Production-location decision and free entry oligopoly: A correction

This paper shows that there is no interior solution in Mai–Hwang's 1992 oligopolistic location model with free entry when the production function exhibits constant or decreasing returns to scale. The comparative static results of the impact of a demand change on the location decision only apply to the case where the production function exhibits increasing returns to scale. It re-examines the impact of a demand change on the location decision of an oligopolistic firm and corrects the propositions derived by [C.C. Mai, H. Hwang, Production-location decision and free entry oligopoly, Journal of Urban Economics 33 (1992) 252–271. Reprinted in: M.L. Greenhut, G. Norman (Eds.), The Economics of Location, vol. I: Location Theory, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1995].     

使用差价补偿策略的寡头竞争模型

差价补偿策略,是近年来在国内兴起的一种企业间竞争策略。从博弈论角度来看,对消费者承诺差价补偿,即是向竞争对手发出了一种不打价格战的可置信的威胁信号,可以有效地避免企业间的价格竞争;从市场营销角度来看,差价补偿策略会影响消费者行为,改变消费者预期,最终促使市场竞争向着企业有利的方向发展。本文对差价补偿策略建立了一个数学模型,分析企业采用差价补偿策略的原因以及竞争双方博弈的均衡结果。     

On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in price–quantity games

This paper examines the existence and characteristics of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in oligopoly models in which firms simultaneously set prices and quantities. Existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium is proved for a class of price–quantity games. If the demand function is continuous, then the equilibrium outcome is similar to that of a price-only model. With discontinuous demand and limited spillover, there are rationing equilibria in which combined production falls short of market demand. Moreover, there might again be an equilibrium reflecting the outcome of a price game. Competition in price and quantity thus yields Bertrand outcomes under a variety of market conditions.     

THE THEORY OF ENDOGENOUS MARKET STRUCTURES

Most market structures are neither perfectly or monopolistically competitive: they are characterized by a few large firms that are engaged in strategic interactions in their production and investment decisions and whose number is endogenous. The theory of endogenous market structures analyzes markets in partial and general equilibrium where strategies affect entry and entry affects strategies, and exogenous primitive conditions on technology and preferences affect the equilibrium. We discuss applications to industrial organization, international trade, business cycle theory, international finance, growth and implications for welfare and for competition, trade, fiscal and monetary policy.     

中国卷烟行业竞争态势分析

我国卷烟企业长期存在生产规模小、分布范围散、销售区域性强等的特点,卷烟行业始终处于一种"优不胜、劣不汰"的低水平均衡。本文从博弈的角度解释了这种现象的产生原因,并分析了我国卷烟行业的市场竞争类型,提出建立寡头垄断市场是重组卷烟企业的目标。     

有效需求波动、国有商业银行调整刚性与外资银行经营规模的选择

本文建立了一个有效需求水平不确定情况下的两阶段混合寡占博弈模型．前瞻性地讨论了国有商业银行的经营规模表现出调整刚性的情况下，外资银行经营规模的选择、其实际想要吸收的均衡存款量与选定经营规模之间所存在的关系．以及这种关系将会带来怎样的宏观经济与社会福利后果等问题。研究发现：（1）当实际中的有效需求水平越低时，外资银行经营规模的“产能”过剩；（2）当实际中的有效需求水平越高时，外资银行经营规模的“产能”不足。这一发现具有实施促进经济增长、有效控制居民收入差距政策方面的理论含义。     

Climate change policy, market structure, and carbon leakage

The 1997 Kyoto Protocol on climate change obliges the industrialized countries to initiate the international effort of abating anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. If such an initiative is to be taken, the associated competitive effects may lead to significant relocation of developed countries' energy-intensive production. This paper examines this issue. I adopt an oligopolistic structure combined with increasing returns to scale production technologies to represent the strategic interaction among the firms producing energy-intensive products. This representation is then embedded within a multi-regional computable general equilibrium model, which in turn is used for quantifying these relocational effects. The results suggest that significant relocation of energy-intensive industries away from the OECD may occur, depending on the type of market structure, with leakage rates as high as 130%, in which case GHG control policies in the industrialized countries actually lead to higher global emissions.     

Correlation Tests for Competitive and Cournot Equilibria

This note derives simple correlation tests for eithercompetitive or Cournot conduct. Robustness of theprocedure is theoretically explored and a time-seriescorrection for inflation or market growth is derived.     

The price normalization problem in imperfect competition and the objective of the firm

Summary. General equilibrium models of oligopolistic competition give rise to relative prices only without determining the price level. It is well known that the choice of a numéraire or, more generally, of a normalization rule converting relative prices into absolute prices entails drastic consequences for the resulting set of Nash equilibria when firms are assumed to maximize profits. This is due to the fact that changing the price normalization amounts to altering the objective functions of the firms. Clearly, the objective of a firm must not be based on price normalization rules void of any economic content. In this paper we propose a definition of the objective of a firm, called maximization of shareholders' real wealth, which takes shareholders' demand explicitly into account. This objective depends on relative prices only. Real wealth maxima are shown to exist under certain conditions. Moreover, we consider an oligopolistic market and prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in which each firm maximizes the real wealth of its shareholders. Received: July 10, 1997; revised version: July 27, 1998     

The impact of e-commerce: It always benefits consumers, but may reduce social welfare

This paper investigates the impact of e-commerce on social welfare using a linear city model. Our model incorporates the diversity of consumers such that some can purchase the good via the Internet while others cannot. Our main result is as follows. The appearance of e-commerce enhances retail competition and always increases consumer surplus. However, total surplus does not necessarily improve. This is because the equilibrium market division between conventional stores and e-commerce is not socially optimal and efficiency loss of distribution accrues if the population of Internet shoppers is small and/or the cost of e-commerce is high. Our theoretical results indicate that the small e-commerce market share in the Japanese and US economies may result in welfare loss.