Saudi investors

This paper reports on a questionnaire survey about share valuation practices among investors and their intermediaries in Saudi Arabia. The findings suggest that fundamental analysis is used most by investor respondents where a P/E multiple is applied to an earnings forecast to generate a prediction of future price. However, technical analysis is also used to a much greater extent than in developed markets. Finally, the results indicate that quarterly and annual reports as well as newspapers are widely consulted by investors when forming their expectations about share valuations.     

Capital market trading volume: an overview and some preliminary conclusions

This paper suggests an explanation for the heavy trading volumeobserved on the US capital markets, the world's largest. Heterodoxeconomic theory puts much of this volume down to speculation.Mainstream theory tends to support this thesis, either directlyor indirectly, by giving space to the idea that trading activityis for the most part exogenous to the functioning of the capitalmarkets. The central hypothesis of this paper is that the tradingvolumes observed are an endogenous feature of the capital markets,because they are to a great extent determined by the needs ofthe institutional investors who predominate on these markets.This endogeneity of trading is posited in connection with theemergence of a new ‘core–satellite’ paradigmin institutional investment, a development that essentiallymanifests the asset-management industry's transformation froma small industry serving a few wealthy clients to a mass industryserving large sections of the population.     

境外战略投资者参股中资银行与中国金融安全

近期，关于引入境外战略投资者是否会影响中国金融安全的讨论颇多，但研究者在讨论时所使用的金融安全概念较为模糊，不利于正确理解两者之间关系。本文从界定金融安全的概念入手，澄清了金融安全的学术含义及当前人们所关心的金融安全问题，之后对目前引进战略投资者的情况进行介绍，通过对我国的引资政策和相关数据的深度分析得出结论，认为不应该对中国金融安全过分担忧，而阻碍通过引入境外战略投资者促进银行业改革的战略。     

多主体投资对经济增长贡献的回归分析

在市场经济条件下,多种资本的联合、重组和流动是促进经济发展的重要手段之一。本文根据道格拉斯生产函数、以改革开放近20年来的国有投资、集体投资和个体投资数据为样本构造了多主体投资生产函数,并进行多主体投资对经济增长的回归分析。     

不完全信息与FSI对国有银行治理结构的作用

建立了一个简单的公司绩效模型,以代理问题和公司治理为代表分析了引进境外战略投资者对改善国有商业银行内部治理的作用,以超产权理论和公司治理为代表分析了其对改善外部治理的作用,说明了引进境外战略投资者是一种战略选择。     

国有公司财务监督问题研究

现行的国有公司财务监督中缺少真正代表国有资本所有者行使监督职权的机构和人员，董事会、监事会和财务人员管理体制的缺陷以及外部审计监督的不力使得国有公司经营管理者有机会违规获取个人利益，结果必然导致国有资产流失。应考虑建立国有公司出资者监督代表的再监督制度和对财务监督人员的激励约束制度，推行国有公司年报审计的公开招标制。     

引入战略投资者与我国商业银行改革

引入境外战略投资者、海外上市几乎成了目前国有商业银行股份制改革的必经之路，但这种改革模式正引起广泛争议。我国商业银行在推进股份制改革过程中引入境外战略投资者，有其深刻的经济背景；外资金融机构对中资银行进行股权投资，也有其种种动因。国有银行把部分股权卖给外资战略投资者，其究竟算不算“贱卖”，最终还得通过市场实践才能得以验证。