全球金融体系的脆弱性与发展中国家的金融安全

全球金融体系脆弱性的根源在于金融经济脱离实质经济的过度扩张。恐慌有自我正名的能力,由于市场的双重标准的存在,与发达国家相比,发展中国家抵抗恐慌自我正名机制的能力更加脆弱。在金融全球化的背景下,一个国家的经济体受到恐慌自我正名机制的攻击而爆发金融危机时,危机产生的破坏性影响会通过一定的途径扩散到其它的一些国家,使得发展中国家面临着空前的系统性风险,从而加剧了发展中国家面临的挑战。     

金融危机理论演进与发展研究

随着我国金融开放的深度和广度的不断提高,旧有风险进一步暴露,新的风险进一步产生。我国经济受全球经济波动的影响越来越大,发生金融危机的可能性也在增大。由于金融危机的最大特征就是货币的急剧贬值,关于货币危机的研究也最为成熟,目前已形成四代理论模型。而银行业危机理论和外债危机理论的研究比较分散,还没有形成像货币危机理论那样完善的体系。     

The Subprime Panic*

Understanding the ongoing credit crisis or panic requires understanding the designs of a number of interlinked securities, special purpose vehicles, and derivatives, all related to subprime mortgages. I describe the relevant securities, derivatives, and vehicles to show: (1) how the chain of interlinked securities was sensitive to house prices; (2) how asymmetric information was created via complexity; (3) how the risk was spread in an opaque way; and (4) how trade in the ABX indices (linked to subprime bonds) allowed information to be aggregated and revealed. These details are at the heart of the origin of the Panic of 2007. The events of the panic are described.     

Causes of bank suspensions in the panic of 1893

There are several competing theories explaining bank panics. Some argue that panics are driven by real shocks, asymmetric information, and concerns about insolvency. Others argue that bank runs are self-fulfilling, driven by illiquidity and the beliefs of depositors. This paper tests predictions of different theories using information uniquely available for the Panic of 1893. The results suggest that real economic shocks were important determinants of the nationwide scope of panic, however at the local level, liquidity concerns are found to be a more important trigger of bank panics.     

In the eye of the storm: Isaac Seligman and the panic of 1873

This paper focuses on the activities of the Seligman investment banking firm during an intense six-week period following the outbreak of the panic of 1873 in New York City. Because of their conservative business strategies, the partners did not experience any genuinely serious financial stress. The firm's ability to facilitate monetary transatlantic transfers helped to ease credit conditions in the New York and London financial sectors. The text also cites evidence arguing that the US economy experienced a two-year recession rather than a major depression in the 1870s.     

Understanding the denial of abuses of human rights connected to sports mega-events*

Abstract

Academics debate the positive and negative consequences of hosting sports mega-events, and although there is a general recognition that doing so cannot be a panacea for solving other social issues, who wins and who loses tends to be the same. This article considers why mega-events are not more regularly resisted given the routinization of harm to local populations that they tend to invoke. It develops ideas derived from the late sociologist and criminologist Stanley Cohen concerning the relationships between, and the politics of, denial and acknowledgement, with specific attention to the role of academics, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the media. The article illustrates the difficulties in exposing, contesting and transforming these human rights abuses, but suggests that there are grounds for optimism as new strategies for communicating human rights abuses in connection with sports mega-events are developed.     

Panic in the plains: agricultural markets and the panic of 1893

Nearly every previous study of the 1893 bank panic acknowledges its regional concentration in the Western states yet few provide any in-depth study of what caused such a distinct regional pattern. Here, I recast the 1893 crisis as having its origins in agricultural markets and then spreading to Western banks that were highly exposed to agricultural shocks. Negative shocks to agricultural yields and the relative importance of the wheat crop for specific states emerge as important explanations for the regional pattern of bank closures and thus for the panic itself.

Optimal financial crises: A note on Allen and Gale

This note provides an example of an optimal banking panic. We construct a model in which a banking panic is triggered by the banker, not the depositors. When the banker receives a pessimistic information on the return on the bank’s assets, he liquidates them prematurely in order to protect his capital. In the face of this liquidation, all depositors withdraw their funds prematurely. The premature liquidation of the bank’s assets strengthens the bank’s balance sheet. As a result, the banking panic does not cause bank failure and the government should not try to prevent the panic. Such a panic occured in 1857 in the United States. JEL Classification G21     

Public Panic and Morale: Second World War Civilian Responses Re‐examined in the Light of the Current Anti‐terrorist Campaign

Following September 11 in the US and July 7 in the UK, the threat to civilians from terrorist attack has become real yet considerable disagreement exists about how people might respond. The effect of aerial bombing on the public's morale during the Second World War and the incidence of psychiatric casualties have been explored to provide reference points for the current terrorist threat. Systematic study of restricted government investigations and intelligence reports into the effect of air‐raids on major British towns and contemporary medical publications have shown that panic was a rare phenomenon and arose in defined circumstances. Morale fluctuated according to the intensity of attacks, preparedness and popular perceptions of how successfully the war was being conducted. Resilience was in part a function of the active involvement of the public in its own defence but also reflected the inability of German bombers to deliver a concentrated attack over a wide area. Most civilians, by their very numbers, were likely to survive. Inappropriate or excessive precautionary measures may serve to weaken society's natural bonds and, in turn, create anxious and avoidant behaviour. Weapons that tap into contemporary health fears have the greatest psychological impact. Efforts by government to engage the public not only build trust but may also make an effective contribution to the campaign against terrorism.     

Paupers,burial clubs and funeral insurance: Calculating moral panics

Funeral insurance is an example of a practice that has evolved from the grass-roots burial clubs that developed from the 18th century as a response to the social anxiety wrought by the threat of a pauper's funeral. Largely accessed by the poor and working classes to avoid this social stigma, burial clubs commodified a social risk into a manageable and controllable financial arrangement. We explore this phenomenon through the lens of moral panic to trace the calculative practices that recast the social anxiety of a pauper's funeral into the novel metric of a ‘funeral benefit’.