Motives in the Acquisitions of NASDAQ Targets during the Aftermath of the 1987 Crash

After the crash of 1987, the Nasdaq composite index stayed below the precrash level for nearly two years. Takeover activity surged in this after‐crash period. We compare the motives in the acquisitions of Nasdaq targets during the after‐crash period with those in the ten‐year period before the crash. We find that the announcement period return to acquirers and the proportion of acquirers with positive gains declines in the after‐crash period. For both the periods, agency is the motive for takeovers that have negative total gains (acquirer + target), but synergy and hubris are comotives for takeovers that have positive total gains. The proportion of takeovers in which the managers of acquirers act against the interest of the shareholders increases after the crash.     

The adaptive consequences of pride in personal selling

This study examines the adaptive consequences of pride in personal selling and its self-regulation with colleagues and customers. Study 1 investigates the effects of experiencing pride, where two benefits were found. First, pride increases salespersons’ performance-related motivations. Specifically, it promotes the use of adaptive selling strategies, greater effort, and self-efficacy. Second, pride positively affects organizational citizenship behaviors. Study 2 takes an emotion-process point of view and compares excessive pride (hubris) with positive pride. The results show that salespeople are capable of self-regulating the expression of these emotions differently toward colleagues and customers via anticipated feelings of fear, shame, and regret. Salespeople, in other words, are affected by their emotions, but they also are capable of controlling them to their advantage. Willem Verbeke (verbeke@few.eur.nl) is a chaired professor of sales and account management at Erasmus University in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. His research has appeared in a number of academic journals, including theJournal of Marketing, theInternational Journal of Research in Marketing, theJournal of Management, theJournal of Organizational Behavior, and theJournal of Applied Psychology. His area of research interests includes personal selling, sales management, emotions and emotion regulation, social capital, and knowledge management. Frank Belschak (belschak@few.eur.nl) is an assistant professor of marketing and organizational behavior at Erasmus University in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. He received his Ph.D. in organizational behavior from the University of Cologne in Germany. His current research interests include emotions and emotion regulation in organizations and across cultures, as well as social capital and networks. Richard P. Bagozzi (bagozzi@rice.edu) is the J. Hugh Liedtke Professor of Management in the Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Management and a professor of psychology at Rice University in Houston, Texas. He conducts research on human emotions, the theory of action, goal setting and goal striving, and structural equation methods.     

The differential effects of CEO narcissism and hubris on corporate social responsibility

Research Summary: While prior studies have predominantly shown that CEO narcissism and hubris exhibit similar effects on various strategic decisions and outcomes, this study aims to explore the mechanisms underlying how narcissistic versus hubristic CEOs affect their firms differently. Specifically, we investigate how peer influence moderates the CEO narcissism/hubris—corporate social responsibility (CSR). With a sample of S&P 1500 firms for 2003–2010, we find that the positive relationship between CEO narcissism and CSR is strengthened (weakened) when board‐interlocked peer firms invest less (more) intensively in CSR than a CEO's own firm; the negative relationship between CEO hubris and CSR is strengthened when peer firms are engaged in less CSR than a CEO's own firm. Managerial Summary: Some CEOs are more narcissistic while others may be more hubristic, but these two groups of CEOs hold different attitudes toward the extent to which their firms should engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Our findings with a large sample of U.S. publically listed firms suggest that narcissistic CEOs care more about CSR, but hubristic CEOs care less. Interestingly, when narcissistic CEOs observe their peer firms engaging in more or less CSR than their own firms, they tend to respond in an opposite manner; in contrast, hubristic CEOs will only engage in even less CSR when their peers also do not emphasize CSR. Our findings point to a fundamental difference between CEO narcissism and hubris in terms of how they affect firms' CSR decisions based on their social comparison with peer firms.     

How CEO hubris affects corporate social (ir)responsibility

Grounded in the upper echelons perspective and stakeholder theory, this study establishes a link between CEO hubris and corporate social responsibility (CSR). We first develop the theoretical argument that CEO hubris is negatively related to a firm's socially responsible activities but positively related to its socially irresponsible activities. We then explore the boundary conditions of hubris effects and how these relationships are moderated by resource dependence mechanisms. With a longitudinal dataset of S&P 1500 index firms for the period 2001–2010, we find that the relationship between CEO hubris and CSR is weakened when the firm depends more on stakeholders for resources, such as when its internal resource endowments are diminished as indicated by firm size and slack, and when the external market becomes more uncertain and competitive. The implications of our findings for upper echelons theory and the CSR research are discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hubristic Start-up Founders – The Neglected Bright and Inevitable Dark Manifestations of Hubristic Leadership in New Venture Creation Processes

The hubris tradition of research has been criticized for limiting its scope by associating hubris predominantly with detrimental leadership behaviours. To counteract this bias, we provide a more nuanced exploration of hubris and consider both beneficial and detrimental manifestations of hubris in start-up founders’ leadership behaviours. Our analysis, based on qualitative data from expert interviews and two case studies, indicates that, whilst hubristic start-up founders are likely to fail overall, they also excel in creating and communicating visionary scenarios, steering employees through critical situations, and extracting commitment from third parties. These under-researched ‘bright’ manifestations of hubris allow start-up founders to lead their venture towards a stage, in which their visionary power and resilience become crucial prerequisites for economic progress. Our findings extend knowledge on hubristic leadership, offer new directions for the hubris tradition of research, and open up avenues for future research with a more balanced view of hubris.     

The Mabey and Johnson bribery scandal: A case of executive hubris

Convicted for paying bribes to secure contracts abroad, Mabey and Johnson (M&J), a UK construction firm, made both legal and international business history. Drawing on hubris as a lens, we examine M&J's bribery scandal in Ghana and Jamaica. Through a qualitative study of court documents, witness statements, newspaper articles, and internal company emails, we unpack the bribery scheme operated by M&J executives that enabled the firm to illegitimately win major government contracts in Ghana and Jamaica. Fueled by executive hubris, M&J's practice of bribing foreign officials to secure contracts effectively insulated M&J executives from day‐to‐day realities. Over time, the firm's executives viewed themselves as infallible, exempt from established mores, invincible, and were unremorseful for their actions. Building on these findings, we develop a hubris‐bribery heuristic framework showing how individual, organizational, and institutional contexts constitutively fueled executive hubris, driving bribery at M&J. The implication for theory and practice is examined.     

The impact of market cycle on the performance of Singapore acquirers

In this paper, we hypothesize that acquisitions undertaken during low market cycles will exhibit better performance than other acquisitions for two key reasons: lower likelihood of overpayment due to hubris and ease in implementing restructuring initiatives such as retrenchment. We define performance as the cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the acquisition event and deploy a trend‐based measure for market cycle. Based on an analysis of 115 acquisitions by Singapore firms between 1990 and 1999, we find strong support for the hypothesized relationship. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Predicting domain-specific risk-taking attitudes of mainland China university students: a hyper core self-evaluation approach

This study applied the framework of hyper core self-evaluation to examine the risk-taking attitudes, in the ethical, financial, health/safety, recreational, and social domains, of 437 university students from Harbin, China. Under the hyper core self-evaluation approach, overconfidence and hubristic pride were found to be significant predictors of risk-taking attitudes in the ethical, financial, and health/safety domains. The control variable of sensation seeking found in the Impulsive Behavior Scale was also significant in predicting risk-taking attitudes in certain domains. Different regression analysis models were run to generate these results. Limited studies have focused on Chinese university students’ risk taking attitudes in different domains, and most studies have merely applied sensation seeking and impulsivity in understanding risk-taking. However, this empirical study contributes to finding out whether a particular group of Chinese students had high levels of overconfidence and hubristic pride (as many young people do) and whether these common characteristics could contribute to the understanding of risk-taking attitudes in the five domains.     

Acquirer's return and the choice of acquisition targets: does acquisition experience matter?

We study a sample of 6503 UK acquisitions completed between 1985 and 2004 and control for previous deals similarities. Returns for frequent acquirers decrease constantly but they remain positive through high-order deals. We do not detect an improving pattern of returns but, at best, a stable one when the deal is settled for cash. Using ‘characteristics-based’ experience variables, our multivariate analysis shows that the acquirers’ returns are unaffected by prior acquisition experience. However, we find solid evidence for acquirers drawing inferences from prior experience in designing the method of payment, selecting the organizational form of the target firm and engaging in focused acquisitions, which is consistent with learning through acquisitions. The results are robust to various consistency checks.     

Conceptualizing executive hubris: the role of (hyper‐)core self‐evaluations in strategic decision‐making

Researchers have long been interested in how an executive's self‐concept affects his or her behaviors, but have lacked a theoretically grounded, validated construct for conducting systematic inquires. The concept of ‘core self‐evaluation’ (CSE), which has been recently validated in the psychology literature, concisely encompasses and consolidates the common, overlapping portions of four previously unconnected personality dimensions: self‐esteem, self‐efficacy, locus of control, and emotional stability. CSE has great potential to provide substantial leverage for research on executive self‐concept. We review and reconcile prior research on related constructs in executive settings (including narcissism, hubris, and overconfidence) and argue that CSE should be adopted as a robust, well‐validated umbrella construct for research on executive self‐concept. Indeed, a very high level of CSE, or hyper‐CSE, aligns closely with what is often colloquially called ‘hubris.’ We anticipate that hyper‐CSE executives—who possess supreme levels of self‐confidence, self‐potency, and conviction that they will prevail—will manifest this trait in their job behaviors. We develop a set of integrated propositions that describe the implications of CSE for strategic decision processes, strategic choices, and organizational performance. Finally, we propose additional avenues for research. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.