Maximum efforts in contests with asymmetric valuations

Efforts may be reduced when players with different valuations participate in a contest. This paper considers the problem of designing a contest to elicit maximum aggregate effort from players with asymmetric valuations. Optimal designs for different classes of contest technologies are computed and characterized. A value weighted contest is optimal in the concave case. In the unconstrained case, the optimal contest is equivalent to a first price all-pay auction with a reserve price. The optimal design discounts the effort of the high valuation player in order to induce him to compete vigorously.     

金融组织强制性信息披露问题研究

由于规模经济的原因,作为信息劣势方——投资者公共利益代表者的政府必然成为强制性信忠披露的主体。政府按照参与约束原则和激励相容原则进行机制设计甄别金融组织,引导其确定合理的信忠披露边界,形成分离均衡,金融市场上的非对称信息转变为对称信息。但政府强制金融组织进行信息披露时,应尊重其利益追求和考虑金融市场发育程度等。     

Dynamic and asymmetric impacts of macroeconomic fundamentals on an integrated stock market

A large body of evidence indicates that macroeconomic and financial variables are dynamically interrelated. In an international setup, we analyze the transmission mechanisms of macroeconomic shocks on the stock market of a small open economy in an increasingly integrated world. We use a time-varying vector error correction model (VECM) that allows analysis of asymmetric impacts that depend on the state of the business cycle. A special focus is directed on monetary policy surprises, where we find that foreign shocks exert a strong influence on an integrated stock market, and that the stage of the business cycle heavily affects the signals of the shocks.     

Asymmetric volatility in the foreign exchange markets

We examine the presence or absence of asymmetric volatility in the exchange rates of Australian dollar (AUD), Euro (EUR), British pound (GBP) and Japanese yen (JPY), all against US dollar. Our investigation is based on a variant of the heterogeneous autoregressive realized volatility model, using daily realized variance and return series from 1996 to 2004. We find that a depreciation against USD leads to significantly greater volatility than an appreciation for AUD and GBP, whereas the opposite is true for JPY. Relative to volatility on days following a positive one-standard-deviation return, volatility on days following a negative one-standard-deviation return is higher by 6.6% for AUD, 6.1% for GBP, and 21.2% for JPY. The realized volatility of EUR appears to be symmetric. These results are robust to the removal of jump component from realized volatility and the sub-samplings defined by structural-changes. The asymmetry in AUD, GBP and JPY appears to be embedded in the continuous component of realized volatility rather than the jump component.     

风险投资股份转让的博弈分析

本文讨论风险投资股份转让的两种方式的比选问题,基于信息的不对称程度,可实现的交易范围相应变小,而随着风险企业控制方的不同,不同的转让方武是最优的.     

Carrot and stick: A role for benchmark-adjusted compensation in active fund management

Investors delegating their wealth to privately informed managers face not only an intrinsic asymmetric information problem but also a potential misalignment in risk preferences. In this setting, we show that by tying fees symmetrically to the appropriate benchmark investors can tilt a fund portfolio toward their optimal risk exposure and realize nearly all the value of managers’ information. They attain these benefits despite an inherent inefficiency in the choice of the benchmark, and at no extra cost of compensating managers for exposure to relative-performance risk. Under certain conditions, benchmark-adjusted performance fees are necessary to prevent passive alternatives from dominating active management. Our results shed light on a recent debate on the appropriate fee structure of active funds in contexts of high competition from passive funds.     

Pricing, learning, and strategic behavior in a single-sale model

Summary. We analyze an infinite horizon model where a seller who owns an indivisible unit of a good for sale has incomplete information about the state of the world that determines not only the demand she faces but also her own valuation for the good. Over time, she randomly meets potential buyers who may have incentives to manipulate her learning process strategically. We show that i) the seller's incentives to post a high price and to experiment are not necessarily monotonic in the information conveyed by a buyer's rejection; and ii) as the discount factors tend to one, there are equilibria where the seller always ends up selling the good at an ex-post individually rational price. Received: January 6, 1999; revised version: July 15, 2000     

Regulating an externality-generating public utility: A multi-dimensional screening approach

In this paper, I present a monopoly screening model in which a firm holds private information on fixed abatement costs. Because of the nature of the optimal contracts, bunching is never optimal even with ‘n’ distinct types. A characterization of full and limited information solutions is offered and it is shown that the design standards alone determine the value of an information rent. The variable charge is completely free of any marginal information costs. This allows the variable charge to track marginal damages and thereby ensures that marginal social costs are covered. A fixed charge implements the optimal solution.     

非对称信息下企业信用风险形成机理及其降低策略

信用风险控制既是风险控制研究的理论难点，也是风险控制实践的难点。从非对称信息理论的角度出发。分析非对称信息下信用风险形成的机理，可以得出控制信用风险的关键在于事前阶段的结论。加强客户信用信息管理系统的建设是企业降低信用风险的关键，也是实现企业信用风险标本兼治的第一步。     

建筑市场信息不对称及治理对策研究

本文基于不对称信息理论,建立了委托代理关系下的建筑业信息模型,并具体分析了建筑业目前由于信息不对称造成的各种问题,最后对相关问题提出了几点治理对策和建议。