Bribery,corruption and bureaucratic hassle: Evidence from Myanmar

Corruption has been found to be the most severe obstacle to business operations, according to a recent survey of over 3000 firms in Myanmar. This paper sets out to understand the structure of corruption through an econometric analysis of this survey. It finds that firms with higher ‘ability to pay’ (proxied by sales revenue and employee growth) are more likely to pay bribes. While firms with lower ‘refusal power’ (i.e. those dependent on bureaucratic permissions to export and import) are more likely to find corruption to be an obstacle. A distinct but related question is whether bribes act as ‘efficiency grease’ by allowing firms to circumvent red tape. No evidence is found to support this hypothesis; in fact, firms that pay bribes report greater bureaucratic hassle compared to firms that do not. This result fits in more closely with the view that red tape could be used to extract bribes from firms.     

我国注册会计师刑事责任若干问题探讨

提供虚假证明文件罪和出具证明文件重大失实罪是与注册会计师刑事责任最为密切的两个罪名,有关此两罪的立法和司法实践存在诸多需要探讨的问题。在立法方面,探讨了两罪的追诉标准和提供虚假证明文件罪的法定加重情形等问题;在司法实践方面,从单位犯罪、共同犯罪两个方面探讨了两罪的法律适用。     

Foreign ownership and bribery: Agency and institutional perspectives

In this study we examine the effectiveness of formal institutions (as the macro-level mechanism) and external auditing (as the micro-level mechanism) in controlling multinational firms’ engagement in bribery. We adopt World Bank’s data and investigate 38,673 firms in 113 countries. Our results suggest that a firm’s engagement in bribery is positively related to its foreign ownership. Furthermore, we demonstrate the substitute effects of formal institutions and external auditing in controlling this unethical activity. We argue that in a situation whereby formal institutions are weak, a firm’s internal governance mechanism plays a vital role in controlling bribery.     

Bribery and firm performance in India: A political economy perspective

This study examines how corruption affects firm performance in India using data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for 2013-14. A set of testable hypotheses is formulated with regard to the interaction between bribery and the political environment to capture the nuances of the effect of corruption on firm performance. To overcome endogeneity between bribery and firm performance, the study employs two-stage least squares instrumental variables estimation. The foremost finding is that bribery has significantly negative effects on firm profitability and labor productivity. This finding confirms the hypothesis that in India bribery “sands the wheels” of business. A further finding is that the negative effect of bribery on productivity is stronger in states run by right leaning parties, although there is no significant effect of party orientation on the relationship between bribery and profitability. This finding supports the hypothesis that tighter connections between business and government facilitate rent seeking that undermines productivity even as profitability is unencumbered. Finally, bribery is found to have more harmful effects on smaller and older firms than on larger and younger ones.     

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION: WHAT HAS PAST DECADE'S EMPIRICAL RESEARCH TAUGHT US? A SURVEY

Corruption has fierce impacts on economic and societal development and is subject to a vast range of institutional, jurisdictional, societal, and economic conditions. It is this paper's aim to provide a reassessment and a comprehensive state ‐ of ‐ the ‐ art survey of existing literature on corruption and its causes and effects. A particularly strong focus is put on presenting and discussing insights resulting from empirical research and contrasting recent with older findings.     

Press freedom and corruption in business-state interactions

We show that press freedom has a role in constraining business corruption. Using firm-level data, we find that countries with greater press freedom have significantly fewer incidences of bribery involving public officials. In particular, we find that a free press is associated with a substantial reduction in the percentage of firms that report corruption during interactions with tax officials and when obtaining construction permits. Furthermore, we find that fewer businesses in these countries report that corruption is the biggest problem that they face. These findings highlight the role of an independent media in combating corruption.     

Corruption in international business

I analyze corruption in international business, presenting a critical assessment of the topic and providing suggestions for future research. I argue that corruption creates a laboratory for expanding international business studies because its illegal nature, the differences in perception about illegality, and the variation in the enforcement of laws against bribery across countries challenge some of the assumptions upon which arguments have been built, i.e., that managers can choose appropriate actions without major legal implications. Hence, I first provide suggestion for how to analyze the topic of corruption in future studies by analyzing the types, measures, causes, consequences, and controls of corruption. I then provide suggestions for how to extend leading theories of the firm by using corruption as a laboratory that challenges some of the assumptions of these theories: extending agency theory by analyzing the existence of unethical agency relationships; extending transaction cost economics by analyzing illegal transaction costs minimization; extending the resource-based view by studying corporate social irresponsibility capability; extending resource dependency by analyzing the ethical power escape; and extending neo-institutional theory by studying illegal legitimacy.     

Bribery in International Business in Post-Soviet Union Countries

Data from 1996 to 2016 on perceived levels of bribe taking in 15 post-Soviet Union countries indicate three distinct groups—Russia and seven contiguous countries are most prone to bribe taking, a set of four countries in the southwest less so, and the three Baltic nations are the least corrupt. Public officials in countries that have high economic freedom and human development, are democracies, and proactively adhere to global anti-bribery treaties are less likely to take bribes. The findings show that despite a common recent history, the countries have evolved differently following the breakup. Implications for international businesses are discussed.     

Imprecise information disclosure and truthful certification

This article studies the interaction of information disclosure and reputational concerns in certification markets. We argue that by revealing information less precisely, a certifier reduces the threat of capture because this reduces her gains from selling fraudulent certificates. As a result, only imprecise disclosure rules are implementable for intermediate discount factors. Our results therefore suggest that contrary to the common view, imprecise disclosure may be socially desirable. Regulatory intervention may provoke market failure especially in industries where certifier reputational rents are low.     

论“村官贿选”的法律规制

村民自治是我国民主政治体制中的一大特色,是人民当家做主的直接体现。然而,当前由于相关选举机制、法律机制和监督机制不完善,导致“村官贿选”现象日益突出。治理“村官贿选”,在主观方面,应当促进村民的权利意识与文化素养的提高;在客观方面,应当完善相关法律制度,以促进选举制度的规范化发展,确保村民选举权与被选举权的落实。