隐性杠杆约束、流动性风险和投资者情绪

本文以2003—2019年间开放式主动管理型的股票型和偏股型基金为样本,以持仓占比为权重估算基金投组中A股的总市场风险暴露,检验结果表明,该序列上升反映了基金面临的隐性杠杆约束收紧,刻画了市场的弱流动性。内在逻辑在于,流动性收紧时,投资者难以通过融资直接增加杠杆,更倾向于重仓持有高市场风险头寸的股票而间接实现杠杆。本文发现隐性杠杆约束所刻画的风险在股票或基金收益截面上的无条件定价基本失效,而条件定价则依赖于低市场情绪与弱流动性。分解基金持股的敞口,进一步发现,因中小盘基金在流动性收紧时具有更强的流动性偏好,其持股的市场风险头寸能够更敏锐地捕捉到弱流动性风险。     

Experimental evidence on the ‘insidious’ illiquidity risk

This paper introduces an experiment aiming to investigate the contribution of illiquidity risk to the total risk of a collective investment project. If implemented, the project succeeds with a known probability. Yet the project fails if the quota of investors is not reached in the first place. Hence strategic uncertainty compounds its effect with the “intrinsic risk” of the project. Results confirm the insidious nature of illiquidity: as long as a first collective default does not occur, investors accept high intrinsic risk projects. After a first default, they become extremely prudent and come back to market only gradually. After several defaults, private agents manage to coordinate on a relatively low intrinsic risk above which they refuse to participate in the project. Macroeconomic policy implications follow.     

Marketing Period Risk in a Portfolio Context: Comment and Extension

This paper re-examines and extends the findings of Bond et al., Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 34, 447–461, (2007) who consider the theoretical model of Lin and Vandell, Real Estate Economics, 35, 291–330, (2007) to determine the extent to which individual real estate asset return characteristics caused by marketing period risk disappear in a large, diversified real estate portfolio. The effects of marketing period risk are found to disappear in the limit with growth in the size of the portfolio, with ex ante variance approaching ex post variance, but only if the portfolio consists of nonsystematic risk alone, in which case both approach zero. The marketing period risk factor (MPRF), representing the ratio of ex ante to ex post variance, however, does not in general approach zero in the limit, in fact could increase or decrease depending upon the illiquidity characteristics of the individual assets and the magnitude and degree of correlation among individual property returns and marketing periods. The results suggest that even large institutional real estate portfolio managers must consider the illiquidity present in their portfolios and cannot assume that its effect will be diversified away.

Economic policy uncertainty and illiquidity return premium

In this study, we examine the relation between the price of liquidity, or illiquidity return premium, and the economic policy uncertainty (EPU). On average, an illiquid portfolio earns a 0.597% higher monthly return than a liquid portfolio. The results further show that the EPU index has a positive relationship with the illiquidity return premium. This indicates that investors require higher compensation for holding illiquid stocks when there is a higher economic uncertainty. We also show that EPU affects the illiquidity return premium through the market illiquidity channel. The rise of EPU could increase the risk of illiquid stocks and make investors more risk-averse, thereby requiring higher compensation for illiquidity. Finally, it is found that the relationship between EPU and the illiquidity return premium is stronger when market liquidity is impaired and during crises.     

A comparison among various dimensions of illiquidity effect: A case study of Finland

We study different dimensions of the illiquidity effect on asset returns in the Finnish market. The market illiquidity is measured as unexpected rises and falls in average monthly zero returns across all stocks. We find that for the returns on the specific class of assets, a flight to the liquidity effect is the most important systematic risk among all dimensions of the illiquidity effect. In other words, higher returns for illiquid assets in good times compensate for a pronounced drop in those returns in bad times and vice versa. Furthermore, only one illiquidity-related factor has a similar pricing capacity as Fama and French's (1993) three-factor model and Carhart's (1997) four-factor model in the context of this study.     

Risk,illiquidity or marketability: What matters for the discounts on private equity placements?

Using a clean sample of private equity placements over the period of 1999 to 2012, we examine the determinants of the discounts on private placements. Classifying various determinants into three categories, namely risk, illiquidity, and marketability, we show that risk and marketability are significant determinants of the discount on private placements over the entire sample period. However, we identify a structural break in the relation between the discount on private placements with illiquidity and, to a lesser degree, marketability. Specifically, we find that liquidity is a more important determinant during the pre-2003 period, but marketability becomes a more important determinant during the post-2003 period. We attribute the structural break to substantial changes in market microstructure during our sample period. Lower transaction costs make illiquidity less of a concern for investors, whereas more active trading by investors calls for a higher discount for the lack of marketability.     

Financially constrained arbitrage in illiquid markets

This article analyzes trading strategies when arbitrageurs impact prices. Trades of financially constrained arbitrageurs are feedback functions of their capital, which depends on the amount traded. A component of arbitrage trading ensures financial flexibility. This hedging component explains why price deviations persist in spite of arbitrage. Financial constraints are responsible for volatile prices and for time variation in the correlations of prices across markets. Distortions arise when regulated firms can influence the dynamics of prices on which capital requirements are based. Under current value at risk (VaR) measures, large traders behave aggressively and have a cost advantage relative to other traders.     

Does illiquidity matter in residential properties?

No, it does not, despite the general perception that illiquidity matters in real estate. As expected, our evidence shows that the illiquidity costs for the U.S. residential properties are large. The costs are equivalent to 12% of the total property returns on average, ranging from 9.5% to 29.5% of property prices depending on the illiquidity level and market conditions. However, when amortized by holding periods, monthly illiquidity costs are on average 0.08%, and illiquidity risk does not appear to be priced in residential properties; illiquid properties do not show higher returns than liquid properties. On the contrary, we find evidence of flight-to-quality in bull markets, that is, high-quality illiquid properties are preferred to low-quality liquid properties in buoyant markets. These results are in sharp contrast with those in equities and bonds where flight-to-liquidity has been reported when markets are in stress.     

Large traders and illiquid options: Hedging vs. manipulation

In this article, we study the effects on derivative pricing arising from price impacts by large traders. When a large trader issues a derivative and (partially) hedges his risk by trading in the underlying, he influences both his hedge portfolio and the derivative's payoff. In a Black–Scholes model with a price impact on the drift, we analyze the resulting trade-off by explicitly solving the utility maximization problem of a large investor endowed with an illiquid contingent claim. We find several interesting phenomena which cannot occur in frictionless markets. First, the indifference price is a convex function of the contingent claim – and not concave as in frictionless markets – implying that for any claim the buyer's indifference price is larger than the seller's indifference price. Second, the seller's indifference prices of large positions in derivatives are smaller than the Black–Scholes replication costs. Therefore, a large trader might have an incentive to issue options if they are traded at Black–Scholes prices. Furthermore, he hedges option positions only partly if he has a negative price impact and thus exploits his ability to manipulate the option's payoff. For a positive price impact he overhedges the option position leading to an extra profit from the stock position exceeding a perfect hedge. Finally, we also study a model where the large shareholder has a price impact on both drift and volatility.