我国上市公司股权结构与现金股利政策关系研究——基于半参数模型的分析

多重委托代理关系的存在使得我国上市公司股权结构与现金股利政策之间的关系极其复杂。选取多个代理变量从不同的角度构建半参数模型,利用函数形式来刻画两者之间的非线性关系。利用我国565家上市公司的数据进行实证研究,结果表明:股权制衡度与现金分红数量之间存在倒"S"形关系,拐点分别在30%和60%左右;前十大股东持股比例与现金分红意愿及分红数量之间均存在明显的倒"U"形关系,拐点分别在60%和80%左右。     

商品供应链中修正模型研究

本文尝试利用和扩展委托代理模型来解释商品供应链,分析了供应链中各个主体的选择行为,并构建了供应链的委托代理模型,通过求解模型提出了规范商品供应链、消除逆向选择的基本思路和条件。     

Expropriation risk and technology

This paper develops a unified framework to analyze the dynamics of firm investment in countries with poor legal enforcement. The firm's technology edge over the government generates endogenous property rights. Industry variation in the technology gap predicts a sectoral pecking-order of expropriations. Long-run investment distortions may be Pareto superior relative to persistent investment at the static optimum. The dynamics of investment and transfers depend on whether incentives (backloading) or efficiency (frontloading) concerns dominate at the initial division of surplus. An increase in government efficiency may reduce its welfare. The model provides a technology-driven rationale for the widespread use of conglomerate structures in emerging market countries.     

Optimal excess-of-loss reinsurance contract with ambiguity aversion in the principal-agent model

ABSTRACT

We discuss an optimal excess-of-loss reinsurance contract in a continuous-time principal-agent framework where the surplus of the insurer (agent/he) is described by a classical Cramér-Lundberg (C-L) model. In addition to reinsurance, the insurer and the reinsurer (principal/she) are both allowed to invest their surpluses into a financial market containing one risk-free asset (e.g. a short-rate account) and one risky asset (e.g. a market index). In this paper, the insurer and the reinsurer are ambiguity averse and have specific modeling risk aversion preferences for the insurance claims (this relates to the jump term in the stochastic models) and the financial market's risk (this encompasses the models' diffusion term). The reinsurer designs a reinsurance contract that maximizes the exponential utility of her terminal wealth under a worst-case scenario which depends on the retention level of the insurer. By employing the dynamic programming approach, we derive the optimal robust reinsurance contract, and the value functions for the reinsurer and the insurer under this contract. In order to provide a more explicit reinsurance contract and to facilitate our quantitative analysis, we discuss the case when the claims follow an exponential distribution; it is then possible to show explicitly the impact of ambiguity aversion on the optimal reinsurance.     

契约理论视角下专用性投资激励研究述评

契约理论的发展,提出了物质资产专用性和投资激励的问题.专用性人力资本投资同专用性物质资产投资一样,也受到了机会主义的困扰,对该问题的研究形成了专用性人力资本投资的激励理论.契约理论主要包括完全契约理论、交易成本理论和新产权学派三大主要分支.文章分别论述了这三大分支各自的理论观点以及基于这三大分支理论基础上的专用性人力资本投资激励研究的现状并作出了简要述评.     

Takeovers and Corporate Governance: Whose Interests Do Directors Serve?

Using internal records of board meetings, this research explores issues relating to the motivation of directors' action during takeover negotiations. The records relate to a time period when regulation was low and directors had ample opportunity to engage in adverse selection and moral hazard. In such circumstances, it might be supposed that they would have sought to protect their own tenure rather than seek to maximize shareholder wealth by recommending acceptance of a bid. However, in the case study under examination the directors worked hard to maximize the bid price by auctioning the company despite having little equity exposure themselves. The directors also sought to protect the interests of the staff when negotiating with bidders. Intentionally this behaviour was not disclosed to the shareholders and, on occasion, threatened the success of the negotiations. The article concludes that the actions of the directors were motivated by strong reputational effects not widely recognized in the contemporary literature as being a force that powerfully drives corporate governance.     

Executive compensation: a calibration approach

Summary. We use a version of the Grossman and Hart principal-agent model with 10 actions and 10 states to produce quantitative predictions for executive compensation. Performance incentives derived from the model are compared with the performance incentives of 350 firms chosen from a survey by Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy. The results suggest both that the model does a reasonable job of explaining the data and that actual incentives are close to the optimal incentives predicted by theory. Received: August 12, 1997; revised version: October 27, 1997     

央地博弈视角的化解产能过剩新政解读

进入21世纪以来,我国学术与实践界有关产能过剩的讨论就没有停止过,中央政府以及有关部门也一再出台抑制产能过剩的政策文件,但旨在抑制产能过剩的政策为什么没有获得应有的效果?该文从中央与地方政府博弈的视角,以中央政府为委托人,地方政府为代理人,利用委托—代理模型,分析两者各自不同的目标和收益函数,以此解释产能过剩屡抑不止的原因,并根据激励相容理论对2013年的新政进行解读,展望新政效果。     

Implications of variant efficiency measures for policy evaluations in UK higher education

Policy goals in UK higher education encourage the publicly funded universities to become more-specialised and larger in size without compromising output quality. Efficiency gains are expected to flow from this increased specialisation in accordance with universities’ comparative research and teaching strengths. Mergers to reap further gains from economies of scale are also being actively encouraged. Given this scenario, the paper investigates whether best-practice efficiency measurement based on data envelopment analysis (DEA) provides empirical support for the current policy goals. It also assesses whether such support is dependent on the specific type of efficiency measure used in the DEA modelling. This assessment finds that a selection of (nine) commonly used, variant efficiency measures generally support the current policy goals. The paper also uses the principal-agent framework to explore the issues involved in using computed DEA-based efficiency scores for policy evaluations and possible funding guidance in UK higher education. This highlights empirically how policy-makers and universities can have very different preferences about which efficiency measure is to be used for policy evaluations and possible funding guidance.