Reviewing Oates' insights in a repeated game setting

This paper analyzes the optimal assignment of public good policies to layers of a federal system in a repeated game setting. Under a centralized regime, public goods are financed jointly across regions, and a federal legislature decides on the regional quantities. Under a decentralized regime, public goods are financed locally, and governments play a non-cooperative provision game. We find that a centralized (decentralized) regime is more likely to provide the efficient public good policies in case spillovers are small (large). Received: September 2003, Accepted: October 2004 JEL Classification: H11, H41 I wish to thank Clemens Fuest, Anke Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments on this paper. Financial support by the DFG (SPP 1142) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Regulatory Federalism and Workplace Safety: Evidence from OSHA Enforcement, 1981–1995

The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) gives states the option to enforce federal occupational safety and health standards on their own instead of relying on the federal Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA). This legislative provision provides an opportunity to analyze a homogenous set of regulatory standards enforced by heterogeneous agents engaged in interjurisdictional competition. This study finds important differences in the effectiveness of enforcement options measured by occupational mortality. State-administered OSHA programs are associated with fewer workplace fatalities than states regulated at the federal level. This finding is consistent with regulatory federalism and government-as-facilitator models of OSHA enforcement.     

Income Redistribution with Well-Informed Local Governments

This paper examines the problem of redistributing incomeacross jurisdictions and to mobile workers within jurisdictionswhen local governments have better information than the centralgovernment about local production conditions. Under the centralgovernments optimal policy, the subsidies or taxes that localgovernments provide to mobile workers normally depend on whetherthese governments are net recipients or net donors of interjurisdictionalincome transfers. Moreover, the public-input decisions of somelocal governments are distorted. The analysis demonstrates thatit may not be desirable to harmonize social policies across jurisdictions,even when the beneficiaries are quite mobile.     

The supreme struggle: ‘Obamacare’ and the new limits of federal regulation

On June 28, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected legal challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, commonly known as ‘Obamacare,’ by a vote of 5-4. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012), a majority of the justices affirmed Congress's power to expand Medicaid and impose an individual mandate requiring people to obtain health insurance or face increasing tax penalties. The Court's decision was widely condemned as a dramatic expansion of federal power that threatened state sovereignty and individual liberty. The Court was heavily criticized for betraying the principles of federalism and limited government in the U.S. Constitution. The harshest criticism was reserved for Chief Justice John Roberts, a Republican appointee who—though considered a conservative justice—authored the Court's opinion and cast the critical deciding vote to uphold the Act. In reality, far from dramatically expanding federal power, the Court's decision placed groundbreaking limits on Congress's power to regulate commerce and use federal funds to pressure states into doing its bidding. These aspects of the Court's decision received less attention in the popular media, but may actually prove to have a more significant impact on the scope of federal regulation in the future. This installment of Business Law & Ethics Corner explains how those aspects of the Court's decision place new limits on the nature and scope of federal regulation.     

转型期的政治激励、财政分权与地方官员经济行为

本文在一个框架内考虑了政治激励与财政分权,考察了转型期我国地方官员的经济行为.中央强调经济增长与财政收入增加的考核导向,使得地方财政支出过度偏向基础设施建设而公共品支出不足,同时抑制了其中的官员私人消费支出.在资本不可流动但多期情形下,地方官员通过降低税率和加大基础设施投资来积累资本.在资本可流动情形下,地方官员为了吸引资本.有额外的激励降低征税力度和加大基础设施建设投入.在资本可流动情形下,地区初始发展水平差距意味着地区吸引资本能力的差异,这可能导致地区发展差距比资本不可流动情形下更大.由于资本有更好的流动性,地方倾向干将财政压力施加到劳动所得上,从而导致初次收入分配中劳动所得份额偏低.     

Federalism,taxation, and economic growth

We present a model of endogenous growth where government provides a productive public good financed by income and capital taxes. In equilibrium, a decentralized government chooses tax policy to maximize economic growth, while a centralized government does not do so. Furthermore, these conclusions hold regardless of whether governments are beholden to a median voter or are rent-maximizing Leviathans. However, a decentralized government will under-provide public goods which benefit citizens directly, while a central government beholden to the median voter will optimally invest in such public goods.     

The structure of authority, federalism, commitment and economic growth

Summary. In a neoclassical growth model with many regions and a mobile factor, two federal arrangements are considered. In the first federal arrangement the central government chooses a uniform tax policy, whereas in the second each regional government chooses its own tax policy. The main result is that the first federal arrangement leads to high tax rates and economic stagnation, whereas the second leads to low tax rates and economic growth. This result stems from a time consistency problem. The lack of tax competition forces a time consistency problem on the central government under the first federal arrangement. In contrast, regional tax competition acts as a commitment device under the second federal arrangement. The fundamental feature in the environment that gives rise to different abilities of the state to commit is the different structure of authority within the state.Received: 10 February 2003, Revised: 2 December 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: H77, O41, E60, C73, E13.Ronald A. Edwards: This is a revision of Chapter 3 of my University of Minnesota Ph.D. I thank my advisor Edward C. Prescott for his encouragement and numerous helpful discussions. I also thank Tim Kehoe for many useful discussions as well as Beth Allen, Berthold Herrendorf, Arilton Teixeira and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. This research was assisted by an International Predissertation Fellowship from the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies with funds provided by the Ford Foundation.     

Politicians at higher levels of government are perceived as more corrupt

The relationship between decentralization and corruption has been discussed extensively, but little is known about the variation of corruption across government levels. Using an original survey where French citizens were asked to assess corruption at all levels of government, we observe that corruption perceived at a government level is higher, the higher the government level in the government hierarchy. Specifically, municipal governments are perceived as the least corrupt, followed by local governments, senators, deputies, and the national cabinet. The president of the Republic is perceived as slightly less corrupt than the national cabinet, but more corrupt than any other level of government. The relationship is robust to alternative specifications, controlling for a series of individual and regional characteristics, and to alternative definitions of the dependent variable. The finding is not reducible to geographic distance. We observe it in several other countries.     

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORM UNDER STRESS - The Ukrainian civil service experience

This article presents a heuristic continuum for the development and reform of civil service systems, drawing implications for the usefulness of western civil service reforms to the current Ukrainian situation. The authors argue that the current reform ideology common to western democracies may not be appropriate when applied to Ukraine and other nascent states.