The Workout of Banking Crises: A Macroeconomic Perspective

This paper provides a macroeconomic perspective for governmentinterventions in banking crisis. Such crisis occur when a largenumber of banks fail to meet capital requirements or are insolvent.Using a macroeconomic model with financial intermediation, ouranalyis suggests that strict enforcement of capital-adequaterules suffices in prosperous periods. Capital requirements serveas an indicator for crises interventions in critical stateswhich may require interest rate intervention and restructuringof the banking industry. These policies can be reinforced byrandom bailouts and temporary financial relief, with a largepercentage of the costs being covered by current and futureowners of banks. (JEL D41, E4, G2)     

金融中介及关系银行——基于广东外资企业银行融资数据的研究

本文根据外资银行和国有商业银行向在中国境内的外资企业提供的外币贷款和人民币贷款的数据 ,对金融中介及关系银行进行了实证研究。我们的主要结论有两点 :第一 ,企业与银行建立起来的金融业务关系越长久 ,那么其所获得的外币贷款利率就越低。这是对金融中介理论的支持。另外 ,外资控股、第三方担保等因素 ,也具有降低外币贷款利率的效应。第二 ,人民币贷款的利率随着外资企业与更多的银行建立和保持合作关系而降低。人民币贷款主要是由我国商业银行提供。如果商业银行间的竞争仅仅是用来作为信贷定价的主要决定因素 ,而不是用来推进金融创新 ,提供高质量的金融产品和服务 ,那么这将会损害我国商业银行的获利能力并进而影响金融系统的健康发展。     

Liquidity, Transaction Costs, and Reintermediation in Electronic Markets

Relationships between trading cost, technology, and the nature of intermediation in the trading services industry are discussed. Electronic markets are linked to reductions in trading costs. Lower explicit costs are related to system development and operating costs. Electronic order book information is identified as a means of realizing implicit cost savings. The concept of liquidity management in electronic environments is introduced, and its potential is empirically illustrated. The empirical results suggest new roles for brokerage and exchange operations, and competition between the two. Competitive advantage with respect to the provision of liquidity management services is compared across types of intermediaries.     

Bank liquidity,stock market participation,and economic growth

We develop a growth model with banks and markets to reconcile the observed decreasing trend in the relative liquidity of many financial systems around the world with the increasing household participation in direct market trades. At low levels of economic development, the presence of fixed entry costs prevents the agents from accessing the market, and pushes them towards the banks, which provide high relative liquidity. We characterize the threshold after which the agents are rich enough to access the market, where the relative liquidity is lower, and show that the relative liquidity of the whole financial system (banks and markets) drops because of the increasing market participation. We provide some evidence consistent with this theoretical prediction: a one-unit increase in an index of securities market liberalization leads to a drop in the relative liquidity of between 17 and 27 per cent.     

Bank capital and the macroeconomy: Policy considerations

We develop a macroeconomic model in which the balance sheet condition of financial institutions plays an important role in the determination of asset prices and economic activity. The financial intermediaries in our model are required to make investment commitments before a complete resolution of idiosyncratic funding risk that can be addressed only by costly refinancing, forcing them to behave in a risk-averse manner. The model shows that the balance sheet condition of intermediaries can drive asset values away from their fundamentals, causing aggregate investment and output to respond to shocks to intermediaries. We use this model to evaluate several public policies designed to address balance sheet problems at financial institutions. With regard to short-run policies, we find that capital injections conditioned upon voluntary recapitalization can be a more effective tool than asset purchases. With regard to long-run policies, we demonstrate that higher capital requirements can have sizable short-run effects on economic activity, and that a long transition period helps avoid undesirable side effects. Finally, we show that the marginal effects of policies can be larger during “crises” because of the nonlinear interactions between some financial frictions and policy actions.     

Financial fragility,sovereign default risk and the limits to commercial bank bail-outs

We show that with intertwined weak banks and weak sovereigns, bank recapitalizations become much less effective. We construct a DSGE model with leverage constrained banks lending to firms and holding domestic government bonds. Bond prices reflect endogenously generated sovereign risk. This introduces a negative amplification cycle: after a credit crisis output losses increase more because higher interest rates trigger lower bond prices and subsequent losses at banks. This further tightens bank leverage constraints, and causes interest rates to rise further. Also bank recapitalizations are then much less effective. Recaps involve swaps of newly issued sovereign bonds for bank equity, the new debt increases sovereign debt discounts, leading to capital losses for the banks on their holdings of sovereign debt that (partially) offset the impact of the recapitalization. The favorable macroeconomic effects of bank recaps on the recovery after a financial crisis are correspondingly lower.     

Is exchange rate risk priced in microfinance?

High microcredit interest rates have often been a source of criticism against the microfinance movement. Research has focused attention on the cost structure of interest rates and more recently on the macroeconomic and macro-institutional factors. While cost structure is probably the most important determinant of interest rates, other factors can also matter. This paper uses an innovative measure of foreign exchange risk to explore its impact on microcredit interest rates. We show that microfinance institutions that operate in countries with fixed exchange rate regimes tend to charge lower interest rates than those operating in countries with floating exchange rate regimes.     

More on Middlemen: Equilibrium Entry and Efficiency in Intermediated Markets

This paper generalizes Rubinstein and Wolinsky's (1987) model of middlemen (intermediation) by incorporating production and search costs, plus more general matching and bargaining. This allows us to study many new issues, including entry, efficiency, and dynamics. In the benchmark model, equilibrium exists uniquely and involves production and intermediation for some parameters but not others. Sometimes intermediation is essential: the market operates if and only if middlemen are active. If bargaining powers are set correctly equilibrium is efficient; if not there can be too much or too little economic activity. This is novel, compared to the original Rubinstein–Wolinsky model, where equilibrium is always efficient.     

The macroeconomic relevance of bank and nonbank credit: An exploration of U.S. data

This paper exploits the Financial Accounts of the United States to derive long time series of bank and nonbank credit to different sectors, and to examine the cyclical behavior of these series in relation to (i) the long-term business cycle, (ii) recessions and recoveries, and (iii) systemic financial crises. We find that bank and nonbank credit exhibit different dynamics throughout the business cycle. We also examine the role of bank and nonbank credit in the creation of financial interconnections and illustrate a method to conduct macro-financial stability assessments.     

Phasing out the GSEs

We develop a new model of the mortgage market that emphasizes the role of the financial sector and the government. Risk tolerant savers act as intermediaries between risk averse depositors and impatient borrowers. Both borrowers and intermediaries can default. The government provides both mortgage guarantees and deposit insurance. Underpriced government mortgage guarantees lead to more and riskier mortgage originations and higher financial sector leverage. Mortgage crises occasionally turn into financial crises and government bailouts due to the fragility of the intermediaries’ balance sheets. Foreclosure crises beget fiscal uncertainty, further disrupting the optimal allocation of risk in the economy. Increasing the price of the mortgage guarantee “crowds in” the private sector, reduces financial fragility, leads to fewer but safer mortgages, lowers house prices, and raises mortgage and risk-free interest rates. Due to a more robust financial sector and less fiscal uncertainty, consumption smoothing improves and foreclosure rates fall. While borrowers are nearly indifferent to a world with or without mortgage guarantees, savers are substantially better off. While aggregate welfare increases, so does wealth inequality.